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Abstract 
Providing workers with a bonus pool based on team performance is a growing practice. Team-based 
rewards are believed to prornote collaboration and, therefore, to increase the success of a tea-m. However, 
when a bonus pool is equally shared, two workers can receive a same bonus, independent of their 
contribution to the pool or work effort compared to w-workers, Loss of motivation can result from such an 
undifferentiated bonus shaing method due to the classic .free-rider problem. This paper investigates how 
different rules for sharing the bonus - equal sharing (ES), sharing based on individual performance (IP), and 
shaBng based on relative performance (RP) - affect the level and mix of helping versus individualistic effort 
in teams. Tearn cohesion is incorporated as a mediator between rules and efforts. 
This paper develops an agency model of team performance in which each member is accountable for a 
particular task and in which helping effort increases production and improves efficiency. The mode1 shows 
the ES rule induces an efficient mix of effort but low levels of both helping and individualistic effort due to 
free-rider problems. Sharing based on iP induces an efficient level of individualistic effort but low levels of 
helping effort. Sharing based on RP results in more help than the individual performance case and higher 
individualistic effort than the equal sharing case. Prior research discourages attempts to differentiate the 
contributions of various individual team members because it can undermine coltective effort. In my model, 
however, the reduction in colIective effort is counterbalanced by the increase in total effort, causing the IF 
and RP rules to outperfom the ES nrle. 
1 incorporate a cohesion parameter in the model; the basic assumption being that cohesion increases the 
level of effort response arnong team members. The model shows that, as cohesion increases, the total 
level of effort and the team perfomance increases under al1 three sharing rules, which is consistent with the 
resources invested by firms to stimulate team spirit. The cohesion parameter increases effort levels andfor 
improves effort rnix, depending on the shanng-nrles considered Le. there is an interaction between cohesion 
and sharing-nile. In particular, Iow levels of cohesion are associated with great differences in outcornes - 
mix and level of effort as well as performance. With high levels of cohesion, however, al1 bonus-shanng 
schernes produce sirnilar (optimal) levels of effort and performance. 
Hypotheses tom the model are subsequenüy tested with a between-subjects expen'rnent in which teams of 
students are mndomly assigned to a specific bonus-sharing condition. The experiment was conducted with 
the participation of 487 undergraduate students from a large pubfic university. Each team performed a 
computerised task for which each member had a distinct knowledge and could interact with other team 
members. As predicted, the experimental results suggest that individual effort, total effort, and performance 
are greater under the RP rule than under the ES rule. However, the results suggest no differences (i) in the 
levels of effort or performance between the ES and IP rules; and (ii) in the mix of effort across al1 three 
sharing mies. OnIy under the RP mle is cohesion positively related to performance. The differences across 
rules are no€ reduced as cohesion increases as hypothesized. On the contrary, the experirnent shows that 
the RP rule outperforms bcth other rules when cohesion is high. 
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Introduction 
The popular and academic press frequenîiy notes the increasing use of teamwork in organizations. 
68% of Fortune 1000 companies reported that they used seif-managing teams and 91% reported that they 
used employee participation groups in 1993 compared to 28% and 70% respectively in 1987 (Lawler, 
Mohrman, and Ledford [199a). Providing workers with a bonus pool based on team performance is also a 
growing practice. In surveys of the Fortune 1 O00 companies in 1990, and then in 1993, team-based pay 
has increased its prevalence in organizations from 59% to 70% in three years tirne (Anfuso [1995]). 
However, only 1 to 20% of the workforce in these organizations are included in team-based incentives. 
Most reports of tearn-based incentives actually refer to the profit-sharing plans offered to high level 
managers. 
Team-based rewards are believed to promote team-oriented behaviour such as collaboration and 
communication and, therefore, to increase the success of a team (Cohen (19931, Ledford [1993], Mohrman 
[1993]). Recent field studies. however, provide littleevidence that gmup incentives are superior to individual 
incentives. Although group incentives did improve performance when combined with comprehensive 
performance measurement and team member participation (Scott and Tiessen [A 9993), tearn reward has no 
significant relationship with manager rating of team performance (Cohen et al. [1996], Campion [1993], 
Magjuka and Balwin [1991]). 
Results frorn several experiments suggest the relationship between pay scheme and group 
performance is mediated by a structural element, the task interdependence given by a fim technology. 
Task interdependence is the degree to which a task induces interaction among group rnembers (Shaw and 
Guuo [1987]). In contexts of high task interdependence, group incentives were more productive than 
individual (French et al. [1977]) and cornpetitive incentives (Miller and HarnbIin [1963], Weinsteen and 
Holzbach [1972], Scott and Chemngton [1974], French et al. [1977], Rosenbaum et al. [19801). In contexts 
of low task interdependence, competitive incentives are more productive than group incentives (Weinsteen 
and Holzbach [1972], Scott and Chemngton [f 9741). Miller and Hamblin [1963], French et al. [197q, and 
Rosenbaum et al. [1980], however, found no relationship between pay schemes and performance. 
Group incentives are impcirtant if people interact with one another in the course of their work and if 
interactions are productive. Few behavioural studies, however, atternpt to assess interaction levels and 
prcjductivity. Mitchell and SiIver [1990] find that cooperative behaviour is about twice as likely to occur when 
subjects are given group goals rather than individual goals. Ravenscroft and Haka [1996] find that 
information is shared more frequently and productivity is higher when cooperative incentives are combined 
with information sharing opportunities. Competitive incentives combined with information sharing 
opportunities do not yield productivity gains (Ravenscroft and Haka, 1996). 
Similady, economic models show that collective rewards promote information sharing and helping 
behaviour. Groves [A9721 shows that collective rewards are required to induce managers to convey private 
information about their division's production capacity. Experimental studies address this issue in contexts of 
resource allocation and transfer-pricing decisions (e.g. Greenberg, Greenberg, and Mahenthiran [1994], 
 aller and Bishop [1990& Although the models deal with division manages rather Vian workers, sharing 
information to attain colfective well-being remains an issue. In the context of teamwork, Drago and Turnbull 
[1988] show that group rewards always promote helping effort. The offered rationale being that helping 
behaviour occurs if an individual receives a share of the outcome he has indirectly contributed to. In Drago 
and Tumbull's model, individual reward can lead to an optimal mix of effort, but only if workers collude (i.e. if 
they reciprocate help). Rank-order toumaments, however, always prevent helping behaviour. In this case, 
workers could even collude to expend Iess effort without pducing their chance of winning (Drago and 
Turnbull, 1988). 
An argument highlighting a dysfunctional aspect of group reward - the free-riding problem - 
emerges from econornic models. Belcher [1987j reports that about 50% of bonus plans distribute the bonus 
pool based on individual salary; the rernainder is shared equally or distributed based on the nurnber of hours 
worked. Using the nurnber of hours worked in the sharing rule attempts to discnrninate based on individual 
- contributions to the bonus pool. However, workers rnight not control their tirne scheduie and, even if they 
do, the nurnber of hous worked can be a poor signal of an ernployee's level of effort. Similady, salaries can 
signal the overall value of an ernployee's contribution to a firm (and therefore to team outcomes) but, again, 
can be a poor signal of effort 
Such sharing-rules can provide two team members with the same bonus, independent of their 
contri bution to the bonus pool or work effort compared to CO-workers. Loss of motivation can result from 
such an undifferentated bonus sharing rnethod. Agency models show that collective rewards result in sub- 
optimal levels of effort due to free-riding problems (Holmstrom [1982]).' Free-riding problems are also found 
in experimental settings (e-g., Nalbantian and Schotter [199/1; Weldon and Mustari [1988]). 
Under certain circumstances, free-riding problerns can be reduced with monitoring (Alchian and 
Demsetz [1972]) or budget-breaking contracts (Holmstrom [1982]). Free-riding can ais8 be mitigated with 
the help of tearn mernbers. Because groups of workers have beîîer information on individual contributions 
than the employer, group incentives motivate ernployees to monitor one another (Milgrom and Roberts 
[1992]). Besides motivation, tearn mernbers need a means of motivating each other. In the Arya, 
Fellingharn, and Grover [1997] model, the two-period incentive-contract provides support for peer 
monitoring. That is, the second-period incentives are designed to allow multiple equilibria such that a 
manager can credibly punish a first period free rider with the aid of his CO-workers. In the Kandel and 
Lazear [1992] model, social pressures affect team mernbers. Members feel guilt or shame from shirking 
and cheaters are harassed and eventually excluded from the team. Social pressure provides an impIicit 
incentive in the rnodet, so that collective rewards alone can induce optimal effort levels. 
Similady, social psychology research suggests that group cohesion can provide implicit incentives 
in teamwork. In a cohesive group, members are attracted to one another and desire to remain part of the 
group (Cartwright [1968]). According to social. psychologists, interaction among tearn rnembers affects 
behaviour through mutual influence or through peer pressure. Earlier studies show that gmup cohesion 
affects these two phenomena. That is, cohesiveness is associated with communication arnong group 
members (Moran [1966], Lott and Lott [1961]), Me readiness of group memben to be influenced by others in 
the group (Berkowih [1954], Schachter [1951]), and the tendency to respond positively to the actions of 
other group mernbers (French [194l]). Cohesiveness exerts a strong influence upon mernbers to behave in 
accordance with group expectations (Wyer [1966], Lott and Lott [1961]). 
This thesis buiids on the behavioural and economic studies above to investigate the effect of bonus 
sharing and cohesion on team behaviour and performance. Following Drago and Tumbull[1988,1991], 1 
developed a team mode1 in which each rnernber is accountable for a particular task and in which helping 
behaviour increases production and improves efficiency. The mode1 is extended to include a tearn cohesion 
parameter; the basic assumption being that cohesion increases the level of response among team 
members. Hypotheses from the rnodel are tested with a between-subjects experiment in which tearns of 
students are randomly assigned to a specific bonus-shanng condition. Each team perfoms a computerised 
task for which each member has distinct knowledge and where team members can help each other. A 
questionnaire is used to assess team cohesion, along with a computer program that records measures of 
effort and performance during the experirnent. 
The notion of task interdependence (discussed in behavioural studies above) is central in this 
mode1 because synergy is created through rnernbers' interactions. 1 consider a technology in which 
members can provide two types of etfort: individual effort that increases their own output and helping effort 
that increases their CO-workers' outputs. As in the Ravenscroft and Haka [1996] and Mitchell and Silver 
[199O] experiments, 1 rneasure and analyse interaction level or assistance among members. However, 
progress on individual work is also assessed so that a mix of helping and individual effort and total effort can 
be investigated. This allows investigating the dual effect of group incentives, that is the promotion of helpful 
l The rationale is that when team production is equally (arbitrarily) shared among rnernbers, each rnernber receives 
interactions and mitigating the free-riding problem. The productivity of both effort types is rnodeled. included 
in my experirnental task, and measured during experimental  session^.^ 
I compare the case where the bonus pool is equally shared with those where the bonus pool is 
shared based on individual performance and relative perfomance.3 Under the individual and the relative 
performance rules, team members are differentiated by their individual performance; however, individual 
performance uses an absolute measure of individual performance while relative performance uses a relative 
measure of performance. In particular, the relative performance rule distributes the bonus pool based on a 
rank-order of the team members' individual performance! This is not a typical rank-order tournament as in 
Lazear [1989], Drago and Turnbull[1991], or Ravenscrofi and Haka [1996], in which members compete for 
pre-determined payoffs. 1 consider a tournament in which members cornpete for pre-determined shares of 
the team payoff. 
My model produces the following hypotheses. An equally shared bonus pool induces an efficient 
mix of effort but low levels of both helping and individualistic effort due to free-rider problems. Sharing 
based on individual performance induces an efficient level of individualistic effort but low levels of helping 
effort. Sharing based on relative performance results in more help than the individual performance case, 
and in higher individualistic effort than the equal sharing case did. Atternpts to differentiate the contributions 
of various team members have been discouraged in the Iiterature because it can undermine collective effort 
(e.g., Hackman [1990]; Shea and Guuo [1987). In rny model, however, the reduction in collective effort is 
counterbalanced by the increase in total effort. The introduction of a cohesion parameter to the model 
shows cohesion increases effort levels andlor improves effort mix, depending on the sharing-rules 
only a share of his contribution to the pool and, therefore, supplies sub-optimal level of effort. 
The use of a particular production function in my model allows me to specify the productivity of both effort types that 
are directiy implemented in my experiment. 
Equally shared bonus pool is used as a benchmark because it constitutes the status quo in ternis of both what is 
observed in practice (Belcher [1987]) and what is commonly praised in the business press and academic literature. 
Basically, the three bonus sharing rules - equal sharing, sharing based on individua1 performance, and sharing based 
on relative performance - considered in my thesis correspond, respectively, to a group, individual, and cornpetitive 
considered. That is, there is an interaction between cohesion and sharing-rule. In particular, the model 
shows low levefs of cohesion are associated with great differences in outcomes - mix and IeveI of e f f o ~  as 
well as performance. With high levels of cohesion, however, all bonus-sharing schernes produce sirnilar 
(optimal) levels of effort and performance. These findïngs are consistent with the resources invested by 
fims to stimulate team spirit. 
This thesis contributes to the experimental incentive-contracting literature in management 
accounting which studies and experimentally tests the ability of different pay schemes to alleviate the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problerns. While rnost of this literature focuses on single-agent settings 
(e.g. Chow et al., 1991 ; Diilard and Fisher, 1990), the papers focussing on multipleagent settings are 
typically concemed with inducing managers to convey private information (e.g. Greenberg, Greenberg, and 
Mahenthiran [1994]; Chalos and Haka [1990]). This thesis differs in that it considers a cohort of workers 
rather than division managers and focuses on moral-hazard problems rather than on adverse selection 
problerns. Frederickson il9921 considers the moral-hazard problern in a triad of workers, but in a 
technology where workers are independent of each other. In contrast, 1 study a technology where helping 
effort has a positive effect on the team performance. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the Iiterature on incentives 
in teams. Chapter 2 presents a mathematical econornic model on tearns. The mode[ is used to develop 
hypotheses to be tested in the experiment. Chapter 3 describes the experimental design and the regression 
model. Chapter 4 reports the regression results. FinalIy, the modelled and experirnentai results are 
discussed in the conclusion. 
incentive types. These are the three types of incentive cornmonly discussed in both emnomic and behavioural 
Iiteratures. 
Chapter 1 - Literature review 
As indicated in the introduction, team incentives are the focus of this thesis. Team incentives are 
directly related to the experimental incentive-contracting literature in management accounting and to the two 
related bodies of research on teams: one emerging from economics and the other from the social 
psychology Pterature. This thesis builds upon these bodies of literature as follows. 
The thesis studies and experirnentally tests moral-hazard problems in teams, contributing to the 
experimental incentiveçontracting literature in management accounting. Foilowing Drago and Tumbull 
[1988; 1991], the thesis develops a mathematical economic model on teams in which help increases 
production and impmves efficiency. ~ a s e d  on social psychology (e-g. Shaw [1981j; Deutsch [1968]). a 
cohesion parameter is incorporated in the model. Since a model's conclusions are essentially driven by its 
behavioural assumptions, using econornic and social insights broadens the scope of the resulting 
hypotheses. The bonus-sharing rules investigated are typically considered in both econornic, and 
behavioural studies and the modelled results find theoretical and empirical support in both bodies of 
literature (e-g., Nalbantian and SchoUer [1997]; Ravenscroft and Haka [1996]). Combining knowiedge from 
economic and behavioural research allows me to enrich my comprehension of the subject due to the 
different methodologies and focus used by both disciplines, as discussed below. 
This literature review is organised as follows. Section 1.1 provides a brief review of the 
experimental incentive-contracting Iiterature in management accounting. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 review, 
respectively, behavioural and economic studies on incentives in teams. Section 1.4 draws evidence from 
behavioural and economic studies, highlights gaps in the literature, and discusses the contribution of this 
thesis. 
1.1 The experimental incentive-contracting literature in management 
accounting 
The expeirnental incentive-contracting Merature in management accounting focuses on two types 
of information problems. The first is the moral-hazard problem arising when the agents' actions are 
unobservable (e.g. unobservable effort)? The second is the adverse selection problem aising when the . 
agents possess hidden information (e.g. their skill level or the division's production ~apacity).~ The papers 
in this literature study experimentally test the ability of different pay schemes to alleviate the moral hazard 
andlor adverse selection problems. 
The literature focusing on adverse selection problems is concemed with inducing agents to convey 
their pnvate information. The papers that consider single-agent settings focus on "seif-selection", Le. 
offering a menu of contracts such that the agent's selection reveals his information (e.g. Chow [1983], 
Waller and Chow [1985], Shields et al. [1989], Dillard and Fisher 11 9901, Shields and Waller [1988]) or on 
the participatory budget-setting process, in which the agent reveals his information by helping set his 
performance standard (e.g. Young [1985], Waller [1988], Chow et al. [1988], Chow et al. [1991a][l991 b]).: 
The papers focusing on multiple-agent settings typically consider the divisional versus fim wide 
performance measurement. In Chalos and Haka [1990] and Greenberg, Greenberg, and Mahenthiran 
(1 9941, buying and selling division managers negotiate transfer-@ces while possessing private information. 
fn Waller and Bishop [1990], a central manager allocates resources between two divisions based on its 
production capacity as reported by the division managers. All three papers studied whether alternative pay- 
Moral hazard refers to the case where agents do not supply an optimal level of effort because of personal cost of 
effort and the difficulty in monitoring effort by managers. 
Adverse selection refers to the case where resources are sub-optimally allocated due to lack of information. 
These papers look at whether the subordinate creates budgetary slack either by building excess resources in the 
budget or knowingly underestimating their production capacities, They typically compare trulli-inducing with more 
traditional pay schemes. 
schemes (division incentive versus firm incentive schemes) affect ihe profit of the firm as a whole! The 
theoretical argument being that division incentives motivate managers to maximise the performance of their 
division (irnplying the possibility of hidden information) at the expense of each other or the fim as a whole. 
On the other hand, firm incentives motivate managers to reveal private information in order to maximise the 
firm's benefit, which aligns the interests of both managers and owners. Expen'mental results were m i ~ e d . ~  
The second part of the literature focuses on the moral-hazard problem and is concerned with 
inducing agents to supply the optimal level of effort. Some papers consider single-agent settings and look at 
whether altemative pay schemes affect an agent's performance, whiie attempting to control for his skiII 
Ievels ana risk-preference (e-g., Chow [1983]; DiIIard and Fisher [1990]). Frederickson 119921 considers a 
multiple-agent setting. In his paper, production is organized into three separate shifts and agents decide on 
the amount of units to produce during their own shifi (taking into account their personal cost of effort). 
Workers are paid based on their individual performance (piece-rate scherne) o r  on their relative performance 
Le. when compared to the workers in the two other shifis. Frederickson [1992] studies whether pay scheme 
and comrnon uncertainty affect agents' level of effort. 
Consistent with econornic theory, his results suggest that the agent's level of effort is higher under 
the cornpetitive scheme than under the individual scheme. In addition, increasing the degree of common 
uncertainty does not affect the agent's levei of effort under the individual scheme but increased it under a 
competitive scheme. The latter resuIt is not consistent with economic theory but provides evidence for 
social influence theory - behavioral research. Note that Frederickson [1992] considers a technology where 
a More precisely, Chatos and Haka [1990] consider division incentive and mixeddivision and firm-incentive schernes. 
Greenberg, Greenberg, and Mahenthiran [1994] consider division incentive versus firm incentive schemes. Waller and 
Bishop [1990] consider division profit, division profit-plus-penalty when unfavourable profit variance occurs, and Groves 
scherne Le. own division actual profit plus others' division budgeted profit. 
9 In Chalos and Haka [1990], division-incentive induces higher firm profit ihan rnixed-incentive did whereas in 
Greenberg, Greenberg, and Mahenthiran [1994], firm-incentive induces higher firm profit in cases of both high and Iow 
interdependence betiveen the trading divisions. In Waller and Bishop (1 9901, misrepresen tation of private information 
workers are independent of each other and uses anonymity to controf for social pressures and peer 
influences. 
In conclusion, despite the growing use of teamwork and team-related pay in organizations, most of 
the experimental incentive-contracting literature in management accounting focuses on single-agent 
settings. Young and Lewis [1995] highlight the need for more studies on teams: "A relevant aspect for 
incentive-contracting research relates to how new business practices are affecting the design of 
compensation schernes. . . . Consistent with the movement to teams, gainsharing incentive mechanisms 
represent a largely unexpiored area of research" (74). Building upon evidence from both behavioural and 
economic research on incentives in teams, this thesis investigates moral-hazard problerns in a technology 
where mutual help is productive. The contribution from the behavioural research is reviewed next. 
1.2 Contributions from behavioral research 
This section is organized as follows. Sub-sections 1.2.1, 1.2.2, and 1.2.3 review studies that 
investigate the relationship between pay scheme and group performance. In particular, sub-section 1.2.2 
introduces the notion of task interdependence and presents studies using this notion to mediate the 
relationship between pay and performance. In sub-section 1.2.3, studies stress the effect of incentives on 
individual versus collective action in group production. Finally, sub-section 1.2.4 reviews the literature on 
group cohesion and discusses how it relates to incentives in teams . 
1.2.1 Relationship between pay scheme and group performance 
Recent field studies investigating the relationship between group incentives and team performance 
show mixed results. In particular, team rewards have no significant relationship with manqer ratings of 
performance (Campion et al. [1993]; Cohen et al. [1996]; Magjuka and Baldwin [1991]) or team ratings of 
performance (Campion et al. (19931; Magjuka and Baldwin [1991]), Cohen et al. [1996] did find however, 
and resource consurnption rather than investment of resources were both higher under the Groves scheme Vian under 
that management recognition (including perfomance-contingent rewards) is positively associated with team 
ratings of performance. Shea and Guno [1987] studied the effect of implementing team bonuses (using 
pre-and post- intervention measures) and found that team rewards increase customer service, but not sales. 
Finally, Scott and Tiessen [A9991 found that team performance substantially improves when comprehensive 
performance measurement is cornbined with the participation of team rnembers and a larger weight on team 
performance in compensation schemes. One explanation for these mixed results is differences in 
technology, as discussed in the following sub-section. 
1.2.2 Task interdependence given by a firm technology 
Researchers argue that the relationship Setween pay scheme and group performance is 
rnoderated by a structural elernent, the task interdependence given by a firm technology (e-g., Shaw and 
Guao [1987]). Task interdependence can be defined as the degree to which a task induces interaction 
among the members of a group (Shaw and Guzzo 119871). Thompson Cl9671 identifies three categories of 
structural interdependence: pooled, sequential, and reciprocal. In a pooted technology, group members 
- work in parallel, having Iitüe or no contact with one another. In a sequential technology, each member 
completes part of a task and passes it aiong to another mernber. In a reciprocal technology, members 
interact frequentiy in order to do their work. The degree of interaction required among group members 
depends on how production is organised. 
Deutsch [1949] provides strong support for group reward and highlights the inefficient aspects of 
cornpetition. That is, group rewards are posited to promote rnutual assistance, information shaing, and the 
development of positive feelings among the members of a group. l0 On the contrary, competition is believed 
the division profit-plus-penalty scherne. 
1 O Deutsch's [1949] theory of caoperation and cornpetition provides the underlying hypotheses for most behavioural . 
research on rewards in teams. In short, Deutsch states that group rewards (cooperation) result on "promotive" 
interdependence, Le. an individual's effective action promotes his CO-workers' success. On the other hand, competition 
results on 'contrien? interdependence. i.e. an individual's effective action obstnicts his CO-workers. Deutsch argues 
that group rewards rnotivate more skilled individuals to help and guide less skilled fellow members, whereas 
to obstruct such behavior and to stimulate jealousy, suspicion, and even sabotage- Researchers 
recornmend incorporating task interdependence in Deutsch theory because the beneffis of group rewards 
only occur if people interact with one another in the course of their work and if intemctions are productive. 
In the case where people work in parailel, for example, there is no need for mutual assistance or information 
sharîng. Here, competitive rewards could be even more productive if workers are rnotivated by iarger pay. 
Therefore, it is genemlly hypothesized that group and competitive rewards would be more productive, 
respecti\rely, in a context of high task interdependence and in a context of low task interdependence. 
Results of experimental studies are fairly consistent with each other and with theory. Miller and 
Hainblin [1963] find an inverse relation between group productivity and differential rewarding in a context of 
high task interdependence, but there is no relationship between reward and performance in a context of low 
task interdependence." The authors conclude that competition provides small incentives at best. However, 
Weinsteen and Holzbach LI9721 and Scott and Cherrington f19741 find that group performance is greater 
under competitive incentives than under group incentives in contexts of low task interdependence. French 
et al. LI9771 find that subjects increase their perfomance through group-individual-cornpetitive incentives in 
the context of high task interdependence? However, Rosenbaum et a1.[1980], in a replication of French et 
cornpetition discourages it Cooperation stimulates the development of positive feelings among people, e-g. fnendship 
and tnist, whereas cornpetition induces jeatousy and suspicion. Cooperation induces rnutual influence, Le. encourages 
or pressures people to supply effective actions, whereas competition prohibits such behavior. Finally, individuai 
rewards imply no interdependence. Therefore, individual rewards do not generate suspicion or sabotage, but nor do 
they induce the positive effects of cooperation i.e. mutual help and assistance. 
l1 Miller and Harnblin [1963] considered group, intermediate, and extreme competitive schemes. Under group 
incentives, members share the group reward equally. Under externe competition, the most successful rnember 
receives two thirds of the group reward, the next rnost successful member receives one third, and the least successfuI 
rnember receives nothing. Under intermediate competition, the most successful member receives half of the reward, 
the next most successful member receives one third, and the least successful member receives one sixth. 
" French et al. ( 1 9 7  abo investigated group, individual. and (extrerne) competitive incentives in contexts of high and 
Iow task interdependence. Rewards are distributed equaily (group incentive), in relation to the contribution (individual 
incentive), or only to the most productive group member who is rewarded according to his own contribution (extreme 
cornpetitive incentive). 
al. [19TI], fi nd that group and individual incentives are associated with greater productivity than cornpetitive 
incentives. but group and individual incentives do not differ from each other. There is no relationship 
between reward and performance in the context of low task interdependence. This result is compelling 
given that an extreme competitive incentive is provided i.e. only the best menber gets rewarded. 
Rosenbaum et al. [1980] extended French et al. [1977l to include work process variables. In the 
context cf high task interdependence, three subjects worked together to build a single tower and in the 
context of low task interdependence, each subject builds his 1 her own tower. Each subject receives blocks 
of a specific colour allowing the assessment of individual contributions. Performance is measured by the 
nurnber of blocks in a tower standing at the end of the exercise. Rosenbaum et al. [1980] assess process 
variables such as total blocks handled, efficiency of work, falls, tum taking, and differential input by 
individual group rnember. Their results indicate that in the context of low task interdependence, the number 
of btocks handled increased through the group-individual-cornpetitive incentives. Efficiency (the number of 
blocks in a tower divided by the total number of blocks handled) was significantly higher'under group and 
individual incentives than under competition. FaIIing towers were significantly more frequent under 
individual and competitive incentives. These results can suggest a negative effect of competition on the 
quality of work; altematively, they can underiine the use of an expenmental task for which rapidity (potential 
proxy for motivation to succeed) is counter-productive due to the risk of fails. 
A central element in these studies is the consideration of two "puren foms of technology. That is, a 
technology where each subject works alone on an individual task and a technology where subjects work 
together on a common task. Results strongly suggest group rewards to be more productive with collective 
production and competitive rewards appear weakly superior with individual work. However, few insights are 
provided on the best reward for a more "hybridn technology i.e. a technology requiring both collective and 
individual action. 
In a field study, Wagernan [1995] intervened in the reward system at a large U.S. corporation, 
creating group, individual, and hybnd (a mixture of group and individual) rewards for 150 existing teams of 
technicians with group, individual, and hybrid tasks. Results suggest that the highes: perfonning groups are 
those whose rewards and tasks has either pure group or pure individual designs. Groups with hybnd 
designs (where tasks and 1 or rewards have both individual and group elements) perfomed paorly, and had 
low quality interaction along with low member satisfaction. Wageman [1995] was unable to identify a 
superior scheme with hybnd designs, nor could she find a theoretical argument from the Iiterature to explain 
her results. Overall, Wageman [1995] deplored the Iittle attention given to hybnd technology in the Iiterature, 
despite the prevalence of jobs requirhg both coliective and individual action (151). In the following sub- 
section, 1 revizw studies that distinguish between collective and individual behaviour in workgroups and look 
at how these behaviours are affected by alternative incentives. 
1.2.3 lncentive effect on collective versus individual behaviour 
Mitchell and Silver [1990] investigate collective and individualistic behaviour in workgroups. 
Using the same task as French et al. [1977] and Rosenbaum et al. [1980] (in a context of high task 
interdependence), Mitchell and Silver differentiate between cooperative behaviour such as taking turns or 
balancing the tower from competitive behaviour such as trying to go first or putting blocks on quickly without 
regard for the others.I3 Results suggest that cooperative behaviour is about twice as likely to occur when 
subjects are given group, mixed (group and individual), or no goals than when they are given individual 
goals. Moreover, the number of falls is significantly higher when subjects are given individual goals than in 
the other three conditions, whereas turn taking is significantiy lower. 
Ravenscroft and Haka [1996] studied whether (group and competitive) incentives and information 
sharing opportunities affect task-related information shan'ng and tearn productivity. In their experirnent, 
subjects are assigned to three-person teams in which each rnember must complete a series of progressive 
'3 Mitchell and Silver [1990] investigate whether alternative goal setting conditions (individual goal, group goal, mixed - 
individual and group, and no specific goal anditions affect task strategies (cooperative and competitive strategies) and 
group performance. 
In the cooperative condition, subjects are rewarded based on the performance of their tearn. 
whereas in the cornpeüüve condition, tearn members are rewarded based on their relative performance (a 
rank-order tournament). Specifically, members receive predetermined payoffs based on their rank-ordering 
performance within the team. Finally, a group of subjects are allovred to exchange information (answers or 
explanations) with the other team members, while a second group of subjects worked in iso lat i~n.~~ Results 
suggest that information is shared more frequentfy and productivity is higher when cooperative incentives 
are combined with opportunity to share information. Cornpetitive incentives combined with information 
shanng opportunities did not yield productivity gains. 
The results above suggest that group reward is positively related to cooperation and to group 
productivity. Such results depend on the use of experimental tasks for which cooperation is productive. In 
Young et al. [1993], four-peson teams were organised into production Iines to build Lego-castles and ail 
subjects are rewarded based on team performance. In the cooperative condition, subjects are allowed to 
move along the production Iine to help other members of their team, whereas in the non-cooperative 
condition team members worked in isolation. Contrary to expectations, subjects in the non-cooperative 
condition outperformed subjects in the cooperative one. According to Young et al [1993], subjects spent 
time waiking from their work stations to help and encourage each other instead of focusing on their task. 
Their resuits can be due to the nature of the experimental task, that is, a Lego-like construction task for 
which all the subjects are well-trained (Ravenscmft and Haka [1996] 125). Advantages to interacting are 
possible only if members can share sorne resource - knowledge or expertise (Libby and Luft Cl9931 439). 
'4 A progressive matrix task presents a visual sequence of abstact shapes or symbols that the subject is required to 
complete by making one of several choices. 
'5 Progressive matrices are chosen because they can benefit from infornation sharing, yet can be completed 
individually. Actually, pilot-testing shows that fairly bnef explanations could significantiy improve performance. 
1.2.4 The effect of cohesiveness 
A cohesive group is one in which memben are attracted to one another and want to remain part of 
the group (Cartwright [1968]). This definition captures the basic understanding of cohesion in the literature. 
However, many definitions can be found (Murdack [1989] provides a chronological review). The first set of 
definitions appeared in the 1 95Os, as group cohesiveness became a popular theme in the social psychology 
literature. After being almost forgotten in the mid-1960s, the theme of group cohesiveness reappeared in 
contemporary literature. However, contemporary studies describe cohesiveness in different ways, often 
focusing on specific dimensions of the concept Muller and Cooper [1994] identify three dimensions of 
cohesiveness in the literature: interpersonal attraction, cornmitment to the task, and group pride. 
The social psychology literature shows that cohesiveness can significantly affect group 
performance. Three recent meta-analyses of the relationship between cohesiveness and group 
performance (Evans and Dion [1991], Muller and Cooper [1994], and Gully et al. [1995]) find a significant 
and positive relationship between the two concepts. Moreover, recent field studies (not included in the 
meta-analyses) suggest consistent results. Cohesiveness is found to be a positive predictor of hospital 
treatrnent team performance (Vinokur-Kaplan [1995]), customer service behaviour in retail sales groups 
(George and Bettenhausen [1990]), and departmental eficiency (Seers et al. [1995]). Moreover, MuIlen and 
Cooper [1994] and Karayaman and Nath [1984] find that task requirement moderates the relationship 
between group cohesion and performance. Cohesive groups are particulariy productive when the task 
involves a high degree of interaction, communication, and mutual monitoring. This literature suggests that 
group cohesion can be particularly important with technologies where assistance is efficient. 
Social psychologists clearly distinguish between a group and a set of individuals. According to 
Shaw [1981], "there must be a minimum degree of cohesiveness if the group is to continue functioning as a 
group. To the extent that this minimum requirement is exceeded, one could expect that the degree of 
cohesiveness will be related to the other aspect of group processes" (p.216). Functioning as a group 
implies that workerç affect each other's behaviour. This effect can culminate through mutual influence or 
through peerpressure - two phenornena affected by group cohesion in eartier studies. 
Members of high-cohesive groups have a higher level of communication than members of low- 
cohesive groups, despite similar opportunities to interact (Back 11 951 j, French [1941 j, Lott and Lott [1961], 
Moran [1966]). Members of high-cohesive groups are more infl uenced by other group members (Berkowitz 
[1954]; Schachter et al. [1951]), change their opinions in the direction of their partnets opinions (Back 
M l ) ,  and conforrn to the judgement of the majority more often than do members of low-cohesive groups 
(Bovard 1951, Lott and Lott 1961, Wyer 1966). Deutsch [1968] notes that cohesiveness is associated with 
communication among group members, the readiness of group members to be influenced by others in the 
group, and the tendency to respond positively to the actions of other group members. 
Convergent behaviours could also result from peer pressure. Tearn members know more about 
the individual contributions of their cohort than the employer does. Group incentives than motivate the 
employees to monitor one another and to encourage effort provision or other appropriate behaviour 
(Milgrom and Roberts [199Z] p.416). French [194l j suggests that cohesiveness exerts strong influences 
upon mernbers to behave in accordance with group expectations. French notes that members of cohesive 
groups are motivated to respond positively to others in the group, and their behaviour should reflect this 
motivation. 
In conclusion, the behavioural studies reviewed highfight the importance of "task interdependence" 
in studying compensation schemes. While cornpetitive rewards are more productive with individual 
production (e.g., Scott and Chenington [1974]), group rewards are more productive with collective 
production (e-g., Rosenbaurn et al. [1980]), which might be due to the fact that group rewards promote 
cooperative behaviour (e.g., Ravenscroft and Haka [1996]). In addition, workers who interact may develop 
some IeveI of cohesion, which should provide additional incentives in production. 
The next section reviews studies on incentives in teams from econornics. In these studies, the 
team technology is fomally defined (Le. using a mathematical function) and the effects of incentive schemes 
systematicaly deriveci from a series of modelled assumptions, as discussed below. 
1.3 Contributions from economics 
This section is organised as follows. Sub-section 1.3.1 describes the specifications used in 
economic models ta fefi ect team technology. Sub-section 1.3.2 reviews studies addressing free-riding 
issues in teams. Sub-section 1.3.3 reviews studies îhat highlight the trade-off between individual and 
collective action and dernonstrate how incentive schemes affect this trade-off. 
d.3.1 Team technology specification 
In economic models, the characteristics of a technology are captured by the production fun~tion.'~ 
Various kinctions can be used to reflect tearn production. Broadly, team technology can refer to any set of 
individuais contributing to a common output (e-g., people working for the same firrn). Sorne studies on 
teams focus on firms with Iwo divisions or business unit managers and are usually concerned with resource 
allocation or transfer pncing decisions when managers have private knowledge about their own divisions 
(e.g., Greenberg, Greenberg , and Mahenthiran [1994]; Chalos and Haka [199O]; Waller and Bishop 
[1990]).17 Other studies focus on cohorts of workers. Below is a review of the team technology 
specifications developed in such st~dies.;~ 
Holmstrom [1982] proposes the following general specification for a tearn technology. Consider a 
team composed of n rnembers (indexed i = 1 ,.JI) and define Q as the team production, ei as the effort 
'6 The production function specifies the productivity of f im factors of production such as labour Le. effort, machines, 
rnaterials, etc. 
'7 The division managers are usually concerned with making a decision (investrnent decision or decision conceming 
the technology) andlor communicating private knowledge to either the principal or the other division manager. The 
models focus on the incentive for the managers to make optimal decisions and to truthfully communicate knowledge. 
la Of course, some intuitive parallels couid exist between both types of models, especially when there are 
interdependencies among Vie two divisions investigated (e.g., Anctil [19951; Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith [1995]). 
provided by mernber i, and e as the Ndimensional vector of mernbers' effort, A team technology is defined 
as Q = f(e) which is non-separable in ei. Technological interdependence is implicit in Holmstrom's definition 
since rnernbers' efforts are non-separable. However, the nature of such interdependence is not specified in 
the function. 
Fisher [1994] proposes specifications for Thompson [1967] group structural categories. In a pooled 
technology, each member (individualiy) contributes to the group performance given his or her ski11 level. 
Fisher modelled this technology using an additive function Q = Caiei where ai captures member i 's skills 
level. In a sequential technology, group performance is constrained by the less skilied member. In a 
maximum technology, however, it is the more skilled member who drives group performance. Io The 
sequential technology is captured by a conjunctive production function Q = min [aieil where min is the 
minimum element of the function, and the maximum technology is captured by a disjunctive function Q = 
rnax [aiei] where max is the maximum element of the function. 
Assuming various ski11 levels, Fisher [1994] identifies key members in tearn productivity for each 
specifications. 20 Fisher does not specify a particular production function for reciprocal technology (which is 
the technology investigated in this thesis), mentioning that a function of any forrn - additive, disjunctive, 
conjunctive, Cobb-Douglass, etc. - could be used. Given that members working with reciprocal 
technologies interact frequently in the course of their work, the technology specification should reflect the 
nature and productivity of these interactions. 
In Tjosvoid [1990], employees described recent interactions with CO-workers and identify specific 
resources of the other person they valued the most. Results indicate that the information-knowledge, effort- 
assistance, emotional support, authority, funding, and evaluation accounted for the vast rnajority of valued 
resources. Information sharing and help are ihe most cited reasons for interaction. From an econornic 
'9 Fisher LI9941 adds a 'maximum technoiogy* to Thompson[1967] original structural category. High petformers are 
the determinant members in maximum technologies (e-g., a research team). 
20 Based on economics rationale, Fisher [A9941 argues that individual incentives motivate ail agents given their skills 
levels, and that group incentives motivate high skilled agents to monitor low skilled agents to work harder. 
perspective, the main difference between sharing information and helping a CO-worker is that helping is 
cosffy in ierms of effort (cost from which results the free-riding problem discussed in sub-section 1.3.2). 
Models including both individuai and helping efforts were developed in the tournament Iiterature (a 
branch of game theory). In these models (e-g., Drago and Tumbull[1988; 1991]), each rnember has a 
production function qi = f(ei, hi) V j # i, where ei is worker i's individual effort and hi is the help from bis CO- 
workers, and team performance is the sum of al1 q;. This specification makes explicit the interactions among 
members through helping effort- It ako allows for testing the effect of pay schemes on bath individual and 
collective actions, which is the focus of sub-section 1.3.3. Thus, before presenting this research, the next 
section describes the free-riding problem. 
1.3.2 Free riding problem and social influences 
Alchian and Demsetz's [1972] seminal paper on teamwork describes the free-riding problem 
implicit to team production. Alchian and Dernsetz [1972] define a tearn as a group of people working in a 
CO-operative way and illustrate this definition with the exarnple of two people jointly lifting heavy cargo into 
trucks (779). According to the authors, a team has two dominant characteristics: (i) it has a production 
function that dominates (ai least at one point) the surn of the separate production functions of its members, 
and (ii) individual contributions cannot be identified. 21 T'ne first characteristic provides a reason for 
teamwork, i-e. the creation of synergies among the rnernbers of the team. The second characteristic creates 
the setting for the free-rider problem." 
21 There are two main definitions of a team used in &fie economic literature: one is from Marschak [1955] and the oher 
from Alchian and Demsetz [1972]. in Marschak's model, each manager makes local decisions using observed 
information as well as information communicated by the other team rnembers. Team theory assumes that people 
unilaterâlly behave in the best interest of the team, and the team is concemed with the information structure that 
facilitates optimal decisions. Although more recent studies extended team theory to consider incentives issues, the 
focus usually remains on decision making and information sharing (e.g. Groves f19731). 
22 In a teamwork setting, the free-rider problem refers to situations where workers provide sub-optimal levels of effort at 
the expense of their CO-workers. 
Holmstmm [1982] formally demonstrates the free-riding problem implicit in teamwork, Le. there is 
no way to share the team production Q among the members that induces optimal effort 6. When tearn 
production is equally (arbitrarily) shared among members, each meinber receives only a share of his 
contribution. Optimal effort levels are provided when members receive their marginal contribution- Agency 
problems occur because marginal contribution cannot be identified. Note that the Coumot assumption (Le. 
the assumption that team members do not react to each other's effort) is necessary to demonstrate the free- 
riding problem. 
Several ways to reduce the free-riding problem in team production are proposed in the literature. 
Alchian and Dernsetz [1972] propose a monitoring solution in which the principal supervises the workers. 
Holmstrorn (19821 propose an incentive-pay solution. In particular, Holmstrom shows that under certainty 
and when the workers' utility function is known, a standard-based contract can induce the first best solution. 
Other researches (e.g., Arya, Fellingham, and Grover [1997]; Kandel and Lazear [1992]) consider peer 
influences as another way to reduce free-riding problem. As pointed,out by Milgrom and Roberts [1992], 
'Groups of workers ofien have much better information about their individuai contributions than the employer 
is able to gather. Group incentives then motivate the employees to monitor one another and to encourage 
effort provision or other appropriate behaviour" (416). Studies that rely on peers to reduce free-riding are 
described next. 
Arya, Fellingharn, and Grover 11 9971 develop 3 two-penod incentive contract which induces peer 
monitoring and offsets free-riding problems. In their model, each member works in the first period and 
promises to work in the second only if the other member does not free-ride in the first period. ln other words, 
managers monitor each other's first-period action and threaten to punish deviant behaviour during the 
second period. The first period compensation is minimal and would nomally induce both managers to shirk. 
However, the second-period incentives are designed to allow multiple equilibria such that a manager can 
credibly punish a first period free-rider. Moreover, the penalty in the second period is so high that a 
manager prefers to work in both periods rather than to free-ride in the first period and be punished in the 
second. Arya, Fellingham, and Grover [1997] show that peer monitoring provides implicit incentives 
- reducing the need for explicit incentives, and thus the cost of contracting for the firm (as in the first penod of 
their model).B 
Kandel and Lazear [1992] explore how peer pressure and mutual monitoring can prevent free-rider 
problems in a profit-sharing context. In Kandel and Lazeats model, the team mernbers could be affected by 
social pressures. This is reflected in the workers' utility function, so that it becomes Q(e)lN - C(ei) - P(ei), 
where C(e;) is the usual cost of effort and P(ei) is the cost of social pressure.Z4 In this rnodel, shirking 
increases moral or social deprivation so that everyone has the incentive to work hard. Peer pressure coutd 
anse frorn the guilt felt by a member who shirks at the expense of his CO-workers or from the shame felt by a 
member who is caught shirking. Peer pressure might also anse from sorne penalty imposed on a cheater by 
his peers (e-g., mental or physical harassrnent that can eventually lead to the exclusion of the cheater from 
the team). 
The studies above analyse the free-riding problem in a technology where al1 effort directly 
contributes to the group outcome. The next sub-section considers technologies where agents can provide 
individuai and collective effort and where individuai and collective outcornes are produced. 
1.3.3 Trade-off between individual and collective effort 
Studies from the tournament literature have investigated the effect of pay scheme on the mix of 
individual and helping effort. Drago and Turnbuil El9881 investigated whether group and individual pay 
schemes affect the mix of individual and helping effort for two different types of workers: those who 
reciprocate help and those who do not. According to Drago and Turnbull, Japanese workers are the first 
23 By süpulating rewards allowing multiple equilibria in the second period, the incentive contract provides the workers 
with the opportunity and means to monitor and punish shirking. 
24 Q(e) and N remain as in Holmstrom 119821. That is, N is the number of team members, Q is the team production, 
and e is the N-dimensional vector of rnernbers' effort. 
type of workers while Amencans are the second type. Their results soggest tbat optimal effort levels would 
be induced by different pay schemes, depending on the type of workers. In particular, workers that 
reciprocate help can obtain an efficient mix of effort under an individual pay scheme. However, group 
rewards are required for workers that do not reciprocate help. 
Other research papers (e.g. Lazear [1989]; Drago and Turnbull[1991]) have also investigated the 
use of rank-order tournaments in technologies where workers can affect their CO-workers output. Lazear 
[1989] investigates tournaments in technologies where sabotage is possible. Sabotage refers to costly 
actions by a worker that adversely affect the output of another (Q, /&, < O), so that it can be interpreted as 
the opposite of help. Lazear shows that increasing the wage spread between winners and losers increases 
sabotage; as a consequence, the potentiai for sabotage decreases the optimal spread. 
Drago and Turnbull[1991j compare rank-order tournaments and an individual quota scheme 
(standard-based scheme) in a technology where help to CO-workers is efficient. The authorç consider three 
behavioural modelling assumptions: (i) Cournot behaviour, (ii) partial bargaining (workers bargain or 
. exchange helping effort), and (iii) compIete bargaining (workers bargain or exchange al1 types of effort). 
Their results show that rank-order toumaments prevent helping effort, regardless of the behavioural 
modelling assumption. Helping effort either reduces the worker's probability of winning (the Cournot case) 
or does not affect it (the bargaining cases). In the case where the workers bargain over a l  effort, 
tournaments cause them not to work (they collude to expend less effort without reducing their chance of 
winning). In the case of a Cournot quota scheme, there is no heiping since a worker has no incentive to 
increase someone else's output when he expects nothing in retum. In the cases of partial and complete 
bargaining quota schemes, positive effort is associated with a technically efficient rnix of individual and 
helping effort. 
These studies can be surnmarised as follows. In econornic models, the effect of pay scheme on 
the mix of effort irnplicitly depends on behavioural assumptions. In Drago and Tumbuli [1988], the best 
incentives for the Japanese and American workers differ because behaviour varies through cultures. In 
Drago and Turnbull[1991], the best incentive depends on bargaining over effort. From an econornic 
perspective, therefore, conclusions depend on behavioural rnodelling assumptions, The following section 
draws evidence from behavioural and econornic studies, highlights gaps in the Merature, and discusses the 
contribution of this thesis. 
1.4 Literature gaps and thesis contribution 
Similar concems and evidence can be drawn from the economic and behavioural studies reviewed. 
All studies share a cornmon goal, that is a better understanding of the relationship between pay scheme and 
group performance. Studies from both literatures cover similar pay schemes, i.e. group incentives (in which 
individual pay depends on group performance), individual incentives (in which individual pay depends on 
individual performance), and competitive schemes (in which individual pay depend on individual 
perfomance relative to the performance of others). The notion of task interdependence is emphasized in 
both literatures; the devance of a particular pay scheme depending on the type of technology considered, 
arid the levei of interaction required by a task. 
Most studies reviewed focus on pure technology types. In several economic studies (e.g., Arya, 
Fellingham, and Grover [1997]; Kandel and Lazear [1992]; Holmstrom [1982]), team technoiogy is defined 
as a group of people working together to a common task. The degree of interdependence is such that 
individual contribution cannot be identified, thus preventing the use of individual or competitive schemes. 
The behavioural experirnents reviewed typically compare a pure group technology with a technology in 
which peuple worked individually and often isolated from one another. As an example, several studies use 
the classic Lego-blocks experimental tasks in which triads build a tower cooperatively (high task 
interdependence) or three single-towers (low task interdependence) (e.g., Mitchell and Silver [1990]; 
Rosenbaurn et al. [1980]; French et al. [1977]). 
This thesis investigates a technology in which both individual and collective work is productive. 
According to Wageman [1995], hybrid technology receives relatively little attention in the literature, despite 
the prevalence of jobs requiring both collective and individual action. In particular, I investigate a technology 
in which each member is accountable for a particular task and in which help increases production and 
improves the efficiency of the whole team. The specification used in my model is sirnilar to Drago and 
Turnbull[1988; 1991 j; this specification makes explicit the interactions among members through helping 
effort. While Drago and Turnbull simply assume that help is productive, I consider a specific functional fom 
that allows me to specib the productivity of both effort types that are directly implemented in my experiment. 
What is interesting about the study of hybrid technology is the tension between cooperative 
behaviour and total level of effort. That is, group incentives promote an efficient mix of effort (helping versus 
individual effort) but generate free-riding problems (low level of both effort types). On the contrary, individual 
incentives prornote individual effort but reduce helping behaviour. 00th economic models and social 
psychology theory suggest that group rewards promote collective actions. This finds some ernpirical 
support in Ravenscroft and Haka 11 9961 and Mitcheii and Silver [1990]. Although free-riding problems are 
rarely addressed in behavioural studies on group incentives, it is a fundamental concept in econornic theory 
in that it derives directly from team technology specifications. This thesis reconciles botfi arguments in its 
theoretical developrnent and experimental investigation. 
This thesis also incorporates the concept of cohesion into its economic model; the basic 
assumption being that cohesion increases the level of responsiveness among the mernbers of a group. This 
assumption is supported in the literature on group cohesiveness; studies showing communication, mutual 
influences and social pressures correlated with group level of cohesion. My model relaxes the Cournot 
assumption allowing cohesion to increase the level of responsiveness among tearn rnernbers; the result 
being that cohesiveness mitigates free-riding problems under group incentives and non-cooperative 
behaviour under individual rewards.25 
In this thesis, the productivity of both effort types is modeled, included in my experimental task, and 
rneasured dunng experimental sessions. The review of prior research raises concems about the choice of 
experimental tasks and measures of effort. The experimental results in Young et al. [1993] suggest that 
cooperation is not productive. However, the subjects performed simple tasks for which they were al1 well- 
trained. This training can explain why interacting was not productive. Young et al. did not assess the level 
of interactions among group members. Ravenscroft and Haka [1996] do not systernaticaIIy record 
information shaiing but measure it as a categoricai response (Le. yes or no) to a direct question about task- 
related information sharing among group members. Since they are not concemed with the trade off 
between cooperation and overall level of effort, the studies reviewed do not assess levels and productivity of 
individual or overall effort. In Ravenscroft and Haka [1996], the fact that the cooperative incentive plan 
outperfonned the competitive one does not imply that free-riding problems did not occur, but simpiy that 
information-sharîng is highly productive. In the experiments conducted by Mitchell and Silver [i 9901 and 
Rosenbaum et al. [1980], the number of blocks handled could be a proxy for total effort provided. Their 
results suggest that subjects under competitive incentives were more eager to succeed although this did not 
translate into higher productiviiy due to the nsk of falling blocsltowers. 
Finally, this thesis considers a rank-order toumament differing from Ravenscroft and Haka [1996] 
who use a typical rank-order toumament discussed in the economic literature (e-g., Lazear Cl9891 and 
Drago and TumbulI[1991]). In a typical rank-order toumament, members compete for pre-detemined 
payoffs, whereas in my thesis, members compete for pre-determined shares of the tearn payoff. In a typical 
tournament, rnembers have no incentive to help as it onIy decreases the probability of winning better prizes. 
tn my rnodel, helping decreases the pmbability of winning better prizes but increases the team payoff and 
25 This thesis also extends studies that explore how peer pressure and mutual monitoring can reduce free-riding 
problems (e.g., Arya, Fellingham, and Grover [1997] and Kandei and Lazear [1992]). 
thus the bonus pool to be shared by the group. I use this particular rank-order tournament because it 
induces a positive levef of help in my model. The specifics of this resuit, as well as the other results of the 
model, are described in the following chapter. Chôpter 2 fonally defines the technology investigated in this 
thesis, describes the rnodelled assurnptions, and systematically derives the effects of incentive schemes on 
tearn members' effort choices and performance. The three bonus-sharing mies investigated in this thesis, 
which are equal shanng, sharing based on individual performance, and shanng based on relative 
performance, provide sirnilar incentives to the pay schemes considered in the literature, which are, 
respectively, the group, the individual, and the cornpetitive schemes. The notion of a bonus pool is used to 
emphasize that workers are part of a tearn and ultimately share the team outcome no matter which 
incentivecontract is offered. 
Chapter 2 - Model and hypotheses 
Based on the Iiterature review. tfîis chapter models the team workers' choices of effort and 
performance under different bonus-sharing rules. Section 2.1 presents a basic model where workers do not 
affect each other's choices of effort (Le. Coumot behaviour). In section 2.2, the model is extended to 
include a group cohesiveness parameter that allows for the possibility that group members respond to each 
other's effort choices. 
- 2.1 The basic model 
This section is organised as follows. Sub-section 2.1.1 introduces the team technology and sub- 
section 2.1.2 introduces the bonus-sharing rules and workers' utility function. Sub-section 2.1 -3 examines 
workers' optimal effort choices under specific rules and develops hypotheses comparing effort Ievels and 
performance across rules. Finally, sub-section 2.1 -4 develops hypotheses regarding the effect of team size 
and its interaction with bonus-shanng rules. 
2.1 .l Introduction to the team technology 
Consider a team composed of N workers indexed i = [ I I  .. , NI. Each worker is given a task and 
can supply two types of effort: individualistic effort, ei, directed toward his own task, and helping effort, hi, 
directed toward his CO-workers' tasks. In particular, hi is the help supplied by i to al1 j * i and is wntten 
~l,hi where hii is the help from i to j. Each worker's individual output, qi, is a function of his individual effort, 
ei, the help received from his CO-worken, xLihj , and a random disturbance ~ i ,  such that qi = f (ei, ~ P h i  ) + 
The team's output Q is the sum of the workers' individual output, Le. Q = ~,N=,qi. This generol 
technology is similar to the two-worker model of Drago and Turnbull[1988, 1991 1. 
26 The random disturbance ternis CI. .., EN are identically and independently distnbuted, with the sum ZE~ symmetnc 
around zero. 
My model specifically considers a prodüction function that is additive in the two types of effort, so 
that q = ae(ei)'e + a,( h )" + ci, and where both types of effort have identical declining marginal 
productivity, i.e. ~e = a h  and & = Ph, where O < Be = ph < 1. Specifically, 1 develop rny arguments for the 
case where cr, = a h  = 2a and = P = .S. so that qi = 2a(ei).c+ 2a(1r!.hi )-5 + &i . I choose this 
specification for the following reasons. First, one of my objectives is to study the mix of individual and 
helping effort and the sensitivity of that mix to bonus-sharing rules. This specification implies that ei = hi at 
the optimum and facilitates the cornparison of different incentive s c h e m e ~ . ~ ~  Second, the additive fom 
makes the experiment simpler (and therefore more tractable) since participants do not have to predict the 
effort of their CO-workers before choosing their own (this would be the case with a multiplicative fonn). 
This technology corresponds well with AIchian and Demse!zl [1972] seminal definition of a team, 
which incorporates two dominant characteristics: (i) the team's production function dominates (at Ieast at 
one point) the surn of the separate production functions of its rnembers, and (ii) individual contributions 
cannot be identified. The first characteristic provides a rationale for teamwork and the second creates the 
setting for the free-rider ptobfem. In my model, teamwork is synergistic since helping improves efkiency 
and free riding occurs because effort is unobservable. This technology alsc corresponds to the general 
definition of a team in behavioural studies, in that it includes interdependencies. lnterdependence is a major 
reason for forming groups (Mintzberg [1979]). It is also a defining characteristic of teams (Cohen and Bailey 
[1997]). lnterdependence is incorporated by the helping effort in my mode[. 
Team technology can also be represented by Q = ICx:,qi where K > 1 (e.g., Sainty [1998]). In this 
case, individual output qi depends only on worker i's effort so that K > 1 is required to ensure the 
superadditivity of tearnwork. In my model, the superadditivity follows because depends on the efforts of 
all workers, such that Q = ~ 2 , q i  is maximised when the workers interact (and K > 1 is not required). This 
27 Different marginal productivity of effort types could be easily incorporated in the model by changing the value of the 
parameters. However, as long as the optimal mix includes both types of effort in a technology, the qualitative 
reflects synergy from CO-operation amongst empioyees, which anses due to the complementary nature of 
the workers' knowledge and abilities? Note also Mat, although workers benefit from the help of CO-worken, 
this help is not essential to production. This differs from rnodels where workers are not allowed to interact 
and rnodels where they are forced to interact, such as chain production rnodels. Here, each worker has a 
choice. 
In determining each worker's compensation, both team and individual outputs are observable by 
the principal but the effort suppiied is not. This prevents the principal from allocating the bonus pool directly 
based on each worker's effort and therefore, frorn obtaining the first-best solution.29 The principal 's 
objective is to design a second-best compensation contract based on QI qi, or a combination of both. 
2.4.2 introduction to the bonus-sharing rules and workers' utility 
function 
The bonus pool, 8, eamed by the team depends on their collective performance rneasured by Q. 
For simplicity, 1 
a bonus 8i with 
assume that 8 = QI Le. the reward is Iinear in output.' Each worker receives a share of 8 as 
EL, ei = 0. Three bonus sharing rules are considered: the equal sharing (ES), the 
distribution based on individual performance (IP), and the distribution based on relative performance (RF). 
Under the ES rule, each worker receives an equal share of the bonus pool, i.e. 8i = UN. Under the 
IP rule, a worker receives a share comsponding to his own production, such that Bi = 8qi 1 x\, qi = qi. 
Under the RP rule, a worker's bonus depends on his rank or position in terms of individual production. In 
- - -  
predictions developed in this model continue to hold. 
" This is not to be confused with econornies of scale from many individuals sharing a common asset (which often 
justified teamwork). Neither should it be confused with synergy resulting from proxirnity of producers or products (e-g., 
doctors and pharmacists locating in the same building or complementary products displayed together). In my model, 
synergy arises from productive CO-operation amongst agents. This technology implies not only that help is productive . 
but that help is positive in the first-best solution. 
particular, the positions indexed z = 11, .., N] are attributed to the workers according to their relative 
performance. qzdenotes the output produced by the worker at position z (e-g. q1 is the highest output while 
- qN is the lowest). Each position provides the worker with a specific share of the bonus pool pz, where pl > .. 
> pN and pt > (IIN). Worker i's probability of attaining position z depends on his effort Ievels and his CO- 
worker's effort levels, and is written as O r P =(el h) S I ,  where e and h are effort vectors. His expected 
bonus is therefore Bi = x!=, [Pz(-)pz6] where Pz(.) = Pz(=, h). The probability of winning increases with ei 
and decreases with hi as examined in section 2.1.3.3. 
Each worker's expected utility is given by Wi = EU(@ ) - C(ei, h,), where E is the expectation 
operator, U is the utiIity for incorne, and C is the cost of effort. To simplify, it is assurned that U(8i) = 8i (nsk 
neutrality), and C(ei, hi) = Sei + 6hi. Below, Ce and C h  denote the derivatives with respect to the first and 
second arguments, Le. Ce= Ch =O denote the constant marginal cost of ei and hi, respectively. Each 
worker continues to provide effort until the increase in his expected bonus just equals the cost of supplying 
the additional effort. A unique optimum is obtained since the technology exhibits declining marginal 
productivity of effort, i.e. %ilai and ai Idhi, are declining. 
ln this section, Cournot behaviour is assumed. This means that worker i chooses his levels of effort 
assuming tbat this will not affect the level of effort of his teammates. The Cournot assumption is a common 
assurnption in econornic rnodels.30 The concept is most reasonable when workers have no reason to 
believe that they can influence or pressure their CO-workers' decisions. In such cases, the only choice that 
remains available to a worker is to independently choose the level of effort that maximises his utiIity. This 
does not mean that workers will not help each other, but that they will only do it if it direcfly increases their 
The 'first bestn solution would be obtained if the agents' effort Ievels could be contracted upon directly. The optimal 
contract would provide each team member with a bonus corresponding to the marginal product of his or her efforts, 
inducing effort choices that maximize team surplus. 
30 Nash (Cournot) equilibrium solution concept is used in the great majority of the applications of noncooperative game 
theory (see Kreps [1990], p.405). 
own utility. This îhesis argues that such behaviour reflecb an absence of group cohesion. The Coumot 
assumption is relaxed when group cohesion is introduced (section 2.2). The next subsection considers the 
workers' effort choices and expected team performance under each compensation scheme. The effort 
choices and output levels are compared to those in the first best solution. 
2.1.3 Team workersy effort choices under specific bonus-sharing rules 
Before discussing the details of the effort choices and performance under the specific bonus- 
sharing rules, it is useful to present the first-best solution. The first-best solution occurs when the team's 
total surplus (Le. 1 Wi) is rnaximized. The team's total surpius is denoted by S = EQ(e, h) - C(e, h). The 
first order conditions illustrate that S is maximized when ei' = (a/8)2 and h,' = (cd6)* (the derivations are 
presented in appendix A and al1 resuits are summanzed in table 2-11, so that ei = hi in the firçt best solution 
(as mentioned above). The first best Ievels of ei and hi are determined by the productivity and cost 
parameters a and S. These levels of effort would be reached if each worker received the output produced 
by each of his efforts at the margin, Le. his marginal product ldeally (in a first best vrorld), the principal 
would observe the workerç' effort and compensate them commensurately. Here, however, only Q, qi, and q, 
can be contracted on, so that the effort levels actually chosen depend on the specific bonus-sharing rule as 
follows. 
2.1.3.1 Choices of effort under ES 
Under the ES rule, worker i receives (1lN) of the pool and therefore maximizes Wi(e, h) = B(e, h)lN 
- C(e;, hi). His first order conditions indicate that he chooses ei and hi such that ei= (1/N2)(d8)2 and hi = 
(1/N2)(CC/6)2 (these expressions are derived in appendix 8). Under this rule, the mix of individual work and 
help is efficient i.e., the IeveI of individual effort relative to help remains at its first best. This is generally 
consistent with the argument that team-based reward induces collaboration (Cohen [1993], Ledford [1993], 
and Mohtman [1993]). Under ES, free-riding occurs for both types of effort, i.e. ei< e* and hic hi', because 
each worker receives only (IIN) of the incorne generated from his efforts (Holmstrom [1982])." The 
expressions for ei and hi illustrate that free riding increases with N (N -+ a; ei and hi + O). This is because 
each worker's rewards depend relatively less on their own behaviour (decreasing their effort has a srnaller 
impact on their rewards) as N increases. Notice that the expressions for ei and hi follow h m  the Cournot 
assumption: a worker's decisions are not affected by the fact that they receive (1IN) of what his CO-worker 
produces, since fie believes that he does not influence worker j's effort choices. Shirking occurs, therefore, 
and the firçt best is not attained. 
Worker's effort ei = (di5)2 ei-= (llN2)(d8)2 
choices hi=(&)' h i= ( l lN* ) (~~ /6 )~  
Table 2.1 : Effort choices at equilibrium - basic mode1 
Worker's total effort ti = 2(d6)2 t = (21N2)(d6)2 
ti = ei + hi 
First-best 
Worker's mix of effort Mix = '/t Mix = !4 
Mix = (eJ(ei+ hi)] 
I 
ES rule 
Team performance Q = 4Na216 Q= 4a216 
Q(e, h) 
3' In my thesis, the bonus pool is a linear function of team output. This specification provides the most straightfonvard 
and concise way to study the effects of sharing rules and group cohesiveness on the free riding problem. 1 do not 
consider the discrete (standard-based) function of output presented by Holmstrom [1982]. Holmstrom [1982] shows 
that under certainty and when the workers' utility function is known, a standard-based contract can induce the lirst best 
soluîion (Le, no free-riding). However, when these assumptions are relaxed (e.g. when there is uncertainty), the free- 
riding problems reappear and a standard based contract may no longer be optimal (or even superior to the linear 
s pecification). 
Mix = O Mix between O and '/z 
2A3.2 Choices of effort under IP 
Under the IP rule, worker i rnaxirnizes Wi = Eqi - C(ei, hi). In this case, increasing individual effort 
increases compensation by the full marginal product while helping effort increases only CO-workers' 
compensation. Thus, the workers provide only individualistic effort, such that ei = ( ~ d 6 ) ~  and hi = O (see 
appendix C). Comparing this solution to the first best, individualistic effort is efficient, Le. ei= ei', but helping 
effort is inefficiently low. Note that due to the construction of the shares, the effort choices in the IP case are 
independent of N. 
A first set of hypotheses results from the cornpanson of the ES and IF rules. It is clear from the 
above that individualistic effort is higher and helping effort is Iower under the IP rule. In addition, we can 
compare the total effort (the sum of the individualistic and helping efforts of both workers) and total output 
under each rule (these values are derived in appendices B and C and summarised in table 2.1). The total 
effort is higher in the IP case. The intuition is as follows. For any level of individualistic effort, each worker's 
marginal benefit of individualistic effort is N times as high under the IP rule (although the marginal cost is the 
same under each scheme). Due to declining marginal productivity of effort, more than 2 times the 
individualistic effort must be provided before the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost 6. When N = 2 
the increase in total effort just offsets the inefficient rnix so that total output is the same under each rule, and 
when n > 2 performance is higher under IP32 This leads to the following hypotheses that compare effort 
Ievels and performance between the ES and IP rules: 
Hla: Helping effort is greater under the ES rule than under the IP rule 
H l  b: Individual effort is greater under the IP ruk than under the ES rule 
HIC: Total effort is greater under the IP rule than under the ES rule 
Hld: Mix of effort is greater under the ES rule than under the IP rule 
32 Note however that team surplus may be lower under the IP rule due to the lower productivity associated with an 
inefficient rnix of efforts. 
Hle: When N > 2, performance is greater under the IP rule than under the ES rule 
2.1.3.3 Choices of effort under RP 
the probability of attaining position z contingent on workers' efforts as described above. Let Pd and Pt? 
denote the derivatives with respect to the first and second arguments, i.e. the change in worker i's 
probability of attaining position z due to a change in ei and hi, respectively, with Pez>O and Phz<O. The first 
order conditions indicate that he chooses ei and hi such that ei = {@a 1 ( 6 - ~ ) ) 2  and h, = {@a 1 (6+A))2 , 
where A =Q(-)~~=lPez(pz -pN) with P.'= Phz ,  and a = E ~ = ~ ( P ( - ) ~ ~ ~ ) .  (The calculations for RP are presented 
in Appendix D.) 
These expressions for ei and hi differ from the first best solution in two ways: the numerator is 
multiplied by (Dl and A is subtracted from or added to the denominator. Intuitively, the parameter A (-A) 
captures the bonus differential (the difference between the bonus earned by different positions) times P, 
(PI,), the increased (decreased) probability of getting this differential due to an additional ei (hi). An 
increased differential (due to an increased Q orland p) increases a worker's motivation to attain an higher 
position. Since an additional ei increases his probability of receiving a higher share while an additional hi 
decreases it, an increase in the bonus differential increases individualistic effort but decreases helping effort. 
The second parameter (O s 1) captures worker ifs expected bonus (Le. his expected share 
of the value he is creating). As a workei's expected share of the bonus pool increases, both his 
individualistic and helping efforts increase. The intuition is that both types of effort contribute to the 
collective output and consequently to his own bonus. In short, differentiating bonuses have a positive 
impact on ei but its impact on hi is ambiguous. This is because an additional ei increases both the bonus 
pool and the probability of attaining superior positions, whiIe an additional hi increases the bonus pool but 
reduces the probability of attaining those positions. In fact. the worker compares the potential benefit of 
increasing hi (Le. the increase in the expected incorne of himself and his CO-workers) and the potential cost 
(the decrease in his probability of winning the bonus differential rnultiplied by this differential). If the potential 
benefit is greater than this cost plus his cost of effort 6, then an additional h is supplied. 
My second set of hypotheses is derived from companng the RP rule to the ES rule above. Since 
al1 workers are identical, any solution under the RP rule will have the feature that P(-)=(1/N)? That is, each 
wrker will have a fair chance to obtain the first position and the actual winner will depend on E. When P(-) 
= (1 lN ) ,  the effort choices become = (1/W)(al(6 - A))2 and hi = (1IN2)(ccl(6 +A))? And since p > (UN) in 
a competitive context, ei > (11N2)(d6)2 and h, < (11N2)(d6)2. Compared to the ES, therefore, the RP 
induces more individualistic effort but less helping effort, which implies a sub-optimal rnix of effort. 
Moreover, the increase in individualistic effort is greater than the dscrease in helping effort, because (6 + A) 
> (6 - A) (the proof is in appendix D(b)). This means the total level of effort provided under the RP rule is 
greater than that provided under the ES rule. In addition, the increase in total effort leads to an increase in 
output despite the sub-optimal mix of effort (the proof is in appendix D(c)). This leads to the following 
hypotheses that compare effort levels and performance between ES and RP rules: 
H2a: Helping effort is greater under the ES rule than under the RP rule 
H2b: Individual effort is greater under the RP rule than under the ES rule 
H2c: Total effort is greater under the RP rule than under the ES rule 
H2d: Mix of effort is greater under the ES rule than under the RP rule 
H2e: Performance is greater under the RP rule than under the ES rule 
2.2 The extended model 
My basic mode1 assumes that workers do not affect each other's choices of effort, since each 
worker believes his CO-worker will not respond to his effort choices. However, the social psychology 
literature predicts that members of a cohesive group wiil affect each other's behaviour, through mutual 
influence or through peer pressure. That is, cohesiveness is associated with communication among group 
rnernberç (Moran [1966], Lott and Lott [1961]), the readiness of group rnernbers to be inff uenced by others in 
the group (Berkowitz [19541, Schachter [1951]), and the tendency to respond positively to the actions of 
other group mernbers (French [1941]) and to behave in accordance with group expectations (Wyer [1966], 
Lott and Lott 11 96 11). 
In this section, my model is extended to consider the possibility that workers respond positively to 
the actions of their CO-members. Sub-section 2.2.1 incorporates a cohesion parameter into rny basic rnodel. 
Sub-section 2.2.2 develops hypotheses regarding the effect of cohesion on the level and mix of effort and its 
interaction with bonus-sharing rules. 
2.2.1 Inclusion of a team cohesion parameter in the basic model 
I incorporate cohesion in my rnodel by allowing for non-zero "conjectural variations" over efforts? 
A conjectural variation over effort is a guess about how your CO-workers' effort will Vary in response to your 
ovin. Agency models assume that each worker provides effort until the increase in his expected bonus 
equals the cost of supplying the additional effort. To detemine the increased bonus, the worker must rnake 
a behavioural assumption conceming the impact of his decisions on his CO-worker's behaviour (since the 
efforts jointly determine the outcorne). 
Specificaily, conjectural variations over individuatistic efforts are defined as the response in one 
worker's individual effort to changes in another's individualistic effort choices, Le. Ger 1 i3e, = ùei / ai = Ver 
with O r Ve I 1. Similarly, conjectural variations over help are defined as ahi 1 dhj = dhj 1 ahi = Vh, with O I 
Vh I 1. In the basic rnodel, the behaviour of the workers was predicted assuming V, = Vh = O. That is, I 
assumed that the workers believe that a change in their effort level wouid provoke no change in their CO- 
33 Generally assurned with classic rank-order tournament (e.g. Lazear and Rosen [1981], Drago and Turnbull[1991]). 
This is comrnon in game theory (e.g. in Von Stackelberg equilibrium). In Drago and Turnbull [1988, 19911, this was 
used to model bargaining of efforts between two workers. 
workers' effort choices. In contrast, when V>O, an increase in worker i's effort is met with an increase in 
worker j's effort. The 'perfect responsen case is defined where the coefficients equal one, Le. where V, = Vh 
= 1, which implies perfect reciprocity in tearn workers' supply of effort3 l let 0s i-2 <1 represent the degree 
of cohesion within a team, where R = O expresses no cohesion and C2 = 1 expresses "perfectn cohesion. 
The extended model assumes that cohesion increases the Ievel of response within a team, such that Ve = Vh 
= R. The basic model corresponds to the case of no cohesion, i-e. R = 0. 
These assurnptions are consistent with Shaw's [1981] argument that there must be a minimum 
degree of cohesiveness among individuals in order to function as a group. To the extent that this minimum 
requirernent is exceeded, one could expect that the degree of cohesiveness tvill be related to the other 
aspect of group processes, including mutual influence and peer pressure. In other words, when this 
minimum is exceeded, the responsiveness of team members is expected to increase with the level of 
cohesiveness. Consistently, Deutsch [1968] argues that cohesiveness is associated with communication 
arnong group members, the readiness of group members to be infl uenced by others in the group, and the 
tendency to respond positively to the actions of other group members. 
2.2.2 Effect of cohesion on effort choices 
The specific effects of the cohesion parameter on the effort choices depend on the particular 
bonus-sharing rule. Under the ES rule, worker i chooses ei and hi suchthat ei = (IIN2)[a(l+ (N - 1)R)16]* 
35 An alternative extension could be to modify the workers' welfare functions to include an altnristic component 
refiecting that the workers care about each others' welfôre. For example, the welfare function of worker i could be 
written as Wi = E[U(ei) + U(Wi) - C(e,,h;)] where U(W,) is worker i's utility for worker j's welfare-. Inciuding this tem 
would clearly decrease worker i's free-riding behaviour and improve the effort rnix under any of the compensation 
schemes considered above. Similarly, the normative pressure exerted on group rnembers that is widely discussed in 
the social psychology literature could be included by extending the workers' utility functions to include a cost of social 
pressure, e.g. Wi = E[U(Bi) - C(ei,h;) - C(SP)] where C(SP) is the cost âssociated with social pressure (non-acceptance 
or rejection by other group members) (as in Kandel and Lazear [1992]). This again would decrease free-riding and 
improve the rnix of effort. 
and hi = (1/N2)[a(l+ (N - 1)R)l6]2 (the derivations are presented in appendix E and al1 results are 
summanzed in table 2.2). Under this rule, the first best rnix is obtained for al! levels of cohesion. This is 
because workers receive the same increase in bonus whether output is increased due to individualistic or 
helping effort. As the cohesion paràmeter increases, however, total effort (and output) increases. This is 
due to the positive effect of their increasing effort levels on their CO-workerç' efforts, which increases the 
bonus pool to be shared arnongst the team members. In the perfect cohesion case (0 = I), both the levels 
and mix of efforts reach their firçt best levels. These results lead to the following hypotheses describing the 
effect of cohesion on effort choices and performance under the ES rule: 
H3a: Cohesion is positively related to helping effort under the ES rule 
H3b: Cohesion is positively related to individual effort under the ES rule 
H3c: Cohesion is positively related to total effort under the ES nile 
H3d: Cohesion is not related to mix of effort under the ES rule 
H3e: Cohesion is positively related to performance under the ES rule 
Table 2.2: Effort choices at equilibrium - extended mode1 
1 Choices of ei and hi in equilibrium 1 Case when 1 Case when 1 
where A = Q(-)x:=, RZ (pz - pN) with PeZ= -Phz 
1P rule 
ei = (Cr/6)2 
hi = (~rS2/6)~ 
Ei = (d6)2 
Hi= O 
RP rule 
ei = ( c ~ I S ) ~  
hi = (cd6)' 
Ei= (1INq( - A))12 
Hi = ( l lN2)(  a / ( 6  + A)))' 
ei= (1/N2)[ cx (1+ ((N - 1)R))/{ 6 - (A (1 ZT))12 
hi = (1INz)[ cx (1 + ((N - l )R) )I (  6 + (A (1 - R))12 
ei = (cdS)2 
hi = 
Under the IP rule, worker i chooses ei and hi such that ei= (&)2 and hi = (aN6)2 - The IF rule 
always induces the first best level of individualistic effort, since the worker receives his entire marginal 
product as a bonus. In this case, an increase in the cohesion parameter leads to an improvement in the 
mix of effort. This is because helping a CO-worker has no direct effect on a worker's bonus (it increases only 
the CO-worker's bonus). As the cohesion parameter increases, however, the worker believes that CO- 
workers will provide more help in retum. This increases the indirect effect on a worker's bonus and leads to 
more helping effort. The higher helping effort leads to an improved effort mix under the IP nile. In the 
perfect cohesion case (i2 = A ) ,  the first best levels and mix of efforts is again obtained (appendix F). These 
results lead to the following hypotheses describing the effect of cohesion on effort choices and perfarmance 
under the IP rule: 
H4a: Cohesion is positively related to helping effort under the IP rule 
H4b: Cohesion is not related to individual effort under the IP nile 
H4c: Cohesion is positively related to total effort under the IP rule 
H4d: Cohesion is positively related to rnix of effort under the IP rule 
H4e: Cohesion is positively related to performance under the IP nde 
- Under the RP rule, worker i chooses ei and hi such that ei= (UN2)[ a (1+ ((N - 1)R))I( 6 - (A (1 - 
n))p and hi = (IINz)[a (1+ ((N - 1)R))I( 6 + (A (1 - Q))]2. Under this mle, both helping and individual 
efforts increase as the cohesion parameter increases. This reflects the positive effects of increasing effort 
levels on CO-workers' effort levels, which increases the total bonus pool to be sharea arnongst the team 
members (similar to the ES case above). Under the RP rule, however, the cohesion parameter also affects 
the probability of obtaining a higher share of the bonus pool. In particular, the increase in the probability 
from individualistic effort is offset with cohesion, because CO-workers increase their individualistic effort also. 
Similarly, the decrease in the probability when a worker provides heip is relaxed with cohesion because CO- 
worken increase their help in retum. This implies that helping effort increases faster as cohesion increases, 
so that the effort mix is also irnproved under the RP rule (appendix G). These results lead to the following 
- hypotheses describing the effect of cohesion on effort choices and perfomance under the RP rule: 
Cohesion is positively related to helping effod under the RP rule 
Cohesion is positively related to individuai effort under the RP rule 
Cohesion is positively related to total effort under the RP rule 
Cohesion is positively related to rnix of effort under the RP nile 
Cohesion is positively related to performance under the RP rule 
AS discussed above, the effect of cohesion on effort choices and performance depends on rules. 
That is, team cohesion and bonus-sharing rule interact to effect choices of effort and performance. A Iast 
set of hypotheses descnbe the nature of such interaction. The H6 hypotheses compare the effect of 
cohesion on effort choices and performance between the ES rule and the IP rule: 
There is a stronger positive relationship between cohesion and helping effort under the IP rule than 
under the ES nile 
There is a stronger positive relationship between cohesion and individual effort under the ES rule 
than under the IP rule 
There is a stronger positive relationship between cohesion and total effort under the ES rule than 
tinder the IP rule 
There is a stronger positive relationship between cohesion and mix of effort under the IP rule than 
under the ES rule 
There is a stronger positive relationship between cohesion and performance under the ES rule than 
under the IP rule 
Finally, the H7 hypotheses compare the effect of cohesion on effort choices and performance 
between the ES rule and the RP rule: 
H7a: There is a stmnger positive relationship between cohesion and helping effort under the RP mle Vian 
under the ES rule 
H7b: There is a stmnger positive relationship between cohesion and individual effort under the ES rule 
than under the RP rule 
H7c: There is a stronger positive relationship between cohesion and total effort under the ES nile than 
under the RP rule 
H7d: There is a stronger positive relationship between cohesion and rnix of effort under the RP rule than 
under the ES rule 
H7e: There is a stronger positive relationship between cohesion and perfomance under the ES rule than 
under the RP rule 
To conclude, two general staternents about cohesion emerge from the model. First, as the 
cohesion parameter R increases, the total level of effort provided under al1 three bonus-sharing rules 
incr'eases. So also does team performance under al1 three bonus-sharing rules. The reason is that as S2 
increases, each worker believes that increasing his own effort will cause his co-workers to increase their 
effort also. Thus, the perceived marginal benefit of effort is higher and additional effort is provided. Overall, 
results from the mode1 are consistent with the three meta-analyses of the relationship between 
cohesiveness and group performance (Evans and Dion [199l 1, Muller and Coo.per [1994], and Gully et al. 
[1995]) that find a significant and positive relationship between the two concepts, as well as with results from 
recent field studies (e.g., Vinokur-Kaplan [1995]; George and Bettenhausen [1990]; Seers et al. [1995]). 
Second, as !2 increases the differences between the three bonus-shan'ng rules are reduced. ln 
fact, in the limit (as R approaches unity), al1 three bonus-sharing rules produce the first best solution (Le. the 
first best effort levels and the first best mix). Thus, fimis generating extremely strong cohesion should be 
less concerned with the choice of bonus-sharing rules while the choice of sharing rules is more important for 
fimis with very low levels of cohesion. In the next chapter I describe how I experimentally examine this set 
of hypotheses. 
Chapter 3 - Experimental Method 
This chapter is organîzed as follows. Sections 3.1 to 3.3 include a descn'ption of the parb'cipants 
involved in the experiment, the experimental task, and the three experimental conditions. Section 3.4 
describes the computer interface used during the experiment. Section 3.5 reviews the experimental 
procedures. Finally, section 3.6 describes variable measurement and overviews the hypotheses tests. 
3.1 Participants 
My experiment was conducted with the participation of undergraduate students enrolled in an 
introductory course in management accounting at a large public university." Three extra marks were given 
to students for participaiing in this experiment or submitting an alternative assignment. In addition, a $100 
prize was drawn for each group of 20 students that participated in my experiment? As 566 students (1 62 
teams) chose to participate, 29 draws were held (for a total of $2,900). All participants received the 3 extra 
marks. The nurnber of tickets received throughout the experiment varied according to performance. Extra 
marks provided a basic motivation to participate (similar to a salary) and draw tickets served as bonuses 
(performance-based compensation). 
This course presented an excellent opportunity to investigate natural teams since teamwork is a 
major component of the curriculum. In the course, teams are formed during the first week of class and 
teamwork is required on a weekly basis throughout the temi? Students had six weeks to develop group 
cohesion before starting the experirnent. Previous experimental studies suggest that this time period is 
sufficient to develop a stable Ievel of group cohesion (e-g., Mulvey and Klein [1998], Klein and Mulvey 
TWO sections of the course were offered and 602 students were enrolled in it at the time of the experiment. The 
same instructor taught both sections. 
37 This particular forrn of lottery was chosen based on the results of my pilot study. The draw provides an expected 
value of $5.00 per participant. m i s  is similar to the monetary incentives provided in other experimental studies on 
compensation schemes. For example, undergraduate students in Young, Fisher, and bndquist [1993] received up to 
$16.00 for taking part in three experimental sessions (i.e. $5.55 per session). 
[1995], and Grant et al. [1992]).59 In addition, since students continue working with team members 
throughout the rernainder of the te*, the likelihood of peer pressure during the experiment increases. 
The experiment was conducted in computer laûuratorïes that accommodated 24 students. Thirty- 
three laboratory sessions (one hour) were offered over a three week penod. Table 3.1 presents the lab 
session schedule. Twenty-seven sessions were filled by natural tearns (tearns from the class), and the 
remaining six sessions were fiIled by artificial teams (teams fomed so[ely for the experiment). That is, 
teams cornposed of three or four people from the course were registered as naturat teams. Teams 
composed of two people from the course, aIong with students whose cohort refused to participate, were 
randomly assigned to artificial teamsa 23 of the 162 teams (14%) encountered computer failure while 
perfoming the experimental task! The sample contains the remaining 139 teams: 1 1 1 natural tearns and 
28 artificial teams. Respectively 45,46, and 48 teams are included in the ES, IP, and RP conditions (see 
table 3.2). Group size and artificial teams are distinguished in the hypotheses tests. 
321 participants are fernale and 166 participants are male. The majority of students enrolled in the 
course are in their first terni 1 first year undergraduate studies. Ninety-six percent of the students included in 
The instructor created the tearns and the students had no participation in choosing their cohort. 
39 Grant et al. [1992] studied the development of groups and inter-group confiicts during a Iaboratory simulation (five 2- 
hour sessions). Cohesion was measured three times dunng the first session, which essentially consîsted of group 
development acüvities. Cohesion was also rneasured before a negofiation period dunng sessions 3,4, and 5. A short 
(5-item) measure of cohesion showed rapid and significant increases throughout the first session. As a more 
comprehensive (22-item) measure indicated, the increase continued but only up to the point of the negotiation (third 
session). This suggests that cohesion is developed over a few weeks. Consistentiy, Klein & Mulvey [19951 found 
reliable cohesion measures 10 days after the groups have been created (the 3d week of classes) and 10 days before 
the project ended (the 7ih week of class). The reliabilities obtained were .86 on the first questionnaire and -89 on the 
second, and the correlation between the two assessments was -72. Mulvey and Klein [1398] found a reliability of .86 
measured five weeks aiter the groups were fomed. In the two last papers, after five or six weeks, there was sufficient 
variance in the cohesion rneasures to allow statistical analysis. 
40 AI1 artificial teams are composed of students that had not worked together prior to the experiment 
41 Students encountering computer failure dunng the expenmental task received the average number of tickets 
received by stddents in their expenmental conditions. They were not included in the analysis. 
my sample range fmrn 18-20 yean of age.42 One hundred and seventy-one paficipants are registered in 
accounting - with an arts (98 studeks), science (25 students), or mathematics (48 students) major, 72 
participants are registered h business studies rninor, and the remaining participants are registered in 
applied arts studies (230 students) or science non accounting programs (1  4 students). 
: Lab session with natural teams 
Table 3.1 : Lab session schedule 
: Lab session with artificial teams 













ES: Lab session assigned to the ES condition 
IP: Lab session assigned to the IP condition 
RP: Lab session assigned to the RP condition 
Approximately half of the participants answered 'yesn to the question: 'In addition to being Canadian, is 
Time period 
there a particular nationality or ethnie group you feel you belong to?" One hundred and eight students 
indicated belonging to the Chinese nationality. The remaining 131 students are distributed across more 
In particular, the sample includes 3 seventeen year old students, 52 eighteen year old students, 383 nineteen year 
old students, 32 twenty year old students, 8 twenty-one year students, and 4 twenty-two year oId students; the 









































































than 50 parücular nationalities or ethnic g r n ~ p s . ~  Even though 1 randomly assigned lab sessions to 
experimental conditions, I control for demographic data related to participants in the hypotheses tests. 
Tabte 3.2: Sampte size per experimental condition: distinction between natural and artificial team a!ong with 
3.2 Experimental task 
team sizes 




questions taken from a list accessed through his / her computer screen. 44 A specified number of draw 
tickets are distributed for each correct answer (second column of Table 3.3). As the participant progresses 
through the list of questions, the number of tickets awarded for each correct answer decreases. Teams 
composed of three or four people took part in the experiment. Each rnember within a team has a color 
associated with him 1 her to ease the explanation and irnplementation of the expen'ment. Each participant 
Whole sample 
4 p l t  3 p l t  Total 
60 51 111 
10 18 28 
70 69 139 
ES condition 
4 p l t  3 p l l  Total 
21 15 36 
1 8 9 
22 23 45 
has his 1 her own task to complete. 
IP condition RP condition 
4 p l t  3 p I l  Total 4 p l t  3 p l t  Total 
19 18 37 20 18 38 
3 6 9 6 4 1 O 
22 24 46 1 26 22 48 
Participants must add three single-digit numbers to answer each question: two of the numbers are 
given, but the third must be traced from a rnatrïx (see Table 3.3). This number matnx includes cells from N a  
to Zlz, where A to Z is the vertical axis and a to z is the horizontal axis ( their identification is casesensitive). 
As shown in Figure 3.1, each team rnember is provided with the values for only one-quarter of the complete 
43 After Chinese, the most mentioned nationalities are lndian (15 students), Irish (1 1 students), and Italian (11 
students). There were less than ten students in ail other mentioned nationalities. 
d4 There are so many quesüons that it is impossible for participants to exhaust them in the tirne period atlotted by the 
experimenter, even if he / she only answers those for which he I she has the information. During the pilot-study, a 
specific experimental condition was set where subjects could only answered their own questions. The fastest student 
answered 100 questions in 12 minutes. In the main expen'ment, the 15-minute task included 200 questions. 
matrix. More precisely, rnember red' s matrix includes celis frorn N a  to Mlrn. member blue's matrix includes 
cells frorn Nla to Zm, rnember green's rnatrix includes cells frorn A h  to Mlz, and rnember purple's rnatrix 
includes cells from N/n to Uz (Note that mernber purple exists only in a team composed of four people). 
Each team mernber is provided with a unique list of questions. Questions are ordered in a way that allows 
participants to answer questions 1.3.5. etc. using their own matrix. Help frorn team rnemberç is neceçsary 
to answer the even nurnbered questions. Team mernbers can choose to work individualiy, answering only 
the odd nurnbered questions. or cooperatively. answering any questions they choose. 








Figure 3.1: Number matrix (member red) 
A participant can choose to concentrate on the questions for which he has the information or to 
help other team members too. Considering that the number of tickets offered per question decreases as 
participants progress through the list, it is in the individual's interest, to a certain degree, to cooperate with 
the other team members. If there were no additional cost for communicating, the efficiency of a team would 
increase if questions were answered by the participants in the order in which they are presented. This 
implies an equal number of questions answered with and without help. In the experiment, however, there 
are additional costs for communicating i.e. the time required for requesting and sending information to team 
members. Considering this additional tirne, it remains efficient for a team if rnembers collaborate, but less 
than half of the questions answered should be ones requiring cooperation. 
The following analysis maps the experirnental task to the model being tested. First, a participant 
can supply individual and helping effort. That is, he can answer his own questions and can also help other 
team members. Second, the cost of effort cornes from the time and attention required by a participant ?O 
find numbers in their matrix. Third, the declining productivity of the technology is captured by the decreasing 
number of reward tickets offered per question as task progresses. Fourth, a participant remains free to help 
his team or to focus on the question for which he / she has the information. FinalIy, the risk neutrality of 
rnemberis is imposed by the use of lottery tickets3 
3.3 Experimentat conditions 
The three expenmental conditions correspond to the three bonus sharing rules defined in the 
modei. Under the ES condition, accumulation of tickets by participants is achieved through team effort and 
the ticket pool is shared equally among team members. Under the IP condition, each participant receives 
tickets based on his / her answers, regardless of whether they are a result of individual or hefping effort. 
Under the RP condition, participants accumulate tickets through team effort and distribution of the ticket pool 
is based on individual performance of tearn members in rank order. In the four person teams, bonuses 
equal to 40%) 30%, 20°h, or 10% of the team bonus pool are associated with the lst, 2 5  3rdl or 4m position 
in terrns of individual performance. In the three person tearns, bonuses equal to 50%, 33.3%, or 16.6% of 
the team bonus pool are associated with the Pt, 2ndl or 3rd position in ternis of individual performance. The 
bonus values increase in equal percentages within teams, while rnaintaining a total of 100%. 
45 My mode1 assumes a nsk-neutral agent which is induced in my experiment as folfows: each question correctly 
answered is woNi a certain number of lottery tickets, In a simple fottery, the expected utility of each participant is given 
by: [pU(Prize)] + [(l - p)U(O)j where O<p<l is the participant's probability of winning the prke (and therefore (1 - p) is . 
his probability of winning nothing). A participant who increases his number of tickets increases his p, and 
consequentiy, has a 'linear" increase in his expected utility. Using a lottery makes the participants risk-neutral in terms 
of lottery tickets (sëe Baiman and Lewis [1989]). 
3.4 Computer interface 
Each participant was given access to a corn puter screen. As students entered their lab session, 
they faced the 'gateway screen" (see Figure 3.2). This first webpage requested personal identification. The 
students entered (i) ttieir team number, (ii) their assigned color, and (iii) their first narne. 
Figure 3.2: Gateway Screen 
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The main screen was divided into three areas (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4). The large shaded (yellow 
on the compter) area dominating the screen was used for two different purposes. First, it was used for a 
practice session (Figure 3.3), and subsequently it was used for the expen'mental task (Figure 3.4). In the 
practice session, students leamed how to answer questions, use their number matrix, and cornmunicate 
with the other tearn members. Students were asked to click on "Go to Exercisen once they answered al1 
questions. This presented them with the experhental task section only if al1 questions were correctly 
answered. As discussed above, the experirnentai task was composed of a series of mathematical questions 
and each question had its own answer space. Participants couId scroll back and fourth on the page to 
answer the questions in any order. 
The second area at the bottom of the screen allowed students to communicate with other team 
mernbers. A student could çystematically request the nurnber corresponding to a cell, provide a cell value to 
team mernbers, or send them personal messages. This area contained six input spaces and a submit 
button. The first input space was used to identify the targeted member (the member one wanted to 
comrnunicate with). The following four input spaces were used to ask for or to provide the number 
corresponding to a cell. Students could add comrnents in the sixth input. FinaIly, messages were sent by 
clicking on submk The message sent to participants appears in the blank vertical area to the left of his 
screen. The messages were automatically written in the color of the mernber sending the information and 
then followed by his 1 her name. 
Figure 3.3: Main Screen with Practice Session (mernber green / 4 person tearn) 
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3.5 Experimental procedures 
3.5.1 Procedures pnor to the [ab sessions 
In the second week of classes, 1 visited both sections of the course to present my project to the 
students. 1 described the nature of my experirnent, the scheduling, and the compensation for participating. 
Following my presentation, students indicated on an infomed consent letter (Appendix H) their intention to 
participate in my experiment or submit an alternative assignment. This provided me with an estimate of the 
number of participants for rny expenment. 1 referred to this estimate to determine the number of [ab 
sessions that would be offered. A few days later, available sessions were posted on the experiment's 
website and students were invited to register. 
Twenty-nine sessions were offered and scheduled in a two week period (corresponding to the 
seventh and eight weeks of cla~ses).~6 Among the 29 sessions available, 25 sessions were offered to the 
teams composed of three and four people from the course. These students were invited to register for a lab 
session with the other rnernbers of their team. The four other lab sessions welcorned teams composed of 
two people from the course, along with students whose cohort refused to part i~ipate.~~ The lab sessions 
were assigned on a "first corne, first senred" basis. The students emailed me their preferred time slots and 1 
continually updated the schedule as people registered. Up to five or six (three or four person) teams were 
scheduled in each lab session.* 
46 Five time slots were reserved for the tenth week of classes to allow for rescheduling but there was no mention of it in 
the initial schedule. 
47 The instructor provided me with a list of the class teams. Combined with the students' informed consent letter, I was 
able to estimate the number of natural and artificial teams that would register. 
4a Before visiting the courses, I believed that each student would be part of a four-person team. This was the case 
during previous course offering and it was intended to have four-person teams again in 1999. My plan was to schedule 
5 teams per session (20 participants) and hold one draw per session (as indicated in the Infomed consent letter). 
Scheduling problems regarding classes, however, led to teams with Mo, three, or four members. My expeflmental task 
had already been adapted for three-person teams in order to cope with exceptional cases (if one team member did not 
attend his session). Thus 1 made the following decision and expiained it clearly to the students. As the experirnent 
required teams with three or four members, only class teams with three or four members could register as a team. 
Dun'ng the fifth week of classes, five new lab sessions were added to the initial schedule (three and 
two of these sessions were intended respectively for the naturaI and arüficial teams). These sessions were 
scheduled in the ninth week of classes. The additional sessions were included to accommodate teams who 
needed to reschedule (because of exam conflicts or extraordinary events). As the lab sessions progressed, 
students that missed their time slots and students lefi out by the other members of their teams also 
registered in these additional sessions. 
Figure 3.4: Main Screen with Experimental Task (member blue 14 person team) 
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In the sixth week of classes, I visited both sections of the course to obtain the initial measure of 
cohesion. I asked participants to indicate their agreement with 5 statements using a 7-point Likert scale 
(see Appendix 1). Examples of staternents are "1 look forward to being with the members of my teamn and "1 
Artificial three or four person teams would be created with the other students. In any case, no volunteering students 
would be excluded from the experiment and everybody would receive the same incentive, i.e. a $1 00 draw for each 
group of 20 students who participated. This was necessary since it was no longer possible to schedule exactly 20 
have confidence and trust in my team". This cohesion index (adapted from Seashore [1954]) is used in 
Klein and Mulvey [199q and  ulve^ and Klein 11 9981. 1 chose this index because it perfoned well in 
settings sirnilar to the setting in rny experiment. In particular, Klein and Mulvey (1995, 1998) found the index 
to be positively related to group performance in experimental studies conducted with the participation of 
undergraduate students in naturaliy occumng groups (with 3 to 6 members). In each previous study, the 
index had a high level of reliability (approximately -88). 
I randomly assigned each lab session to one of the three bonus-sharing conditions. The sessions 
with natural and artificial teams were assigned separately to insure an equal nurnber of both types of team 
across experimental conditions. 
3.5.2 Procedures during each lab session 
I teiephoned each participant the day before the experiment to reduce absenteeism. Before each 
session, f prepared a plan of the room with a specific place for each participant. Members of a team were 
assigned to non adjacent areas to reduce chances of oral communication. Members of a color were 
similariy assigned to reduce chances of copying answers. Before the amval of the participants, personal 
cornputers were set to the experiment webpage. A matrix for practicing and 5x7 and 8M11 envelopes 
were distributed to each station seat. The matrices for practicing were leaning against the computer 
screens, face down. On the other side were printed the tearn number and the color of the member seated 
there. The actual matrices (to be used during the 15-minute exercise) were stored in the 5x7 envelopes on 
the top of the computer screen (with "do not open" written on them). The 8% X I  1 envelopes were put 
beside the keyboards. They contained the four documents: (i) Instructions, (ii) Exercise and incentives, (4) 
Index of cohesion, and (iv) Follow-up questions. Each document was printed in a specific color to facilitate 
its identification. 
students per lab session (the sessions now being cornposed of up to five or six teams with three or four members). As 
a consequence, the number of students per lab session varies frorn 11 to 22 participants. 
As participants arrived, I seated them according to the plan. I welcomed them and rerninded them 
of their compensation for participating in the experiment They were first assured that each participant 
would receive 3 extra marks in the course. They were then reminded that a pnze of $100.00 would be 
drawn for each group of 20 participants in the experiment. They would be given the opportunity to 
accumulate tickets for the draw during a fifteen-minute exercise later on dunng the hour. I brïefl y explained 
how we proceed with the envelope and asked them to take the document entitied "Instructionsw (see 
Appendix J) from the envelope. 
1 read the instructions orally. This document covers (i) the personal identification process and (ii) 
the practice session and it leads into (iii) the main exercise. During the persona1 identification process, 
students leamed their tearn number and assigned color. In the sessions with artificial tearns, they were also 
introduced to their team memberç.49 Students entered personal identification (in the gateway screen) and 
were introduced to the main screen. 
During each practice session, I used the same script to teach students to use the computer 
prograrn and nurnber matrix. The session was organized around 9 practice questions. With questions 1, 2, 
and 3, students familianzed themselves with the computer program. Each question simply required the 
students to add three single digit numBers. Students leamed how to enter their answers and how to move 
frorn one question to the next. Questions 4'5, and 6 introduced the question format used dunng the 
experïmental task (questions with a missing number) and verified that students could retrieve numbers from 
their matnx. Questions 7,8, and 9 required participants to obtain information from each of their team 
members. These questions verified that students could communicate with each other. Students were able 
to move on to the expenmental task only when al1 9 questions are correctly answered.M 
49 As I called their team nurnber, students stood up, gave their name and assigned color. It was not the first tirne 
students saw each other as they were part of the same course. 
The effectiveness of this practice session was tested during the pilot study. The results indicated that al1 participants 
understood how to (i) enter their answers to the anthmetic questions, (ii) retrieve numbers from their matnx, and (iii) 
interact with the other members of their team. In addition, on a scale from O to 10, where O is as bad as it can be and 
Once students started the main exercise, they entered their student ID nurnber. When al1 
participants were ready to perform the experimental task. I asked them to remove, from their envelope, the 
document "Exercise and Incentivesn that describes the exercise and its incentive scheme (see Appendix K). 
I read this document to them. The description of the exercise contains two main points. First, students are 
free to answer the questions they wish. It is clearly stated that students do not have to answer all the 
questions, they do not have to answer thern in the order presented, and they do not have to help their team 
members by answerïng their requests. They may choose to help others but they are not forced to. Students 
are also informed that they can answer every other question from their list using their own matrix but they 
need the help of their teammates to answer the rest. The incentives are described using numerical 
examples with hypothetical teams. The examples emphasize (i) how the tickets are accumulated by 
members during the exercise and (ii) how the tickets are allocated to members by applying the incentive 
scheme. In the example, teammates accumutate different numbers of tickets to help clarify how effort c m  
affect persona1 rewards. 
Once the document "Exercise and Incentivesn was reviewed, I asked the participants to be ready to 
extract their matrix from the 5x7 envelope and gave the signal to start the exercise. After 15 minutes, I 
ended the exercise.S1 Participants were then asked to scroll down the list of questions and select the button 
entitled "Send your answersn. Students were finally asked to take the documents entitied "hdex of 
cohesionn and 'Follow-up questionsn from the envelope (see ~p~end ices  I and L). The follow-up questions 
included (i) demographic questions (gender, age, programs, and nationality or ethic group), and (ii) 
manipulation checks regarding the incentive schemes. These questions verified that students understood 
10 is as good as it can bel they gave average scores of 8.87 and 8.95, respectively, when evaluating the instnictions 
and the practice example. 
51 1 chose 15 minutes for the following reasons. Free-riding problems occur because effort is costly. Repeating the 
simple task may become quite bonng Le. costly. Free-riding problems could indicate students doing the least work 
required as opposed to being eager to succeed. Oîber experimental studies on incentive plans also used al5-minute 
experimental task (e-g. Young, Fisher, Lindquist [1993]). 
how their actions (individual and cooperative work) affected the outcomes for their tearn, themselves, and 
the other team rnembers, 
3.5.3 Procedures after the lab sessions 
The draws were held electmnically during the 1 l m  week of classes. A few days later, 1 visited both 
sections of the course. First, 1 asked participants to answer the following two questions using a scaie from O 
to 10, where O is as bad as it can be and 10 is as good as it can be: (i) 'How would you evaluate your ability 
to add numbers quickly?" and (ii) "How would you evaluate your cornputer skills?". These questions were 
designed to capture differences in abilities across participants. Because these questions were asked at 
least two weeks after the experiment but before announcing the winners, the Iikelihood that the students' 
evaluations were biased toward their performance during the experirnent was reduced. After receiving the 
questionnaire, I gave a short presentation on my study. 1 spoke of my research questions and hypotheses, 
provided an overview of the experirnental design, and discussed the role of the students as participants. My 
experiment was proposed to the students as a first-hand leaming opportunity on research. This 
presentation was to ensure that the experience was an educational one for the students. Finally, I 
distributed prizes to the 29 winners. 
3.6 Measurement of variables 
Table 3.4 presents the definition and rneasurement of the variables used in the statistical analysis. 
The five dependent variables - HELP, IND, TOTAL, MIX and PERFORM - measure levels of effort and 
performance in tearns. Two of the independent (tested) variables are durnmies (IP and RP) representing 
the three bonus-sharing conditions. The third tested variable measures the teams' cohesion levefs (CO). 
This expenrnent controls for participants' age (AGE) and gender (GENDER) as well as for the fact that 
people were part of natural or artificial teams (ARTIFICIAL) composed of three or four people (SIZE). 
For the sake of simplicity, the mode1 assumes that people have identical preferences and abilities. 
Regarding preferences, the assumption is that people are indifferent to whether they perform individual or 
collective work (which implies that choices of effort depend on marginal productivity onIy). This experiment 
controls for individual and social preferences. Individual preference (INDPR) is self-reported and social 
preference score (SOCPR) is attributed based on ethnic background.52 Ethnic background is considered as 
it is suggested in the literature that some cultures are more collective while others are more individualistic." 
The mode1 also assumes uniform ability, which irnplies that differences in effort and performance 
levels depend on monetary incentive only. In this experiment, participants' ability to add numbers quickly 
and to a smaller extent their familiarity with cornputers could affect the number of questions they answer in a 
fifteen-minute period. Four contml variables are considered as alternative measures of ability. Two of them 
are self-reported measures of mathematical and computer skills (MATH and COMP) and the others 
represent registration in accounting (ACC) and science / math (SCIENCE) programs. These programs were 
considered as they might attract students with higher grades and / or students cornfortable working with 
numbers. 
Table 3.6 presents descriptive statistics for the variables and tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the 
correlation matrices using, respectively, Spearrnan and Pearson measures. The dichotomous variables, 
52 Social preference is measured using Hcfstede's [1980] index of individualism versus coIlectivism in different cultures. 
Based on extensive cultural surveys and subsequent statistical analysis, Hofstede outlines four dimensions of common 
social preference that can be used to measure the base values of societies (Salter and Niswander [1994]). The 
dimension considered in this thesis concems individual versus collectivism cultures. Participants were asked if, in 
addition to being Canadian, they belong to an additional nationality or ethnic group. Subjects that did not belong to any 
other nationality or ethnic group received the Hofstede score for Canadian. Participants that indicated belonging to an 
additional nationality or ethnic group received the average score for Canadian and the other nationality mentioned. 
For example, Chow et al. [1991] compared the performance of a group of Arnerican students with the performance of 
a group of Japanese students, under different incentive schemes (cornpetitive versus collective schernes). The . 
hypotheses was that the Amencan students would perform better under the cornpetitive schemes while the Japanese 
would do better under a collective scheme. Their experimental results indicate that the Japanese students 
outperformed the Arnerican under al1 schemes; a possible explanation being that the two groups were not comparable 
in ternis of abilities. 
SIZE and ARTIFICIAL, are absent when using the Pearson coefficient The results for the remaining 
variables are generally consistent between both matrices. The main results from these statistics are 
described next. 
At any time duing the experirnent, tearn mernbers had a choice between answering more of their 
own questions (IND) and helping a CO-mernber answering her 1 his questions (HELP). Given the time 
required to exchange information arnong team rnembers (Le. tirne required to ask for and provide 
information as well as the time required to view responses), a question that required an exchange of 
information took much longer to wrnplete than a question that could be answered individually. The negative 
correlation between IND and HELP reflects this trade-off between effort types. The effort trade-off also 
explains the negative correlation between TOTAL and MIX since providing addiüonal helping replies 
prevented people from answering more than one of their own questions. It is consistent with the observed 
value for MIX (mean of .33) which indicates that people answered three of their own questions for each tirne 
that they helped a CO-rnember. For questions worth an equal arnount of tickets, it was more beneficial for a 
tearn to answer questions that did not require an exchange of information. Some level of helping effoFt was 
still beneficial since the number of tickets per question decreased as people progressed down the list of 
questions, so that it was more beneficial to answer a question that required help higher on the list than a 
question of their own lower on the Iist (see table 3.3). As performance is measured by the nurnber of lottery 
tickets eamed by a tearn, there is a sirong positive correlation between PERFORM and each of the 
variables that captures effort levels (i.e. IND, TOTAL, and to a smaller extend HELP). As discussed above, 
past a certain point, increasing mix was detrimental io performance as suggested by the negative correlation 
between MIX and PERFORM. 
There was little variation in the average number of hetping replies across teams, which implies a 
low probability of finding any statistical results in terms of the HELP variable. In contrast, the number of 
questions answered individually varied considerably across teams. As a result, variations in TOTAL are due 
alrnost entirely to variations in fND which explains the strong correlation and similar distribution between 
both variables. 
Four proxies (ACC, SCIENCE. MATH and COMP) could be used to measure the concept of ability. 
The ACC and SClENCE variables are the most strongly related with levels of effort ([ND and TOTAL) and 
performance (PERFORM). This is consistent with the argument that students in the accounting and science 
1 math programs were particularly good a i  the experimental task. 60th program variables are sirnilady 
related to peoples' self-reported ability to add numbers quickly (MATH).S4 The participants' self-reported 
cornputer çkills (COMP) are not relateci to ACC, SCIENCE, or the dependent variables. 
The strong correlation between ACC and SCIENCE is explained by the fact that 85% of 
participants registered in science 1 math prograrns are accounting students while only 25% of participants 
registered in arts are accounting students. In ternis of the average high school scores of individual students 
(not reported), the profile of accounting students is quite similar between arts and science 1 math 
pr0grarns.5~ The 1 s t ,  2d and 3d quartiles are, respectively, 87%, 90%, and 93% in the arts prograrns and, 
respectively, 88%, 90%, and 93% in the science /math prograrns. In cornparison, Ist, 2" , and 3d quartiles 
of non-accounting students registered in this experiment were, respectively, 80%' 83%, and 86%. 
Therefore, ACC is used in the main regression analysis and sensitivity analyses are perforrned using the 
three alternative rneasures of ability. 
Cohesion was measured using the Klein and Mulvey [1995; 19981 index during the sixth week of 
classes (before the experiment) and immediately after their experimental session. To calculate the index, 
participants are asked to agree or disagree with five statements implying high cohesion level, using a 7-point 
Likert scale. Few experirnental teams scored 6 in their cohesion index and none scored O. The mean team 
Twenty-one observations are rnissing for the MATH and COMP variables since not al1 of the participants were in 
class when the mathematical and cornputer skilts questionnaire wôs distnbuted. 
55 Due to the fact that the majority of participants were in their first semester, average high school scores were the 
broadest and rnost recent measures of ability available. High school scores were only available for 420 of the 
participants. 
score is 4.45 (s.d. = .77) for their cohesion index, which is about half way between 'sornewhat agree" and 
"generally agree" with the given statements. Note that a score of 3 rneans that participants "neither agree 
nor disagrec" with the cohesion staternents, which could be interpreted as an absence of cohesion (this is 
what would be expected from people who do not know each other). A score of O means that participants 
"completely disagreen with the statements. 
The reliability coefficients (cronbach's alpha) for the index of cohesion are .90 (N = 444 
participants) and .92 (N = 487 participants), respectively, for the pre-experirnental and the post-expenmental 
measurernent.56 There are no significant differences in change in cohesion (which is defined as post- 
experimental minus pre-experimental cohesion scores) across experimental conditions. This result 
suggests that cohesion was not affected by the experiment ailowing the use of post-experimental cohesion 
scores for the tests of hypotheses. Within-group interrater reliability (rwG) tests have been perforrned to 
insure consistency in cohesion assessrnent among team members (James [1984]).57 The mean interrater 
reliability coefficient is -82 (tne 1st  ,2" , and 3* quartiles being, respectively, -80, -91, and .97). The reliability 
coefficient for the aggregated measure of cohesion CO is -92. 
As expected, the variables CO and ARTlFlClAL are negatively correlated. People in natural 
teams had worked together for at least six weeks prior to their expenmental session, wnich ailowed them to 
build some cohesion levels. In contrast, people in artificial teams had never worked together prior to the 
experiment. Interestingly, CO is positively correlated to INDPR, which suggests that individuals who prefer 
collective work build greater cohesion levels. Finally, results of ANOVA tests showed that tme 
56 Four hundred and forty-four participants were in class when the first cohesion index was distributed. 
Within-group interrater reliability coefficient (rw) is an estimate of the consistency of judgements of a single target by 
one set of judges (James, 1984). The coefficient ~ W G  = JI1 - (s$/md)] 1 41 - (S$/OEL?)~ + (s$/my2) where rwe is the 
within-group interrater reliability for judges' mean scores based on J essentially parallel items, s>rl is the mean of the 
obsemed variances on the J items, and o ~ v 2  is the variance on a single item )(;- that would be expected if al1 
judgements were due exclusively to random measurement error. In particular, OE$ = (A2 - 1 ) I l S  where A corresponds 
to the number of alternatives in the response scale for &, which is presumed to Vary from 1 to A (Mood, Graybill, and 
Boes, 1974). 
randomization occurred, For al1 control variables, there are no differences among the three bonus sharing 
conditions. 
3.7 Test of hypotheses 
The hypotheses were tested using OLS regression analyses. The cohesion scores (CO) were 
centered (COCENT) to reduce the muIticolinearity problems resulting from the use of interactive ternis 
(Cronbach, 1987).s8 Centenng CO is calculated as: COCENT = CO, - Mean (CO). The variables IND and 
TOTAL were ttansformed to correct for the nonnonnality of their regression residuals. Since their regression 
residuals had negative skewed distributions, the dependent variables were transformed as follow: TlND = 
-1lIND and TTOTAL = -1TTOTAL. Each dependent variable was regressed on IP, RP, COCENT, the 
interaction of IP and COCENT (IP*COCENT), the interaction of RP and COCENT (RP*COCENT), and the 
control variables, as follows (equation number in bracket): 
HELP = a + b l  IP + b2 RP + b3 COCENT + b4 IP'COCENT + b5 RP'COCENT + b6 SlZE 
+ b7AGE + baGENDER + bgACC + brolNDPR + blr SOCPR + ~QARTIFICIAL + e; (El) 
TlND = a + b, IP + b2RP + b3 COCENT + b4 IP'COCENT + h5 RP'COCENT + b6 SIZE 
+ b7AGE + beGENDER + bgACC + biolNDPR + 611 SOCPR + 612ARTIFICIAL + e; (E2) 
TTOTAL = a + 61 IP + b2 RP + 63 COCENT + b4 IP*COCENT + b5 RP*COCENT + b6SlZE 
+ b7AGE + b8GENDER + bs ACC + ~IOINOPR + blr SOCPR + b~ ARTlFlClAL + e; (E3) 
MIX = a + b, IP + 62 RP + 63 COCENT + b4 IP'COCENT + 65 RP'COCENT + b6SIZE 
+ b7AGE + b8GENDER + bsACC + bdNDPR + bl, SOCPR + ~QARTIFICIAL + e; (E4) 
PERFORM = a + bl IP + b2RP + 63COCENT + b4 IP'COCENT + b5RP'COCENT + b6SlZE 
+ b7AGE + beGENDER + bs ACC + blolNDPR + b, SOCPR + b12ARTlFIClAL + e; (Es) 
Centering the variables pnor to forming the multiplicative term tend 10 yield low correIations between the product 
term and the component parts of the term. 
The tests of hypotheses are summarized in table 3.9. Most of the hypothesis tests are simple t-test 
on regression coefficients. The ~4 and H5 hypotheses are tests of the simple slope of the independent 
variables on COCENT for, respectively, the IP and RP conditions. 
TABLE 3.4 
Variable definition and measurement 
Dependenf variables 
HELP Helping effort, measured using the average (per person) nurnber of helping replies (correct or 
incorrect) in a team (Le. the total number of helping replies in a team divided by the number of team 
meinbers).' 
IND Individual effort, measured using the average (per person) number of questions answered individually 
(correct or incorrect) in a team (Le. the totai number of questions answered individually in a team 
divided by the nurnber of team members). 
TOTAL Total effort, being the sum of helping and individual effort (Le. TOTAL = HELP + IND). 
MIX Mix of effort. being the ratio of helping effort to total effort (Le. MIX = HELP I TOTAL). 
PERFORM Performance, measured using the average (per person) nurnber of lottery tickets earned by a team 
(Le. the total number of tickets earned by a team divided by the number of team members). 
Independen t variables 
I P Dummy variable coded as 1 if IP condition and O otherwise- 
RP Dummy variable coded as 1 if RP condition and O otherwise. 
CO Team cohesion, measured using the average cohesion score in Klein and Mulvey [1995, 19981 









Average age of members in a team. 
Average score for gender in a team, ranging from O in a tearn with females only to 1 in a team with 
males only. 
Average accounting program score in a team, ranging from O in a team without accounting students to 
1 in a team with accounting students only. 
Average science or mathematics program score in a tearn, ranging frorn O in a team without science 
or mathematics students to 1 in a team with science or mathematics students only. 
Average score for mathematical skills in a team. Mathematical skill is measured using a participant's 
answer to the following question, on a scale from a low of O to a high of 10: How would you evaluate 
your ability to add numbers quickly? 
Average score for computer skills in a team. Computer skill is measured using a participant's answer 
to the following questior! an a scale from a low of O to a high of 10: How woufd you evaluate your 
corn puter skills? 
Average score for members' individual preferences in a team. Individual preference is measured 
using participants' answers to the following question, on a scale from a low of O to a high of 6: Hovr do 
you feel about working in a group relative to individually? 
SOCPR Average score for social preferences in a team. Members' social preferences are measured using the 
Hofstede (1 980) cultural index of individualism versus coilectivisrn. The scores ranged from O for a 
highly collectivist society to 100 for a highly individualistic society. Participants not listing a nationality 
other Vian Canadian were given a score of 80; participants who also listed Chinese, Indian, Irish, or 
Italian received a scores of, 47.64.75, and 78 respectively. 
SIZE Dummy variable coded as 1 if four-person tearn and O if three-person team. 
ARTlFIClAL Durnrny variable coded zs 1 if artificial teams and O if natural teams. 
The frequency of incorrect answers was not significantly different across sharing ruies. 
TABLE 3.5 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panels A: Descriptive statistics for the complete sample ( N = 739) 


















Dichotomous control variables 
SlZE Three-person team codeci as O 69 (49.6 %) 
Four-person team coded as 1 70 (50.4 %) 
ARTIFICIAL Naturai team coded as O 11 1 (79.9 %) 
Artificial tearn coded as 1 28 (20 -1 %) 
Panels 8: Descriptive statistics by experimenial condition 
Variable ES condition (IV = 45) IP condition (N = 46) RP condition (N = 48) 
Dependent variables Mean Std. dev- Mean Std. dev- Mean Std. dev. 
HEU' 9.47 2.48 8.98 3.1 1 9 -45 2.29 
IND 20.68 11.35 21.66 14.17 20.80 6.83 
TOTAL 30.15 10.01 30.64 12.19 30.26 6.1 3 
MIX 0.34 0.1 1 0.33 0.1 2 0.33 0.09 
PERFORM 81 1.88 65.32 798.38 . 81.17 81 5.28 65.20 
Independent variable 
CO 









Dichotomous control variables 
SlZE Three-person team coded as O 23 (51.1 %) 24 (52.2 %) 22 (45.8 %) 
Four-person team coded as 1 22 (48.9 %) 22 (47.8 %) 26 (54.2 %) 
ARTIFlClAL Natural team coded as O 36 (80.0 %) 37 (80.4 %) 38 (79.2 %) 
Artificial team coded as 1 9 (20.0 %) 9 (19.6 %) 10 (20.8 %) 
TABLE 3.5 (Contrnuing) 
Descriptive Statistics 
The MATH and COMP variables have twenty~ne observations missing. For these two variables, N = 118 in the cornpiete sample, 
N = 41 in the ES condition, N = 38 in the IP condition, and N = 39 in the RP condition. 
HEP: helping effort 
IND: individual effort 
TOTAL: totaI effort 
MIX mix of effort 
PERFORM: performance 
CO: tearn cohesion - range from O to 6 
AG€: age 
GENDER: gender- range from O (team with fernales only) to 1 (team with males only) 
ACC: accounting programs -range from O (tearn without accounting students) to 1 (team with accounting students only) 
SCIENCE: science I math programs - range from O (team without science I math students) to 1 (team with science 1 math 
students only) 
MATH: mathematics skill- range from O to 10 
COMP: cornputer skill -range from O to 10 
INDPR: individual preference -range from O to 6 
SOCPR: social preference - range fmm O to 100 
SfZE: team size -O if three-person tearn, 1 if four-person team 
ARTIFICIAL: artificial team -O if natural team, 1 if artificial team 
TABLE 3.6 
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SCIENCE MATH COMP INDPR SOCPR SIZE 
" Conelalion is significant al the 0.01 level(2 lailed) ' Conelalion 1s significant al Ihe 0.05 level(2 tailed) 
The variables are deIined in table 3.5. 
TABLE 3,7 






































































































AGE GENDER ACC SCIENCE MATH COMP INDPR 
" Correlatiorl is significanl a! the 0.01 level(2 lailed) ' Conelalion is signilicant at the 0,05 level(2 tailed) 
The variables are delined In table 3.5, 
TABLE 3.8 
Tests of hypotheses 
Hypotheses Tests of hypotheses 
E î k t s  of Bonus-Sharing Rules 
H l  a: HELP is greater under ES than under IP 
H l  b: IND is greater under IP than under ES 
H l  c: TOTAL is greater under IP than under ES 
H l  d: MIX is greater under ES than under IP 
Hle: PERFORM is greater under IP than under ES 
H2a: HELP is greater under ES Vian under RP 
i-12b: IN0 is greater under RP than under ES 
H2c: TOTAL is greater under RP than under ES 
H2d: MIX is greater under ES than under RP 
Hîe: PERFORM is greater under RP than under ES 
Effects of Group Cohesion 
H3a: CO is positively related to HELP under ES 
H3b: CO is positively related to IN0 under ES 
H3c: CO is positively related to TOTAL under ES 
H3d: CO is not related to MIX under ES 
H3e: CO is posiîivaly related to PERFORM under ES 
H4a: CO is positively related to HELP under IP 
H4b: CO is not related to I N 0  under IP 
H4c: CO is positively related to TOTAL under IP 
H4d: CO is positively related to MIX under IP 
H4e: CO is positively related 10 PERF under IP 
H5a: CO is positively related to HELP under RP 
H5b: CO is positively related to IN0 under RP 
H5c: CO is positively related to TOTAL under RP 
H5d: CO is positively related to MIX under RP 
H5e: CO is positively related to PERF under RP 
H6a: There is a stronger positive relationship between CO and HELP under IP than under ES 
H6b: There is a stronger positive relationship between CO and IND under ES than under 1P 
H6c: There is a stronger positive relationship between CO and TOTAL under ES than under IP 
H6d: There is a stronger positive relationship between CO and MIX under IP than under ES 
H6e: There is a stronger positive relationship behveen CO and PERFORM under ES than under IP 
H7a: There is a stronger positive relationship behhreen CO and HELP under RP than under ES 
H7b: There is a stronger positive relationship between CO and IND under ES than under RP 
H7c: There is a stronger positive relationship between CO and TOTAL under ES than under RP 
H7d: There is a stronger positive relationship between CO and MIX under RP than under ES 
t-test on b i  in E l  
t-test on br in E2 
t-test on b i  in €3 
t-test on b i  in €4 
t-test on br in €5 
t-test on bz in E l  
t-test on bz in E2 
t-test on 62 in €3 
t-tesi on 62 in €4 
t-test on b2 in ES 
t-test on bs in E l  
t-test on 63 in €2 
t-test on 63 in €3 
t-test on b3 in €4 
t-test on 63 in E5 
t-test on (b3 +b4) in El  1 
t-test on (bs + b4) in €2 
t-test on (bs + b ~ )  in €3 
t-test on (bs + b4 in €4 
t-test on (b3 + 64) in €5 
t-test on (bs +b5) in El 
t-test on (b3 + b5) in €2 
t-test on (b3 + bs) in €3 
t-test on (bs + bs) in €4 
t-test on (b3 + b ~ )  in ES 
t-test on b4 in € 4  
1-test on b4 in E2 
t-test on b4 in E3 
t-test on 64 in €4 
t-test on brin €5 
t-test on 65 in E l  
t-test on bs in €2 
t-test on bs in €3 
t-test on bs in E4 
H7e: There is a stronger positive relationship between CO and PERFORM under ES than under RP t-test on bs in €5 
Frorn equation (1). one may cornpute the regression coefficient of CO in the IP condition Le., (b3+b4). The test of the regression coefficient for 
(b3+4) takes the f o m  of a t test, such that t = [(b3+b4) 1 s(b~+b4)] where s(b3+b4) = [(var(b~) + var(b4) + 2 cov(b3, b4)I.s. The value of ((b344) 1 
s(b3+w)] is approximately distributed as t with N-k-1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number of predictor ternis in equation (1) (see Jaccard et 
ai. f19901, p.28).1 
Chapter 4 - Experimental Results 
Chapter four is organized as follows. Sections 4.1 descnbes the results on the expefirnentai 
manipulations. Section 4.2 reports the tests of hypotheses and Section 4.3 reports the sensitivity analysis. 
4.1 Experimental manipulation check 
Subjects were asked post-expedmentaf questions to venfy the success of the experimental 
manipulation. The two main questions tested the subjects' perceptions of the effect of individual and helping 
effort on individual payoff. More precisely, subjects are questioned on the effect of (i) answering one of the 
questions from their Iist and (ii) helping one of their tearn mernbers on the number of tickets they received. 
Manipulation of bonus-sharing rules is such that answering your own questions increases the number of 
tickets one received across al1 three experimental conditions. 
In contrast, the effect of helping a team member differed across conditions as follows. in the ES 
condition, helping afways increases the number of tickets received without regard to recipmcal behaviour. 
In the IP condition, helping increases the number of tickets upon the assumption that team rnembers would 
reciprocate help; otherwise, helping had no effect on the number of tickets received.59 In the RP condition, 
helping would be particulariy beneficial if team members reciprocated help; otherwise, helping has an 
uncertain effect on the number of tickets received. That is, helping increases the number received because 
it increases the team's ticket pool, but helping decreases the expected number received since it decreaseç 
the chance of becoming the team's highest perforrning member. 
Results are the following. In the ES, IP, and RP conditions, respectively 89, 84, and 85 percent of 
subjects indicate that answering a questjon from their list increases the number of tickets received. The 
remaining subjects indicate that answering their own questions decreases or does not affect the number of 
59 Several subjects mention this assumption when answering this post-experimental question. 
ticket received, providing evidence on the success of bonus-sharing rule rnanip~lation.~ There is no 
significant difference acmss experirnental conditions in subjects' answers to this question (x2 = 1.664, p = 
-435). 
In the ES condition, 64 percent of subjects indicate that helping a team member increases the 
arnount of tickets received compared to 13 and 17 percent in, respectively, the IP and RP conditions. In me 
IP condition, 49 percent of subjects indicate that heiping has no effect on the arnount of tickets received 
compared tu 8 and 18 percent in, respectively, the ES and RP conditions. In the RP conditions, 44 percent 
of subjects indicate that helping has an uncertain effect on the amount of tickets received compared to 23 
percent in both the ES and IP conditions: Finally, in the ES, IP, and RP conditions, respectively 5, 15, and 
21 percent of subjects indicate that helping a team member decreases the amount of tickets received. 
Differences found in answers across experimental conditions are significant (XZ = 60.746, p = -000) and in 
the direction expected, providing evidence on the success of the sharing mie manipulation. 
4.2 Regression results 
Tables 4.1 to 4.5 report the results from the HELP, TIND, TTOTAL, MIX, and PERFORM OLS 
regressions (respectively, equations 1 to 5). DFFITS statistics were smaller than 1.2 in al1 regression 
anaiyses, indicating no outliers.6' An analysis of the variance inflation factors did not suggest the presence 
of any rnulticollinearity problems i.e. al1 variable-specific variance inflation factors are found to be smaller 
In the ES, IP, and RP conditions, respectively 1 (IO), 6 (1 l), and 6 (9) percent of the subjects indicate that answering 
one of the question from their list decreases (had no efect on) the number of tickets received. The no effect answer 
can be explained by the use of a loîtery (some students tbought that payoff is related to performance). The answer 
decreased may indicate that the subject was distracted while answerÏng post-experimental questions or while 
performing the expenmental task or did not understand the post-experimental questions or ticket system. 
6' DFFITS = (Y;- - Ka]/(MSE, hij.5 where Y1. is the fitted value for the MI case when al1 n cases are used in fitting the 
regression function, KN is the predicted value for the Ni case obtained when the ith case is omitted in fitting the 
regression function, MSEn is the mean square error when the ith case is omitted in fitting the regression function, and 
hi is the ith element on the main diagonal of the hat matrix'(Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner [1989]). 
than 4-8.62 Three of the regressions (TIND, TTOTAL and PERFORM) are significant (p c -001) and explain 
between 14.3% and 17.1% of the overall variance.6J The MIX regression is marginally significant (F = 
1.723, p c -1 0; table 4.4) explaining 6% of the overall variance and the HELP regression is not significant (F 
= 1.144, p > -33; table 4.1). Consequently, resutts regarding HELP are not discussed further. 
The rernainder of this section is organised as follows. Sub-section 4.2.1 presents tests of 
hypotheses (the H l  and H2 hypotheses) describing the effect of bonus-sharing rules on effort choices and 
performance. Sub-section 4.2.2 presents tests of hypotheses describing the effect of team cohesion on 
effort choices and performance under each bonus-sharing rule (the H3, H4 and H5 hypotheses) and the 
interacticn effect between cohesion and niles (the H6 and H7 hypotheses). Finally, sub-section 4.2.3 
presents a sensitivity analysis of the results using alternative proxies for ability and controlling for teams' 
interrater reliability scores. 
4.2.1 Effect of bonus-sharing rule 
Two sets of hypotheses -the H l  and H2 hypotheses -compares effort levels and performance 
between ES and the two other rules. The H l  hypotheses compare effort levels and performance between 
the ES and IP niles. It is hypothesized that helping effort (Hla) and mix of effort (Hld) are greater under the 
ES rule than under the IP rule while individual effort (Hl b) , total effort (Hlc), and performance (Hle) are 
greater under the IP rule that under the ES rule. The regression resiilts indicate no significant differences in 
any of the dependent variables (TIND, lTOTAL, MIX and PERFORM) between the ES and IP conditions, 
providing no support for the H l  hypotheses. That is, IP is not a significant predictor for TIND (t = 1.092, 
62 The variance inflation factor (VIF) for Xj is 111 - RSQ, RSQi being the R-squared value from the regression of X, on 
the remaining k - 1 predictors. If X, is highly correlated with the remaining predictors, its VIF is very large. 
That is, the TIND regression explains 15.2 % of overall variance (F = 3.054, p < .001; table 4.2); the lTOTAL 
regression explains 17.1 % of overall variance (F = 3.372, p < .001; table 4.3); and the PERFORM regression explains 
14.3% of the overall variance (F = 2.923, p c -001; table 4.5). 
one-tailed p > -13; table 4.2), ïTOTAL (t = 0.625, one-tailed p > .26; table 4.3), MIX (t = -1 -243, one-tailed p 
> -10; table 4-41, or PERFORM (t = -0.424, two-tailed p > -67; table 4.5). 
The H2 hypotheses compare effort levels and performance between the ES and RP rules. It is 
hypothesized that helping effort (H2a) and mix of effort (H2d) are oreater under ES rule than under RP mie 
while individuai effort (H2b) , total effort (H~c) ,  and performance (H2e) are greater under RP rule than under 
ES rule. The regression results indicate that TlND (t = 1.918, one-tailed p < .05; table 4.2) and TTOTAL (t = 
1.763, one-tailed p < .Os; table 4.3) are significantly greater in the RP condition than in the ES condition, 
providing evidence for H2b and H2c. There are, however, no significant differences in the remaining 
variables (MIX and PERFORM) between the ES and RP conditions. That is, there are no significant 
differences in MIX (t = -1 -187, one-tailed p > -11; table 4.4), or PERFORM (t = 0.964, one-tailed p > .16; 
table 4.5) between the ES and RP conditions. 
In the tests discussed above, IP (RP) captures the difference in the dependent variables between . 
the ES and IP (RP) conditions when COCENT equals O, Le. when cohesion is centered (CO = 4-45)? 
Given that the interaction terni RP'COCENT is significant in the lTOTAL and PERFORM regression 
equâtions, differences in total effort and performance between the ES and RP rules might not be constant 
across cohesion levels. Table 4.6 presents additional testing of such differences for low and high cohesion 
levels. Following Cohen and Cohen's (1 983) convention, low cohesion (COLOW) is defined as the mean 
cohesion level minus one standard deviation (i.e. 4.45 - 0.77 = 3.68) while high cohesion (COHIGH) is 
defined as the mean cohesion level plus one standard deviation (i.e. 4.45 + 0.77 = 5.22). The-regressions' 
coefficients were estirnated and tested with CO rescaled so that it value was O at COLOW and COHIGH 
(i-e. COLOW = CO, - 3.68 and COHIGH = CO, - 5.22). 
64 Regression coefficients in models involving interactions are conditional effects. Conditional effects refer to effects 
that hold only at specific values of other predictors in the equation. First-order effects are interpreted when al1 ofher 
continuous variables are coded O (West, Aiken, and .KruII, 1996, page 14)- 
The differences in total effort levels between the ES and RP conditions rernain significant at high 
cohesion level. That is, the regression results indicate that TTOTAL (t = 2.415, one-tailed p .05; table 
4.1 6, panel C) is significantiy greater in the RP condition than in the ES condition, providing additional 
evidence for H2c. However, the differences become insignificant when cohesion is low. The regression 
results also indicate that, when cohesion is high, PERFORM (t = 2.347, one-tailed p < .05; table 4.16, panel 
E) is significantiy greater in the RP condi3on than in the ES condition, providing sorne evidence for H2e. 
Overall, these results suggest that in teams with average or high cohesion levels, the RP rule leads 
to higher levels of total effort in tearns than the ES rule; the RP rule also leads to higher performance than 
the ES rule but only when cohesion is high. The effect of team cohesion on effort choices and performance 
is reported next. 
4.2.2 Effect of team cohesion 
Three sets of hypotheses - the H3, H4, and H5 hypotheses - descnbe the effect of team cohesion 
under each bonus-sharing ruleF The H3 hypotheses describe the effect of team cohesion on effort choices 
alid performance under the ES rule. It is hypothesized that, under this rule, cohesion is positivety related to 
both helping (H3a) and individual (H3b) effort, As a consequence, a positive relationship between cohesion 
and both total effort (H3c) and performance (H3e) are also predicted. Finally it is hypothesized that the mix 
of effort would rernain constant across cohesion levels (H3d). as cohesion iç expected to have the same 
effect on both effort types. None of the H3 hypotheses are supported by the regression results. That is, 
COCENT is not a significant predictor for PERFORM (t = -1 -609, two-tailed p > .il; table 4 3 ,  providing no 
evidence for H3e. The positive effect of COCENT on MIX is rnarginally significant (t = 1.922, two-tailed p < 
. IO;  table 4.4), which is inconsistent with H3d predicting an absence of relationship between both variables. 
These tests estirnate the simple slopes of the independent variables on COCENT for each experimental group and 
the associated t tests assess whether these values are significantiy different from O. 
Finally, the effect of COCENT on TlND.(t = -2.005, two-tailed p < -05; table 4.2) and ?TOTAL (t = -1.802, 
Mo-tailed p < -1 O; table 4.3) is in the direction oppoçite to that predicted in H3b and H3c. 
The H4 hypotheses descnbe the effect of tearn cohesion on effort choices and performance under 
the IP rule. lt is hypothesized that cohesion is positively related to helping effort (H4a) but has no 
relationship with individual effort (H4b). Consequently, tearn cohesion is positively related to total effort 
(H~c), mix of effort (H4d) and performance (H4e). The regression results indicate that the positive effect of 
COCENT+ IP*COCENT on MIX (t = 1.660, one-tailed p < -10; table 4.3) is marginally significant, providing 
some support for H4d. COCENT+ IP'COCENT is not a significant predictor for TIND (t = 1.186, two-tailed 
p > -47; table 4.2), TTOTAL (t = -0.972, two-tailed p > .66; table 4.3) or PERFORM (t = -0.566, two-tailed p > 
.78; table 4.5). These results are consistent with H4d predicting an absence of relationship between 
cohesion and individual effort, but they provide no support for H4c or H4e. 
The H5 hypotheses describe the effect of team cohesion on effort choices and performance under 
RP rule. It is hypothesized that, under this rule, cohesion is positively related to helping effort (H5a), 
individual effort (H5b), total effort (H~c), mix of effort (HSd), and performance (H5e). The regression results 
indicate that the positive effect of COCENT+ RP'COCENT on PERFORM (t = 1.762, one-tailed p < .IO; 
table 4.5) is marginally significant, providing some support for H5e. COCENT+ RPTOCENT is not a 
significant predictor for TlND (t = -0.287, ho-taiIed p > 98; table 4.2), TTOTAL (t = 0.379, one-tailed p > 
-70; table 4.2), or MIX (t = 1.571, one-taiied p > -1 1; table 4,4), providing no evidence for H5b, H5c, and 
H5d. 
Finally, two sets of hypotheses - the H6 and H7 hypotheses - compare the effect of cohesion 
between the ES rule and the two other rules. The H6 hypotheses compare the effect of cohesion on effort 
choices and performance between ES and IP rules. It is hypothesized that there is a stronger positive 
relationship between team cohesion and both helping effort (Hoa) and mix of effort (H6d) under IP rule than 
under ES rule. In contrast, a stronger positive relationship is hypothesized between team cohesion and the 
remaining dependent variables - individual effort (H6b), total effort (H6c) and performance (H6e) - under ES 
nile than under IP rule. The regression results indicate that IP'COCENT is not a significant predictor for any 
of the dependent variables, providing no support for the H6 hypotheses. That is, IP'COCENT is not a 
significant predictor for TlND (t = 0545, two-tailed p. 58; table 4.2), lTOTAL (t = 0.563, one-tailed p > -28; 
table 4.3), MIX (t = -0.1 17, two-taiied p > -90; table 4.4), or PERFORM (t = 0.736, two-tailed p > -46; table 
4.5). 
Finally, the H7 hypotheses compare the effect of cohesion on effort choices and performance 
between ES and RP ruIes. It is hypothesized that there is a stronger positive refationship between team 
cohesion and both helping effort (H7a) and rnix of effort (H7d) under RP rule than under ES rule. In 
contrast, a stronger positive relationship is hypothesized between team cohesion and the remaining 
dependent variables - individual effort (H7b), total effort (H7c) and performance (H7e) - under ES nrle than 
under RP rule. The regression results indicate that RP'COCENT has a significant effect on PERFORM (t = 
2.532, two-tailed p < .OS; table 4.5) and a marginally significant effect on l lOTAL  (t = 1.837, two-tailed p < 
.IO; table 4.3) in the direction opposite to that prsdicted. Finally, the regression results indicate that 
RPTOCENT is not a significant predictor for TlNO (t = 1.600, two-tailed p > .Il; table 4.2) or MIX (t = - 
0.724, one-tailed p > .47; table 4.41, providing no evidence for H7b or H7d. 
Overall, the regression results suggest that team cohesion has the following effect on effort and 
performance levels in teams, under the three bonus-shaBng rules investigated. As predicted, results 
suggest that cohesion is positively related to the mix of effort (H4d) under the IP rule. Under the RP rule, 
cohesion is also positively related to team performance (H5e). Under the ES rule, results suggest that 
cohesion is negatively related to individual and total effod, which goes against the rnodelled predictions. 
The results also suggest some differences in the way cohesion affects effort and performance 
levels between the ES and RP mies. As predicted, results suggest a stronger positive relationship between 
cohesion and helping effort (H7a) under the RP rule than under the ES rule. Contrary to expectations, 
results suggest a stronger positive relationship between cohesion and both total effort and performance 
under the RP nrle than under the ES rule. 
4.2.3 Sensitivity analysis 
I consider alternative proxies for ability. Tables 4.7 to 4.10 present results, respecüvely, from the 
TIND, TTOTAL, MIX and PERFORM regressions, using each of the alternative proxies(ACC, SCIENCE, 
MATH and COMP) for ability. Overall, the regression results are fairîy robust across proxies. ln the TIND 
regression, RP'COCENT becomes marginally significant (t = 1.760, two-taiIed p < .IO; table 4.7) when 
using MATH as a proxy for ability, but in the direction opposite to that predicted. In the ITOTAL regression, 
RP passes from being significant to being rnarginaily significant when SCIENCE (t = 1.489, one-tailed p < 
-1 0; table 4.8) or COMP (t = 1.616, one-tailed p < -10; table 4.8) are used while COCENT passes frorn being 
rnarginally significant to being significant when MATH (t = -2.033, two-tailed p < .05) is used. The former 
result would reduce the suppon for H2c while the later would increase the support for H5d. In the MIX 
regression, IP becomes marginally significant when MATH (t = -1 -371, one-tailed p c .?O) or COMP (t = - 
1388, one-tailed p < .IO) are used, providing some support for Hld. Finally, in the PERFORM regression 
COCENT and IP*COCENT becornes significant when MATH (respectively t = -2.169, ho-tailed p < -05; t = 
1.998, two-tailed p < .05) and COMP (t = -1.984, two-tailed p < .05; t = 1 .?QI, two-tailed p c .10) are used, 
but in the direction opposite to that predicted. Finally, statistical analysis was performed excluding tearns 
with low interrater reliability scores, but the regression results remain unchanged.@ 
66 In this experiment, the variance on that would be expected if ail judgements were due exclusively to random 
measurement error is 4 i.e. -y2 = (72 - l)/12 = 4. Therefore, a team's ~ W G  equals O if the mean of the observed 
variances on the J items (s$) is equal to (or greater) than 4. In my expenment, nine out of 139 teams had an interrater 
reliability score equals to 0, which is the result we would expect if tearn mernbers were ratïng cohesion randomly. 
Withdrawing these nine teams from the sample did not change my results. 
Overall, the experknental results provide a rather modest support for the rnadeled hypotheses. 
Results frorn the model and expenmental results are discussed in the conclusion. The conclusion also 
discusses the difficuities of testing a matherilatical model with a Iaboratory experiment- 
TABLE 4.1 
Results of HELP regression 
HELP = a + br IP + b2 RP + b3COCENT + b4 IP'COCENT + bsRPTCOCENT + bs AGE + 
b7GENDER +baACC + bs INDPR + broSOCPR + bir SIZE +bizARTlflClAL +e 
Independen t Expected 
Variable Siqn Coefficient Std. Emr t-value P-value Hypothesis 
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One-tailed if directional prediction and if in the nght direction, two-tailed otherwise. 
HELP: Helping effort 
IP: 1 if IP condition, O othennrise 
RF: 1 if RP condition, O otherwise 
COCENT: CO* - Mean (CO) where CO is the team cohesion 
IP'COCENT: interaction between IP and COCENT 
RP'COCENT: interaction between RP and COCENT 
AGE: Average age of members in a team.açe 
GENDER: gender - range from O (tearn with fernales only) to 1 (team with males only) 
ACC: accounting programs - range from O (team without accounting students) to 1 (tearn with accounting students only) 
INDPR: individual preierence -range from O to 6 
SOCPR: social preference - range from O to 100 
SIZE: team size - O if three-person team, 1 if four-person team 
ARTIFICIAL. artificial team -O if natural team. 1 if artificial team 
TABLE 4.2 
Results of TlND regression 
Independent 
Variable 
TlND = a + br IP + b2 RP + b3 COCENT + br IP'COCENT + 65 RP'COCENT + bs AGE + 
b7GENDER + ba ACC +bslNDPR + bro SOCPR + b:r SIZE + brzARTIFICIAL + e 
Evpected 
Sign Coefficient Std. Emr t-value F-value ' Hypothesis 














N = 139 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
Panel 8: Additional coeficients2 
- 
COCENT + IPtCOCENT -0.0049 0.0041 -1 .186 -476 H4b 
COCENT + RPwCOCENT + -0.0008 0.0028 -0.287 -988 H5b 
One-tailed if directional prediction and if in the right direction, ho-tailed otherwise. 
The alpha levels are adjusted for multiple cornparisons (Bonferroni adjustment). 
TIND: -1lIND where IND is individual effort 
IP: 1 if IP condition, O othenvise 
RP: 1 if RP condition, O otherwise 
COCENT: COw- Mean (CO) where CO is the tearn cohesion 
IP'COCENT: interaction between IF and COCENT 
RP'COCENT: interaction between RP and COCENT 
AGE: Average age of rnernkrs in a team.age 
GENDER: gender - range from O (team with females only) to 1 (team with males oniy) 
ACC: accounting programs -range from O (team without awunting students) to 1 (tearn with accounting students only) 
INDPR: individual preference - range from O to 6 
SOCPR: social preference - range from O to 100 
SIZE: team size -O if three-person team, 1 if four-person team 
ARTIFICIAL: artificial team - O  if natural team, 1 if artificial team 
TABLE 4.3 
Results of ITOTAL regression 
Independent. 
Varfable 
TOTAL = a + br IP + bz RP + b3COCENT + 6 4  IP'COCENT +. bsRP'COCENT + bsAGE + 
b7GENDER + be ACC + 6s INDPR + broSOCPR + brr SIZE + brtARTlFlClAL +e 
Expected 
Sign Coefficient Std. Error t-value P-value Hypothesis 






























Panel B: Addifional coefficients2 
COCENT + IP'COCENT + -0.001 8 0.001 9 -0.972 .666 H4c 
COCENT + RP'COCENT + 0.0005 0.001 3 0.379 .705 H5c 
One-tailed if directional prediction and if in the iight direction, Mo-tailed otherwise. 
The alpha ievels are adjusted for multiple mmparisons (Bonferroni adjustment). 
TTOTAL: -1/TOTAL where TOTAL is total effort 
IP: 1 if IP condition, O otherwise 
RP: 1 if RP condition, O otherwise 
COCENT: COm - Mean (CO) where CO is the team whesion 
IP'COCENT: interaction between IP and COCENT 
RP'COCENT: interaction between RP and COCENT 
AGE: Average age of members in a team.age 
GENDER: gender - range from O (team with females only) to 1 (team with males only) 
ACC: accounting programs - range from O (team without accounting students) to 1 (team with accounting students only) 
INDPR: individual preference - range from O to 6 
SOCPR: social preference - range from O to 100 
SIZE: team size -O if three-person team, 1 if four-person team 




Results of MIX regression 
MIX = a +. br IP + bz RP + bsCOCENT i- br IP'COCENT + bsRP'COCENT +&AG€ + 
b7GENDER +baACC + bslNDPR +braSOCPR +brr SlZE +br2ARTIFICIAL +e  
Expecled 
Sign Coefficient Std. Emr t-value P-value Hypothesis 
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Panel 8: Additional coefficients2 
COCENT + IP'COCENT + 0.0443 0.0266 1.660 .O99 H4d 
COCENT + RP'COCENT + 0.0278 0.0177 1.571 -1 19 H5d 
One-tailed if directional prediction and if in the right direction, ho-tailed otherwise. 
The alpha levels are adjusted for multiple cornparisons (Bonferroni adjustrnent). 
MIX: mix of effort 
IP: 1 if IP condition, O otherwise 
RP: 1 if RP condition, O otherwise 
COCENT: COra, - Mean (CO) where CO is the team cohesion 
IP'COCENT: interaction between IP and COCENT 
RP'COCENT: interaction between RP and COCENT 
AGE: Average age of members in a team.age 
GENDER: gender - range from O (team with females only) to 1 (team with males only) 
ACC: accounting programs - range from O (team without accounting students) to 1 (team with accounting students only) 
INDPR: individual preference - range frorn O to 6 
SOCPR: social preference - range from O to 100 
SIZE: team size - O if three-person team, 1 if four-person team 
ARTIFICIAL: artificial team -O if natural team, 1 if artificial team 
TABLE 4.5 
Results of PERFORM regression- 
lndependent 
Variable 
PERFORM = a 4br IP + bzRP + b3COCENT + b4 IP'COCENT + 65 RP'COCENT + bsAGE + 
b7GENDER + bs ACC + bg INDPR + broSOCPR + bri SlZE +brzARTlFlClAL + e 
Expected 
Sign Coefficient Std. Ermr 1-value P-value Hypothesis 
Panel A: Regression coefficients 
lntercept 1234.449 209.857 5.882 .O00 
1 P + 8.285 14.805 4.424 .672 Hle 
RP + 13.224 13.71 3 0.964 .169 H2e 
COCENT + -25.676 15.957 -1 -609 .110 H3e 
IP'COCENT 1 6.083 21.841 0.736 ,463 H6c 
RP'COCENT 45.514 17.977 2.532 .O1 3 H7c 
AGE -24.071 10.245 -2.350 .O20 
GENDER 50.320 22.010 2.286 .O24 
ACC 52.463 16.954 3.094 .O02 
INDPR 10.362 8.288 1.250 .213 
SOCPR -0.681 0.767 -0.887 .377 
S I E  1 .O21 1 1.728 0.087 931 
ARTIFCIAL 14.710 14.710 -0.164 .870 
N = 139 F-statistic 
R* .218 . 2.923 .O0 1 
Adjusted R2 .143 
. . - 
Panel B: Additional coefficientsZ 
COCENT + IP'COCENT + -9.593 16.939 -0.566 ,786 H4e 
COCENT + RP'COCENT + 19.838 11 -261 1.762 .O81 H5e 
One-tailed if directional prediction and if in the right direction, ho-taiied otherwise. 
The alpha levels are adjusted for multiple cornparisons (Bonferroni adjustment). 
PERFORM: performance 
IP: 1 if IP condition, O otherwise 
RP: 1 if RP condition, O otherwise 
COCENT: COraw - Mean (CO) where CO is the tearn whesion 
IP'COCENT: interaction behveen IP and COCENT 
RP'COCENT: interaction behveen RP and COCENT 
AGE: Average age of members in a team.age 
GENDER: gender - range from O (team with females only) to 1 (team with males only) 
ACC: accounting prograrns - range from O (team without amunting students) to 1 (tearn with accounting students only 
INDPR: individual preference -range from O to 6 
SOCPR: social preference - range from O to 100 
S I E :  team size - O if three-person team, 1 if four-person tearn 
ARTIFICIAL: artificial team -O if natural team, 1 if artificial team 
TABLE 4.6 
Regression results for high, centered, and Iow cohesion levels 
Low cohesion 5 Centered cohesion High cohesion 5 
(COLOW) ' (COLOW) ' (COHIGH) 
Independent Expected Hypotheses 
Variable Sign Coefficient P-value 4 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Panel A: Results for 77OTAL regression (table 4.3) 
IP + 4.0000 .995 0.0010 .267 0.0021 -186 Hic 
RP + 4.0001 .951 0.0027 .O40 0.0055 -009 H2c 
Panel 6: Results for PERFORM regression (table 4.5) 
I P + -18.602 -436 -6.285 -672 6.032 .386 Hle 
R P + -21 -630 .240 13.224 -1 69 48.079 .O10 H2e 
COLOW = CO, - (twean(C0) + s.d.(CO)] 
* COCENT = COraw - Mean(C0) Le. identjcal to main results in tables 4.1 to 4.5 
3 COHIGH = COa* - [Mean(CO) - s.d.(CO)] 
One-tailed if directional prediction and if in the right direction, two-tailed otherwise. 
5 The alpha levels are adjusted for multiple camparisons (Bonferroni adjustment). 
HEP: Helping effort 
TIND: -1IIND where IN0 is individual effort 
TTOTAL: -1lTOTAL where TOTAL is total effort 
MIX: mix of effort 
PERFORM: performance 
IP: 1 if IP condition, O othenvise 
RP: 1 if RP condition, O otherwise 
TABLE 4.7 
Results of TlND regression using alternative proxies for ability 
TlND = a + br IP + 62 RP + b3 COCENT + br IP'COCENT + bs RPCOCENT + b6AGE + 
b7GENOER + ba Ability + bg INDPR + bro SOCPR + brr SIZE + biz ARTIFICIAL +e 
Ability measured by Ability measured by Ability measured by Abiliîy measured by 


















sign Coefficient P-value1 Coefficient P-value1 Coefficient P-value1 Coefficient 
0.0357 A87 0.0533 -294 0.0037 953 0.0271 
Adjusted R2 -1 52 .147 -105 .O95 
OnHaifed if directional prediction and if in the nght direction, two-tailed otherwise. 
TIND: -1IIND where IND is individual effort 
IP: 1 if IP condition, O otherwise 
RP: 1 if RP condition, O otherwise 
COCENT: COraw - Mean (CO) where CO is the team cohesion 
IP'COCENT: interaction between IP and COCENT 
RP'COCENT: interaction between RP and COCENT 
AGE: age 
GENDER: gender- range from O (team with females only) to 1 (team with males only) 
ACC: accounting programs - range from O (team without accounting students) to 1 (team with accounting students only) 
INDPR: individual preference 
SOCPR: social preference 
SIZE: tearn size -O if three-person team, 1 if four-person team 
ARTIFICIAL artificial tearn -O if natural team, 1 if artificial team 
TABLE 4.8 
Results of ITOTAL regression using altemative proxies for ability 
TTOTAL = a + b~ IP + bz RP + b3COCENT 4 b4 IP'COCENT + 6s RP'COCENT + bs AG€ + 
&&ENDER + baAbility +b9 INDPR + broSOCPR + br i  S E  +bu ARTIFICIAL +e  
Abiliiy measured by Abiliîy measured by Ability measured by Abiliiy measured by 
ACC SCIENCE MATH COMP 
Independent Ekpected 

















Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 1 Coefficient 
0.0199 387 -0.0002 .995 0.0106 
0.001 O .274 0.0010 .290 0.001 1 
0.0022 .O69 0.0028 .O48 0.0027 
4.0032 .O73 4.0040 .O45 -0.0038 
0.001 9 .215 0.0040 .O66 0.0036 
0.0038 .O60 0.0041 .O65 0.0038 
-0.0029 .O1 1 -0.0024 .O74 -0.0026 
0.0086 -001 0.0086 .GO2 0.0092 
0.0069 -004 0.001 0 -260 0.0001 
0.0004 .650 0.001 0 -365 0.0010 
-0.0001 -210 -0.0001 -370 -0.0001 
0.0025 .O54 0.0020 -1 74 0.0020 
4.0002 -907 0.0005 -790 0.0007 
139 118 118 
.245 .O00 .197 .O20 -187 
-173 .1 05 .O94 
One-tailed if directional prediction and if in the right direction, two-tailed otherwise. 
TTOTAL: -1TTOTAL where TOTAL is total effort 
IP: 1 i f  IP condition, O otherwise 
RP: 1 if RP condition, O otherwise 
COCENT: COm - Mean (CO) where CO is the team cohesion 
IP'COCENT: interaction k tween IP and COCENT 
RP'COCENT: interaction between RP and COCENT 
AG€: age 
GENDER: gender - range from O (tearn with fernales only) to 1 (team with males only) 
ACC: accounting programs - range from O (tearn without accounting students) Io 1 (tearn with accounting students only) 
INDPR: individual preference 
SOCPR: social preference 
SIZE: team size - O if lhree-person tearn, 1 if four-person team 
ARTIFICIAL: artificial team -O if natural tearn, 1 if artificial team 
TABLE 4.9 
Results of MIX regression using alternative proxies for ability 
MIX = a + b, IP + 62 RP +b3 COCENT + b4 IP'COCENT + 6sRP'COCENT + 6s AGE + 
b7GENDER +beAbility + bs iNDPR + bio SOCPR + bir SIZE +brtARTIFIClAL + e 
Ability measured by Abilily measured by Ability measured by Ability measured by 
ACC SCIENCE MATH COMP 
lndependent Expected 
v&ble sign Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value l Coefficient P-value 
ln tercept 0.1200 -718 0.0757 .a1 7 0.2820 .486 0.21 20 -596 
RP 4.0256 -1 19 4.0235 -138 -0.0261 -134 4.0259 -1 36 
COCENT 0.0483 .OU 0.0488 .O55 0.051 5 .O66 0 .O499 .O76 
IP'COCENT -0.0040 9 7  4.0076 ,825 4.0067 -8s -0.0037 -921 
RP'COCENT + -0.0205 .470 4.0215 .450 -0.0235 .449 6.0220 -474 
AG€ + 0.01 15 .476 0.0127 -43 1 0.0039 .836 0.0048 -799 
GENDER 4.0789 .O24 4.0818 .O19 4.0801 .O40 -0.0847 .O34 
Abil* -0.0203 .448 -0.0018 -957 -0.0034 .78 1 0.0023 .837 
INDPR -0.0060 547 -0.0056 -669 -0.0080 512 -0.0072 -652 
SOC?R 0.001 1 -358 0.0013 -275 0.0014 .303 0.001 5 -256 
S E  4.0203 .275 4.0228 .213 -0.0249 223 -0.0257 -21 6 
ARTIFCIAL 0.01 15 .620 0.01 27 -587 0.0097 -71 4 0.0078 -770 
N 139 139 118 118 
Rz -141 .O69 -1 37 ,082 .137 -185 -136 .186 
Adjusted R2 .O59 .O55 .O38 .O38 
l One-tailed if diredional prediction and if in the nght direction, two-tailed otherwige. 
MIX: mix of effort 
fP: 1 if IP condition, O othehse 
RP: 1 if RP condition, O otherwise 
COCENT: COm - Mean (CO) where CO is the team cohesion 
IP'COCENT: interaction between IP and COCENT 
RP'COCENT: interaction bet~een W and COCENT 
AGE: age 
GENDER: gender - range from O (tearn vrith females only) to 1 (team with males only) 
ACC: accounting prograrns - range from O (team without accounting students) to 1 (tearn with accounting students only) 
INDPR: individual preference 
SOCPR: social preference 
SIZE: team size -O if three-person team, 1 if four-person team 
ARTIFICIAL: artificial team -O if natural team, 1 if artificial team 
TABLE 4.10 
Results of PERFORM regression using alternative proxies for ability 
PERFORM = a + br IP + bz RP + b3COCENT i- br IPCOCENT + bs RP'COCENT + bs AGE + 
b7GENDER +baAbiiity+ bs INDPR +broSOCPR + brr SlZE + brzARTlFlCIAL + e 
Ability measured by Ability measured by Ability measured by Ability measured by 
ACC SCIENCE MATH COMP 
lndependent Expected 
Variable sioh Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
ln tercept 1234.449 -000 1331.057 .ûûO 1099.888 .O00 1245.974 .O00 
1 P + 6.285 -672 6.t 73 -673 -12.306 -445 -1 1.726 -474 
RP + 13-224 -169 9.190 .247 17.469 -117 16.191 .138 
COCENT -25.676 -1 10 -25.541 .IO7 -37.348 .O32 -34.882 .O50 
IP'COCENT + 16.083 -463 20.64 1 .336 46.082 .O48 39.784 .O92 
RP'COCENT 45.51 4 .O13 46.292 .O10 50.678 .O10 46.231 .O19 
AG€ -24.071 .O20 -28.956 .O05 -25.068 .O35 -26.743 .O27 
GENDER 50.320 .O24 53.141 .O1 5 46.537 .O55 53.559 .O34 
Abilify 52.463 .O02 75.989 .O00 13.897 .O68 2.002 -782 
INDPR 10.362 .213 9.707 .237 19.671 .O46 19.561 .O54 
SOCPR -0.681 .377 -0.702 .351 -0.327 -695 -0.656 -428 
SlZE 1 .O21 .931 i0.179 -373 2.024 -873 1.506 308 
ARTlFlClAL 14.710 .870 1.197 -9350 1.497 -927 4.348 -796 
N 139 139 118 118 
RZ -21 8 .O01 .240 .O00 .198 .O19 .173 .O53 
Adjusted R2 .143 .168 -107 -078 
l One-tailed if directional prediction and if in the right direction, ho-tailed otherwise. 
PERFORM: performance 
IP: 1 if IP condilion, O otherwise 
RP: 1 if RP condition, O othenivise 
COCENT: COraw - Mean (CO) where CO is the team cohesion 
IP'COCENT: interaction between IP and COCENT 
RP'COCENT: interaction between RP and COCENT 
AGE: age 
GENDER: gender - range from O (team with females only) to 1 (team with males only) 
ACC: amunting programs - range from O (team without accounting students) to 1 (team with accounting students only) 
INDPR: individual preference 
SOCPR: social preference 
SIZE: team size - O  if three-person team, 1 if four-person team 
ARTIFICIAL: artificial team -O if natural team, 1 if artificial team 
Conclusion 
Experimental research on incentives in teams has mainly focussed on "pure* forms of 
technologies, that is, a technology where each subject works atone on an individual task and a technology 
where subjects work together on a common task. Results strongly suggest that group rewards are more 
productive with collective production (e.g., Rosenbaum et al. [1980]; French et al. 119771) while competitive 
rewards appear weakly superior with individual production (e.g., Scott and Chemngton [1974]; Weinsteen 
and Holzbach [1972]). However, few insights are provided on the best reward for a 'hybridn technology Le. 
a technology requiring both collective and individual action (Wagernan [1995]). 
My thesis compares alternative methods of sharing a bonus pool in a technology where each 
member is accountable for a particular task and where help is mutually productive. Following Drago and 
Tumbull [1988; 1991], 1 developed a mathematical economic rnodel on teams where help increases 
production and improves efficiency. The model highlights the fact that group incentives promote helping 
effort but reduce overall motivation Le. the free-rïding problems (Holmstrorn [1982D.67 Sharing based on 
individual or relative performance alleviates the free-riding problems. Attempts to differentiate the 
contributions of various team members have been discouraged in the Iiterature because it can undermine 
collective effort (e-g., Hackrnan [f 9901; Shea and Guzzo [1987]). In my model, however, the reduction in 
helping effort is counterbalanced by the increase in total effort, causing the IP and RP rules to outperform 
the ES rule. 
Based on behaviourai research (e-g., Shaw [l98lj; Deutsch [1968]), a cohesion parameter is 
incorporated in the mode[. The basic assumption is that cohesion increases the Ievel of effort response 
among tearn rnembers. The model shows that, as cohesion increases, the total level of effort and the team 
performance increases under al1 three sharing rules, which is consistent with the resources invested by 
G7 Consistent with the modelled results, experimental results suggest collective behaviour to be greater under group 
incentives than under individual (e.g., Mitchell and Silver [1990]) or competitive incentives (e-g., Ravenscroft and Haka 
[1996]); and free riding problerns were found in Nalbantian and Schotler [1997) and Weldon and Mustari [1988]. 
fimis to stimulate team spirit.68 Cohesion increases effort levels andlor improves the effort mix depending 
on the shanng-rules considered (interaction effect). The nature of the interaction is such that, as cohesion 
increases, the differences between the three bonus-sharing rules are reduced. As cohesion reaches its 
limit, al1 three sharing rules produce the optimal level and mix of effort. These modelling results suggest that 
f ims generating extrernely strong cohesion should be less concemed with the choice of bonus-sharing rules 
while the choice of sharing rules is more important for fims with very low levels of cohesion. 
Unlike other research that generates alternative hypotheses (e.g., Fredenckson [1992]) from 
economic theories versus behavioural theones, this thesis includes insights from socia! psychology in a 
mathematical economic rnodel, A model's conclusions are essentialIy driven by the assumptions that are 
made about human behaviour. Although there are sorne common assurnptions in economics (e.g., utility for 
money, cost of effort, or nsk aversion), other sensible assurnptions can also be included in a mathematical 
model. ln my model, the Cournot assumption is relaxed, as peopIe are part of cohesive groups. In al1 
cases, models are enriched using the knowledge emerging from different but often complementary 
disciplines. 
This model is used to develop hypotheses to be tested in a laboratory experiment. Testing an 
economic model in a laboratory experiment poses some difficulties. There is always a trade-off between a 
model's clarity, which impfies that simplifying assumptions are made, and its relationship to reaIity. For the 
sake of clarity, rny model assumes that people have identical abilities. Although 1 have used a simple 
experirnental task (i.e. adding three numbersj and trained the participants to use the computer prograrn, the 
data suggests great differences in ability. In my statistical analysis, the control variable for ability is 
measured by whether the participants are accounting students. Despite its imprecision, this controf variable 
is highly significant. In addition, experimental settings might not be ideal environments to detect free-riding 
problerns. For a free-riding problem to occur, working has to be costly; it rnust be strenuous or 
68 The modelled results are also consistent with three recent meta-analyses of the relationship between cohesiveness 
and group performance (e.g., Evans and Dion [i991]; Muller and Cooper [1994]; and Gully et al. [1995]). 
uninteresting or it must preclude more enjoyable activities. Laboratory expenments last for a short period of 
time, present unusual acüvity, and leave subjects with nothing better to do then the expenmental task. My 
expenmental task was to answer a list of arithmetic questions. 1 was expecting this task to be strenuous 
enough that students would slow down after a few minutes, but students made enthusiastic comrnents 
about their expenence. This could mean that perfoming the experimental task was not very costly. In 
addition, the presence of an experirnenter might have a monitoring effect. Free-riding problems are 
supported in Nalbantian and SchotIer (1997), but in their expenment, subjects were presented with a wrïtten 
work scenarb and chose their level of effort. Their subjects did not experience the cost of working but 
rather 'walked in the shoes" of an individual faced with work to be done under specific incentives. 
Frederickson [1992] had a similar experimental setting.69 
Testing monetary incentives during a lab experiment also poses a problem. Monetary incentives 
are quite srnail in an expetiment setting compared with what they can be in reality. These experiments try to 
replicate the kind of financial incentives offered to business people, which in some cases can be very high. 
Given that students have different economic backgrounds, an identical amount of money can aIso represent 
a radically different financial incentives. 
Finally, performing laboratory experiments that require the participation of teams rather than 
individuals raises both practical and statistical problems. Keeping a large sample size is jeopardised by the 
problems involved with scheduling al1 members of a team for an experimental session, and ensuring they 
will amve. Even with a cornplete team present, 14% of my data was lost due to the failure of the software or 
hardware of one tearn mernber. Statistically, incorporating personal control information is difficult at the 
group level. In my experiment, dernographic data about participants' gender, age, program, and 
preferences were averaged at the team level. This results in a leveling of variables that rnakes systematic 
differences more difficult to capture, Even aggregated, some of these personal characteristics are 
69 The difficulty to detect free-flding problems during laboratory experiments can explain that in previous experimental 
studies, group incentives often outperformed individual incentives. The relaîionship between group incentive and team 
significant. Finally, the reliability of self-reported group characteristics should be taken into account in order 
to use the data. 
In the near future, I will re-examine rny experirnental results using individual member as the level of 
analysis. Predictions from rny model are the same regardless of the level of analysis. When averaged, 
teams' results are identical to mernbers' resuits. For statistical tests, the group level is less powerful than 
the individual Ievel because the sarnple size goes from 139 (teams) t O 487 (members). Cohesion is also 
better controlled at the individual tevel of analysis. In addition, incorporating dernographic data related to 
rnembers (and which appear highly significant in the regression analysis) will be irnproved at the individual 
level of analysis. 
The experirnental support for the hypotheses is rather modest. The regression of helping effort is 
not significant while the regression of the mix of effort is only marginally significant. The regressions of 
individual effort, total effort, and performance are significant but they explain only between 14% and 17% of 
the overall variance. As discussed above, my model predicts that individual effort, total effort, and 
performance are greater under the IP and RP rules than under the ES rule. As predicted, the results 
suggest that individual effort, total effort, and performance are greater under the RP rule than under the ES 
rule (supporting H2b, H2c, and H2e). However, the results suggest no differences in the levels of effort or 
performance between the ES and IP rules. In tenns of helping effort, rny model predicts that the mix of 
effort (proportion of helping effort) is greater under the ES rule than under the IP or RP rules. My results 
suggest no differences in the rnix of effort across the three shanng mies. 
Overall, my rnodel predicts that cohesion has a positive effect on effort under the three sharing 
rules, with two exceptions, First, the mix of effort is independent of cohesion under the ES rule and second, 
individual effort is independent of cohesion under the IP rule. Nevertheless, cohesion has a positive effect 
on the mix of effort and 1 or the total level of effort, both of which shoutd lead to greater performance. None 
of the hypotheses are supported under the ES nile. Under the IP nile, the results suggest that individual 
performance remains unclear in field results, where free-riding problems potentially occur. 
effort remains stable across cohesion levels (consistent with H4d) and that the mix of effort is positively 
related to cohesion (supporting H4b). Under the RP rule, performance is positively related to cohesion 
(supporting Me). The experirnental results also suggest that, in some cases, cohesion does interact with 
sharing rules, but in the direction opposite to that predicted. The positive effects of cohesion on total effort 
and performance were greater under the RP mle than under the ES rule. These results do not support the 
model's suggestion that differences across rules are reduced as cohesion increases. On the contrary, the 
expenment shows that the cornpetitive rule outperfoms both other rules when cohesion is high. 
Sorne patterns in the data might imply problems with rny modelled assumptions and experimental 
design. One of my modei's assumptions is that cohesion increases the level of response of both helping 
and individual effort. In my expen'rnent, cohesion is positively related to mix of effort but has no relationship 
with total effort. These results raise concems about my experimental setting. It is possible that cohesion 
increases the level of response among tearn rnembers, but only for actions observable by the group. Peer 
monitoring requires members to be able to gather information about mutuat contributions to the pool 
(Mitgrom and Roberts [1992]). In my experiments, team members were not seated together. Subjects 
could evaluate helping effort of their peers by their availability to answer questions. In contrast, individual 
work was notas easily evaluated. To test this possibility, multiple-period experiments in which subjects can 
assess each others' individual contribution would be needed. 
Another possibility is that my mode1 is incorrect. It might be that cohesion simply changes people's 
preferences - their utility function - so that rnembers prefer work that involves social interactions, especially 
as they are part of cohesive tearns. This implies that people receive utility for both monetary incentives and 
social interactions in cohesive groups. This would be consistent with behavioural research that found 
cohesion to be particularly productive in tasks requiring a high level of interaction (Mullen and Cooper, 1994; 
Karayaman and Nath, 1984). 
Another modeled assumption is that some level of help improves efficiency. After reaching a 
certain point, helping effort is detrimental to performance because it prevents members from perfaming 
individual work with greater marginal productivity. ln my experiment, the mix of effort was negatively related 
to performance, which means that some mernbers have given too much help. In other words, they helped 
others in spite of the decrease in their performance. A possible explanation could be that collective 
behaviour has a cost of communicating which is difficult to assess in my experiment. Another explanation is 
that in the real world individuals could be financially and socially rewarded for cooperating. 
Future research should continue investigating the effect of incentives on team interactions. 
Ravenscroft and Haka [1996] find that members under group incentives share more information than 
rnembers under competitive incentives. In their experiment, thus, the subjects who understood the task best 
had no reason to share their knowledge when competing. They had nothing to win by sharing out of pure 
altruism. In rny experiment, each team member had exclusive pieces of knowledge (Le. numbers from 
some part of the matrix) that were of great value to their team mernbers. Helping behaviour was reciprocal 
since everybody needed everybody else. Team members exchanged.information not out of altruism but out 
of opportunism. 
In conclusion, the expenmental results provide few insights in understanding the effects of 
incentives in a technoiogy where help is productive. Consistent with Wagernan [1995], no differences in 
performance were found between group and individual incentive schernes. Note that Wageman [1995] did 
not consider cornpetitive incentives, which are the only type of incentives that outperfmn the other 
incentives in my experiment. My results suggest that individuaf effort, total effort, and performznce are 
greater under the RP nrle h a n  under the ES rule. The superiority of the RP nile is consistent with 
Frederickson 11 9921 and Nalbantian and Schotler [1997] in finding effort levels to be higher under 
competitive incentives than under individual incentives. My results extend previous findings in considering a 
technology where both helping and individua! effort are provided. Future research should investigate the 
possibility of creating discrepancies arnongst tearn mernbers' bonuses. 
As predicted, my experimental results also suggest a positive relationship between cohesion and 
performance under the RP nile. The question is, however, whether people working with competitive 
- incentives over a long period of time would remain cohesive. During the experiment, changes in cohesion 
under the RP were not different than changes under the other rules, but the experimental task took only 15 
minutes. Future research should investigate the development of cohesion under different schemes over a 
longer period of time. 
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Appendix A 
First-best solution 
The solution that maxirnizes the tearn's total surplus, the first-best solution, occurs when each worker receives his 
marginal contribution to the team output 
The tearn's total surplus is given by: S = EQ(e, h) - C(e. h) where M = 2a C1[eiS + (x:! hi).'] . 
der"  - S = O Worker 1 supplies e; until the marginal product of el [del-? equals 
de1.5 = 6 the marginal cost of el [61; etn is the efficient level of individual work. 
Se1.5 = u 
e1.5 = ai6 
el- = (d6)2 (double stars indicates first best solution) 
N 
Consider the choice of hlz. Le. the help from 1 to 2, and mcjre broadly, the choice of hl = hl; . 
1x1 
ûSloh12 =ôs1a(&h2) - a(~>h;z)  1312 WoRer 1 supplies hi2 until the marginal product of hi2 
[ d ( ~ k ~ h i 2 ) ' ~  -SI - 1 = 0 [a/( (EL, ha) ).3 equals marginal cost of hi2 [6]; 
d (EL, hi2).' = 6 h12- is the efficient level of help. 
In equilibriurn, hi2 = (d6)2 - (N-2)h12 since al1 workers are identical and act symrnetrically (Le. hik= hik). 
h ~ + ( N - 2 ) h i ~  (&)2 
(N-l)hi2 = (d6)2 
h i 2 = (CdS)2 I(N-1) 
hl- = (d6)Z since al1 workers are identical and act symmetrically (Le. hi = (N-1) ~Y.,hi ). 
At equilibriurn, el = h l  = (al6)zwith total effort t~ = 2(cr/6)2. The rnix of effort [el/(el+ hl)] is efficient at K. 
So that the team performance is Q = 4Na2 16 . 
Appendix B 
Solution under ES / Basic mode1 
Under ES, 81 = BIN = EQ/N where EQ = 2a 1Ll[e' +(~l,hi). '].  
Worker 1 maximises: Wt(e, h) = EQ(e, h)Rcl - C(e1, hi) 
Some individuat work; free-riding i.e. et*< el? Individual work is inversely related with N, the size of the team- 
Consider the choice of h12, i.e. the help from 1 to 2, and more broadly. the choice of h l  = C , h ~ i  .
(xls2  hi^' = (1IN)(cJS) 
xk2 hjz = (1Mz)(dS)2 
(h12+h32+ ...+ h ~ z )  = (I/N2)(Cd8)2 
hl2 = (1/N2)(d6)2- (h32+h42+ ...+ h~2)  
In equilibrîum, hl2 = (1/N*)(d6)2- (N-2)h~ since al1 workers are identical and act symrnetrically. 
(Le. hik = hjk). 
h 12 +(N-2) h 12= (1 IN~)(cxIS)~ 
(N-l)hi2 = (1 W)(CC/6)2 
hi2 = (1 lNZ)(d6]2 I(N-1) 
hi' = (1/N2)(a/6)2 since ail workers are identical and act symrnetrically 
(Le. hi= (N-1) x;,hïj ). 
Some help; free-riding, i-e. h;'~ hln. Help is inversely related with N, the size of the team. 
At equilibriurn, e l  = hl = (1lNZ)(d8)2with total effort tt = (21N2)(d6)2. The mix of individual work and help is efficient 
(Le. the level of individual effort 'relative" to help remains at its first best) because a worker is indifferent between 
supplying both types of effort).j The mix of individual work and heIp is independent of N. 
The outputs are: Eql = 2{(cr[(llN2)(a/6)2j.s) + (a[(llN2)(dS)21.5)) 
. Eqi = [2a(l lN)(dS)] + [2a(l /N)(cr/6)] 
So that the team performance is Q = 4a21S. 
Appendix C 
Solution under IP I Basic model 
N N N - Under fP, ei = 8 [qi! Cqi] =qi  Cqi/Cqi= qi (81 independent of N)- 
i t l  ixl 1=1 
Worker 1 maximises: WI = Eql - C(er, hi) s.t h i  2 O 
= Eqi - C(er, hl) + hhl where L is the Lagrangian multiplier 
= 2V[e1.5 + (h21+h31+...+h~l).~ - (&k + 6hk) + h hk  
de1.5-6 = O  
de1.5 = 6 
6el.5 = a 
eV5 = di5 
ele = (a/6)2. Efficient individual work, i.e. ele= el". 
- 6  +h=O 
h = 6. Since the marginal cost of effort is greater than O (Le. &O), then h>O. A 
positive Lagrangian multiplier implies that the constraint is binding, so that hl = 
0, and the worker's welfare would increase by D O  if h i  couid be reduced by 
one unit 
ÛWllÔA = hl  = 0. No help. The mix of individual work and help is inefficient at O. 
In equilibn'urn, el'= (a/6)2, hl*= 0, and total effort t i  = (a/6)2. 
Tbe outputs are: Eql= 2{a [(cdiS)q-5) 
Eqr = 2{a (cr16)) 
Eqt =2a2 /S. 
So that the tearn performance is Q = 2N(a2 / 6). 
Appendix D 
Solution under RP / Basic mode1 
Worker 1 maximises: 
ln equilibriurn, hi2 = [a@/(6+))I2 - ((N-l)hiz)f 
(N-l)htz= [a@l(6+))]* 
hi2 = [wP/(~+))]~ 1 (N-1 ) 
hl  = (N-1) [a@/(6+))]2 1 (N-1) 
hi = [aWf6+))]2 
(a) Oernonstration that at the equillbrium el > (11N2)(or16)2 and hi < (lIN2)(cr16)*: 
As dernonstrated in Appendix D, under RP: 
In any equilibrium, P(.)z = (UN) (since al1 workers supply same effort and faced same technology). Then 
er = [(l 1N)a 1 (6 - A)?. 
If p =(IN) (Le. there is no cornpetition), then A= O and et = (1/N2)(u16)2 as in ES. If (1IN)cp <1 (there is wmpeooon), 
then A is positive-and since Pe= > 0, e l  > (1/N2)(d6)2, AS p increases, el increases also. 
A simiiar argument holds for the help. As dernonstrated in Appendix D, under CS 
h l  = {@a 1 ( 6  + & ) y  where 0 = ~ ~ = L ( P ( - ) z p z )  and A =Q(-)& Pez(pz - pN ) 
W h  P(-) = (1 IN), help becomes 
hi = [(1IN)a / (8 + A)P. 
If p = (1/N), then A= O and hr = (1iN2)(a/6)2 as in ES. If (11N)cp 51 ,  then A is positive and hi c (11N2)(d6)Z sina? P h  < 
O. As p increases, h i  decreases. 
(b) Demonstration that at the equilibrium t~ > (21N2)(d6)2: 
It was demonstrated above [Appendix D(a)] that under the RP, el > (1/Nz)(cr16)2 while hi  c (llNz)(d6)2. It may weli be 
that the increase in e l  cornpensates for the decrease in hi, so that total effort t i  = e l  + h i  may be greater or less than 
(2/N2)(d6)2 as in the E S  case- 1 will demonstrate that the increase in e l  exceeds the decrease in hl, so that tr > 
(m2) (a/6)2. 
et = [(1/N)a / ( 6  - A)]* and hi = [(1 1N)a / ( 6  + A)I2. 
i want to show that [el RP - el ES] > [hl ES - hi  RP] 
(1 /N')(cr/(& - A))' - (1 /N')(CJ6)2 > (1 /N')(dS) 2 - (1 /N')(d(6 + A)' 
(1/N2)(d(& - A))' + (l/N')(cd(G + A))' > (2/N')(d&)' 
(1/N2)a2(6 - A)-2 + (I/NZ)a2(6 + A)-2 > (2/N2)(Cd6)2 
If A = O, than LHS = RHS 
However in rny model A > O. Let us see how LHS is affected by an increase in A. 
ZLHSlaA = [(UNZ)a2(6 - A)-3] + k(2/N2)a2(6 + A)-3] 
= (UN~)a2{[11(8-A)3]-[1/(6+A)3]) 
Since (6 + A) > ( 6  - A) >O and (6 - A)3 < (6 + A)3 
then [1 / ( 8  - A)3] > [1 / ( 8  + A)3] 
Thus, ÛLHSIÔA = (21N2)a' { fl / (8 - AI3] - [1 / (6  + A)3] ) > O, 
and since ZRHSlaA = O, LHS > RHS when A > O. QED 
(c) Demonstration that at the equilibrium Q * 4a2/6: 
Eqi = 2a [e?+ (lk,hii)-S ] = 2a [el5 + (h21+h3i+ .-.+h~i).5] 
Under RP, ei = [(1/N)a / ( 6  - A)]2 and h i  = [(1/N)a 1 (6 + A)12 so 
Eq: = { 2a  { [(1IN)a 1 ( 6  - A)I2 15) + { 2 a  {[(A /N)a 1 (8  + A)j2 f5 ) 
Eql = { 2a (1 /N)(d(G - A))) + { 2a (1 lN)(d(G + A)) ) 
Eql = { (2aYN)(1 /(6 - A))) + { (2a2/N1(1 l(6 + A)) ) 
As dernonstrated in Appendix 0, under ES, Eqi = (4/N)(a216) 
I want to show that [qt > ql ES] 
{(2a2lN)(l/(S - A))) + { (2a2/N)(ll(S + A)) ) > (41N)(a216) 
((2a21N) (6 - A)-') + {(2a2n\o(6 + A)-I) > (4/N)(a2/6) 
If A = O, than LHS = RHS. Afso, 
Given that (6 -A)2 < (8 + LS)q 
[I / (6-A)2j > [A 1(6+A)q  
and a2 { f l  l ( 6  -A)? - [1 1(S + AI2] } > O 
Thus, cLHSIi3A > O and BRHSIÛA = O so LHS > RHS when A > O. QED 
Appendix E 
Solution under ES 1 Extended model 
Under ES. 81 = BIN = EO/N where EQ = 2a  2 , [e fs  + ( ~ ~ s , h i ) ~ 5  1. 
Worker 1 maximises: W1= EQlN - C(e1, hi) 
Wi=(2/N) u{[e1,5+ (1~1hj1).5 ]+[e25+ (~:,42)-~ ]+[e35+(1k hj3)-' ]+ ...+[e N.S + (EL,., hri).' B - (6ei + 6hi) 
[1+[(~-2)(~/(~-1))]](1/~)al(~~~~hi~)~ = 6 - [- - -1  
( ~ : ~ h j ~ ) ~  {6 - [..-]} = [~+[(N-~)(v / (N-~))U(~IN)~ 
(~y=~hj2)-' = (1 +[(N-2)(~I(N-l))]](1lN)d[6 - [.--Il 
(Ey!, hjz) = [ l  +[(N-2)(~l(N-i))]l2(1 lN2)[a1[6 - [. . . Il2 
(h12+h32+ ...+ h~z )  = [1 +[(N-2)(~/(N-l))]]2(11N~)[d[5 - [..-]Il2 
hi2 = [1 +[(N-2)(v/(N-1))]]2(1 INZ)[cd[6 - [. . -112 - (h32+.. .+~Nz). 
In equillibrium, 
hl  = (N-1)(1IN2)[a[l + (N-l)~]/6]~1(N-l) 
hi* = (1/N2)[at[l + (N-l)~]/6]2 
So that worker k's choices of effort are el'= (1/N2)[a(l + (N - 1)~) /6 ]~  and hl*= (1 /~2) [a ( i  + (N - l)v)16j2, with his 
total effort tt = (UN2)[a(l + (N - l)v)/6]2. The mix of individual work and help is efficient (Le. the Ievel of individuai 
effort relative to help'remains at its first best) because a worker is indifferent between supplying both types of effort).2 
The outputs are: Eqi = 2[a  [(1/N*)[a(l + (N - l)v)/6]q5 + [a (IM2)[a(l. + (N - 1)v)16]qs] 
Eqr = 2[[(1/N)a2(1 + (N - l)v)16] + [(IIN)a2(1 + (N - l)v)/6]]- 
Eqi = 2((2/N)d(i + (N - 1)v)lSfl 
Eqt = (4/N)(a2(1 + (N - 1)v)16) 
So that the team performance is Q = 4(a2(1 + ((N - l)v))/S) 
Appendix F 
Solution under IP / Extended modet 
N N N  
Under IP, 81 = 8 [ql 1 Cqi] = q l  C qi 1 qi = qi (81 independent of N). 
i%l i l  i=1 
Worker 1 maximises: 
WI = Eql - C(e1, hi) 
= Eql - C(e1, hi) 
= 2a[e:(e2+e3+...+e~).5 + (hz~(h;~+hl~+ ...+ hl~+h31+h32+ -.-+ h3~+ -.-+ h~l+h~z+...+h~(l)) 
+ h3i(hiz+hrj+ ...+ hi~+h2i+hz3+--.+h2~+-.-+h~i+h~2+.-.+h~(~-i)) 
+.*. 
+ h~t(hl?+hi3+.. + hi~+h21+hzz+ ..-+ h2~+ --.+ h (~- i~1+h~~1~2+ ...+ h(~-1]~)).5]- (6e1 6h1) 
~WT/%I= ale1.5-6 = O  
ale+ = 6 
6e1-5 = a 
el-5 = or16 
ely = (a/6)2. Efficient individual work, i.e. el'= elw. 
In equilibrium, h21 = (vd6)Z- ((N-2)h21) 
(N-1)hzi = (vor16)Z 
h21 = (vd&)Y(N-1) 
hz = (N-l)(~dG)~i(N-l) 
hz = (vd6)Z 
So that worker 1's choices of effort are elT= (or16)2 and hi'= (av/6)*, with his total effort tl = (1 + ~2)(01/6)2. 
The ou tpu ts are: Eqi = 2{[a(cr/6)] + [a(va/6)]} 
Eqi = 2(ar216) + 2(va216) . 
Eqi = 2(1+ v ) d 8  
So that the team performance is Q = 2N(1+ v)or2/6. 
Appendix G 
Solution under RP 1 Extended model 
where Q(-)=2aael(e2+e3+ ..+ e~).5+(hzi(hrz+hi3+ ..+ hi~+h3i+hx+ ...+ h w + - . - + h ~ i + h ~ 2 ~ 1 ) )  
+ h3i(hiz+hi3+ ...+ hi~+h2i+ha+ ...+ hm+ ...+ h ~ i + h ~ z +  ...+ ~N(N-I~) 
+... 
+ h~r(hi2+hi3+ ...+ hi~+h2t+h~z+ -.-+ ~ ~ N ~ . - . + ~ ( N - I ) I + ~ ~ I ) ~ + . . . + ~ ( w I ) N ) ) . ?  
+-.- f [~N(€?I+~Z+...+~N).~ +( hi (h~i+h23+ ...+ h2~+h3i+h32+-~.+h3~+-..+h~i+h~2+..-+h~(~-i)) 
+ ha(htz+hr3+ ...+ hr~+h3i+h23+ ...+ h 3 ~ +  ...+~NI+~N~+...+~N(KI)) 
+.*. 
+ h(~-r)~(hi2+hi3+ ...+ hi~+h21+ha+ ...+ h 2 ~ +  ...+ h~ i+h~2+ ... ~N(N-I))).~]} 
Worker 1 maximizes: 
~ P 1 [ ~ ' ( - ) p Z [ ( a  I eiS) +(a41 l e?  + î I e l S  +...+ 1 I eN-T))I + [(Petz +( v(Pelz +P=~L+...+P~z)))pzQ(-)I - 6 = 0 
~ ~ l p L ( . ) p L ( a l  e l 5 )  + ~ ~ = , ~ ' ( - ) ~ ' a ~ l l e r ~  +I e l '+...+ l l  e ~ ' )  + x:.,Pe,'$Q(-) 
+ ~P~(v (Pe2~  + P.?,z....+Pmz))pzq-) = 6 
x~= ,~~ ( - )~ ' (n  l e? ) + ~ ~ , ~ ' ( - ) ~ ' a ~ l  1 ez-5 +Il e %-...+Il et?) + xy=,Pe,LpzQ(-) 
+ EL,( +Pe:))pZQ(-) = 6 since & P ~ '  = -P.: 
[(ilel-?)+((v(l /ezs+. . -+lIe~5))] ax:=, PL(-)pz + (1 -v) z:=, PetZp'Q(-) = 6 
[(llei-s))+((v(l lezS+.. . + l l e ~ ~ ) ) ]  a@+ (1-v) ) A = 6 where @ = ~ r= , [P~ ( - )p ' ]  and A = ~k,[Pe.'$Q(-)l 
(11e1.5) ab, = 6 - ((v(1 /ezS+ ...+ 1 Ie~5)) ab,) - A + VA 
1 /e1.5= 6 - ((v(1le~-s+. . +lle~5)) a@) - A + vdaa 
e1.5= a@/ 6 - ( (~ (1  leps+. . . + l  l e d )  ab,) - A + VA 
et= [ a W 6  - A + VA ((v(lle~5f ...+ 1 le^.^)) cz@)j2 
In equilibrium, ei= (a@l6 - A + VA -(v(N-1 )(1 le+)) cr@)I2 
et-5= [a01 6 - A  + VA -(v(N-l)(l/ez5)) a@) 
et-s[6 - A + VA -(v(N-l)(llez3) u a)] = a @  
el-% - el.=& + e+vA -((N-l)va@) = aN 
eP(8 - A + VA) = a@ + (v(N-1) a@) 
el-5= a@ (1 + (v(N-1)))/(6 - (A (1-v))) 
- el= [ a 0  (1 + (v(N-l)))I(& - (A (1-v)))I2 
Worker 1 maximizes: 
In equilibrium, 
(a) Demonstration that at the equilibrium e-~ > (11N2)[a(1+((N-l)v))/6)2 and hi < (llN2)[a(l+((N-1)~))16)~: 
As demonstrâted in Appendix G, under RP: 
et = {Oa( l  + ((N-l)v))/(6 - (A(1-v)))P where 4 =y!=, (P()'pZ) and A = Q(-)E;=,P~'(~' -pN) . 
In any equilibrium, Pz(-) = (1IN) (since al1 workers supply same effort and faced same technology). Then 
et* = {(1/N)a(l + ((N-1 )v))/(6 - (A(1-v))))2 
If p =(UN) (Le. there is no competition), then A= O and el = (lINq[a(l+((N-l)v))/6)2 as in ES. If (1IN)cp 11 (there is 
competition), then A is positive and et > (1IN2)[a(l+((N-l)~))18)2. As p increases, el increases aiso. 
A sirnilar argument holds for the help. As dernonstrated in Appendix G, under RP: 
hi = {@a(l + ((N-l)v))1(6 + (A(1 -v)))JZ where @ = xy=, (P(-) pz) and A = O(-)%, PeZ(pz - pN ) 
Witti Pz(-) = (1 IN), help becomes 
hi* = {(l/N)a(l + ((N-l)v))1(6 + ( ~ ( 1  -v))))2 
If p = (UN), then A= O and hl = (1IN2)[a(l+((N-1)v))lS)' as in ES. If (1IN)cp 11, then A is positive and hr < 
(1/N2)[a(l +((N-l)v))l8)2 . As p increases, h t decreases. 
(b) Demonstration that at the equilibrium tl > (21N2)[a(1+((N-1)v))16)2: 
It was dernonstrated above [Appendix G(a)] that under the RP, et > (1IN2)[u(l+((N-l)~))16)~ while 
hi < (l/N2)[a(l+((N-l)~))/6)2. It may well be that the increase in ei compensates for the decrease in hi, so that total 
total effort tt = el + hl may be greater or less than (îINZ)[a(l +((N-l)v))16)2 as in the ES case. 1 will demonstrate that 
the increase in et exceeds the decrease in hl, so that tr > (2/N2)[a(l +((N-l)v))16)2. 
Under RP, et = {(l/N)a(l + ((N-l)v))/(S - (A(1-v)))~ and ht = ((l/N)a(l + ((N-l)v))1(6 + (A(1-~))))2- 
1 want to show that [et - el ES] > [hl ES - h i  RP] 
{(lIN)cr(l + ((N-l)v))/(G - (A(l +)))y - (1/N2)[a(l +((N-l)v))16I2 
> (1IN2)[a(l+((N-l)~))/6]~ - {(l/N)cr(l + ((N-f)v))f(6 + (~(1-v))));! 
If A = 0, than LHS = RHS 
However in my mode1 A > O. Let us see how LHS is affected by an increase in A. 
Since (6 + (A(1-v)) > (6 - (~(1-v)) >O and (6 - (A(1-v))J c (6 + (~(l-v))3 
then [1 1 (6 - (A(1-v))3] > [1 1 (5 + (A(1-v))3] 
Thus, XHSlùA = (1-v)(2/N2)(a(l + ((N-1)~)))~ [11(S - (~(1-v)))3 - 1/(6 + (h ( l -~ ) ) )~  ] > 0. 
and since GRHSlûA =O, LHS > RHS when A > O. QED 
(c) Demonstration that at the equilibrium Q > 4(a2(1 + ((N-l)v))l6): 
Under RP, el = {(1/N)a(l + ((N-l)v))/(6 - (~(1-v))))2 and hl = {(l/N)a(l + ((N-l)v))1(6 + (~(1-v)))? so that: 
Eqt = {2a {{(l/N)a(l + ((N-1 )v))/(S - (A(1 -v))))2) 3 + { 2a (((1 /N)cr(l + ((N-1)v))/(6 + (A(l -v))))2 ) } 
Eqi = {2a (1 IN)a(l + ((N-l)v))1(6 - (A(1 -v))) ) + { 2a (llN)a(l + ((N-1)v))/(6 + (A(1 -v))) } 
Eqi = {(2a2/N)(1 + ((N-1 )v))/(1 1(8 - (A(1 -v)))) } + { (2a21N)a(l + ((N-I)v))/(1 l(6 + (A(1-v)))) } 
As demonstrated in Appendix El under ES, Eqt = (4lN)(u2(1 + ((N-l)v))l6): 
I want to show that [qt RP > qt ES] 
((2a21N)(1 + ((N-l)v))1(11(6 - (A(1-v)))) } + { (2az/N)a(l + ((N-l)v))/(1/(6 + (A(1-v)))) } > (4/N)(u2(1 + ((N-1)v))lG) 
((2a21N)(1 + ((N-l)v))(S - (A(1-v)))-l ) + { (2aYN)a(l + ((N-l)v))(6 + (~(1-v)))-1 } > (4/N)(d(1 + ((N-1)v))IS) 
If A = O, than LHS = RHS. Also, 
Given ihat (6 - (A(~-v))~ c (8 + ( A ( ~ - v ) ) ~  
[1 1(6 - (A(1-v))? > [ I  / (6 + (A(1-v))q 
and (1-v)(2a2lN)(1 + ((N-1 )v)) [II@ - ( 4 ( l - ~ ) ) ) ~  - 11(6 + (A(~-V) ) )~  ]> O 
Thus, ZLHSIaA > O and 5RHSlûA = O so LHS > RHS when A > O. QED 
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Document entjtled cL1nforrnation-Consent Letter" 
Information-Consent Letter 
1 As stated in the syllabus, students enrolled in ACC131 will'receive thirty out of a possible one thousand and forty points (3%) from either participating in the experimental study described below or submitting an aiternative assignment 
/ The alternative assignment consists of writing a three-page essay on new forrns of compensation in organisations. 
This essay must be handed in by the 12a of November 1999. 
Information about the experimental study 
The experimenta! study examines the effect of compensation on performance. Professor MarieJosée Ledoux (ext 
5731) is conducting this study under the supervision of Dr. Steven Salterio (ext 5778) of the School of Accountancy at 
University of Waterloo. Information collected will be used by Ms. Ledoux to complete her Ph.0. thesis in Accounting. 
The participants must register with their work team members for one of the laboratory sessions by the 8th of October 
1999. The laboratory sessions will take place between the 25m of October 1999 and the 5m of Novernber 1999, mostly 
during late afternoon and early evening (although some daytime sessions wili also be available). The total number of 
sessions available will depend on how rnany students choose to participate in mis study. The list of available 
laboratory sessions will be posted on the experiment's website (which can be reached through the ACC131 website) 
beginning the 28m of September 1999. The list wiII be updated continually as people register. Deterrnine your team's 
preferred time and email me your names, student IDs, and preferred tirne at miedolixG2uwaterloo.ca. Each 
laboratory session can facilitate 20 participants and the sessions will be assigned on a Vrst corne first served" basis. 
During the laboratory session, the participants will be asked to perforrn a task that involves interacting with a computer 
and other participants. The task is to answer simple questions of the following level of difficulty: 2 + 7 + 4. In addition, 
the participants will have to answer some straightforward questions about themselves, their experience working in 
teams, and their understanding of the experiment 
The laboratory session will take one hour for which each person will receive thirty points out of a possible one 
thousand and forty points (3%) towards their ACC131 mark. Each participant will also receive tickets for a draw in 
which the pnze is $100.00. There will be one draw per session. The number of tickets received by the students will 
depend on their performance during the experiment. Once al1 laboratory sessions are over, I will visit each class and 
present the preliminary results of my study. 
There are no anticipated risks associated with parücipating in this study. NI information collected as a result of your 
participation in the study will be used for teaching or research publication purposes. By participating in this study, you 
will increase knowledge about compensation that could be useful to managers in actual practice. Your anonyrnity is 
guaranteed and you will not be identified for any reports or publications. Consent to participate, or consent for the use 
of information you provide may be withdrawn at any time by advising the student researcher without reprisal. 
This study has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance, through the Office of Research Ethics at the 
University of Waterloo. Any comments or concems about the study or your participation may be directed to this office 
(ext. 60 05). 
Appendix H (continued) 
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Indication of choice 
Indicate your choice by checking the appropriate box. If you choose to participate in the experirnental study, please 
sign the foilowing consent form. You may withdraw from the experiment and opt for the alternative assignment at any 
tirne. 
Experimen ta1 research a Alternative assignment CI 
Consemt to participate in the experirnental study 
I have read the infornation about the study above and any additional questions I had have been answered. I 
understand that my anonymity is guaranteed and that 1 may withdraw my participation at any point throughout the 
study without reprisal. I further understand that I will receive 30 points for ACC131, and will be eligibie for a $100.00 
draw. upon cornpletion of my involvernent in the study. 
Participant's Name (please print): 
Participant's Signature: 
Witnesç's Signature: 
Date: 1 1 
D M Y  
Appendix I 
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Index of Cohesion 
Answer the fotlowing questions about your experimental team by checking the appropriate boxes. 
My team is very attractive in ternis of being interesting, fun to be with, and enjoyable. 
Completely General 1 y Somewhat Neither agree 


















I look fonvard to being with the members of my team. 
Cornpletel y Generally Sornewhat Neither agree 
disagree disagree disagree nor disagree 
Sornewhat Generally 
agree agree 
1 have confidence and trust in my team members. 
Cornpletely Generally Sornewhat Neither agree 
disagree disagree disagree nor disagree 
Sornewhat Generally 
agree agree 
1 feel I am really a part of my team. 
Cornpletely Generally Somewhat Neither agree 
disagree disagree disagree nor disagree 
Sornewhat Generally 
agree agree 
I would like to work with this team again on a sirnilar project. 
CompIeteIy Generally Sornewhat Neither agree 
disagree disagree disagree nor disagree 
Scrnewhat Generally 
agree agree 
The last question does not refer to your experimental team but evaluates your general feeling about working in a group 
relative to individually. 
How do you feel about working in a group relative to individually? 
Completely Generall y Sornewhat Neither agree Somrwhat Generally Completely 
disagree disagree disagree nor disagree agree agree agree 
Appendix J 
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This session has four parts. First, you will go through the team member identification process. Second, you will practice 
how to do the exercise. Third, you will perfom the exercise that will allow you to cumulate tickets for the draw. And 
fourth, you will answer sorne follow-up questions. 
(1) Personal Identification 
Each of you is part of a team, Each team consists of four or three people- Your team number is indicated on the 
laminated sheet in front of you. Within a team, each member is associated with a specific colour- In a four-person 
team, colours are red, bIue, green and purple. In a three-person team. colours are red, blue and green. Your colour is 
also indicated on your laminated sheet. To make sure that everybody knows his or her tearn number and coiour, 1 will 
ask each of you to stand up and Say your assigned colour when I cal1 your team's number. Team number 1, team 
number 2, etc. 
You are facing the 'gateway screen". 1 would like you to locate on this screen the column that corresponds to your 
team number and, under it, your colour. Once you have Iocated it, write your first name in the empty space. This will be 
the name used while you communicate wim the other rnembers of your team. 
Please, make sure that you are writing your name in the appropriate box, this is essential for the rest of this experiment 
to succeed. When your name is written, click on "GO". 
You are now facing the "main screenn, which is divided into three sections. The large yellow area dominating your 
screen will be use for practice right now but later on, this is where you will do the exercise. The practice example that 
you have on your screen is designed for four person teams. If you are a three person team, please click on the number 
3 at the top right corner of your screen. Let's start the practice example. 
(2) The practice example 
Your task is to answer arithmetic questions frorn the Iist provided in your screen. During the exercise, each correct 
answer will be worth a certain amount of tickets for the draw. The number of tickets per correct answer wili be listed in 
the second column of the exercise section. In the practice example, this column is filled with 'nonen. This is because 
the practice questions are used to Iearn how to answer your questions and to communicate with your team rnembers, 
not to accumulate tickets. 
Each question requires you to add three numbers. Type your answers in the blank space. You can use your Tab key to 
move from one question to the next. The first three practice questions were designed to familiarise you with the 
computer package. You may answer these three questions now. 1 repeat, you may answer questions 1 ,2 ,  and 3 of the 
practice example now. 
[Practice example -questions 1.2, and 3 - in process.] 
The exercise requires you to add three nurnbers just as you did, however, one of these numbers has to be traced from 
a matrÏx. An example of the matrix is given on the back of the laminated sheet in front of you. Take a look at it. As you 
Appendix J (continued) 
Document entitied 6clnstructions" 
see, this matrix of numbers includes cells from A/a to Z/z. The capital letters correspond to the vertical axis while 
the small letters correspond to the horizontal axis. 
Each of you holds only the numbers for one-quarter of the complete matrix, and the other members of your team hold 
the rest of them. In particular, you hold the numbers corresponding to your colour. Note that this matrix is only used for 
the practice example. Each of you has another matrix in the srnall envelope under your keyboard, which is similar 
except there is a number in each celi (instead of an X that you see on your practice matrix). 
Dunng the exercise, some questions will require you to retrieve nurnbers from your own matnx. The three following 
questions, that is, questions 4,s. and 6, were designed to venfy that you can retrieve numbers frorn your matrix. You 
may answer these three questions now. 1 repeat, you may answer questions 4,5,  and 6 of the practice example now. 
[Practice example - questions 4,5, and 6 - in process.] 
Other questions will require Lie help of the other members of your teôm. At the bottom of your scrsen is a form 
consisting of six inputs and a submit button. It is through this fonn that you will cornmunicate with your team members. 
The first input on the forrn is entiffed 'Target" and contains the cofours of your team mernbers. It is through this input 
that you will choose which team mernber you wish to communicate with. It is essential to identify a target each time you 
communicate with one of your team mernbers. If you don't choose a target, your message will be send to yourself. 
The second and third inputs on the form are entitled, respectively, ' A  to 2" and 'a to z". It is through ffiese inputs 
that you will indicate which cell of the rnatrix you are interested in. The fourth input on the form are entitied "?/=*. The 
question mark is used to ask a question while the equal sing is used to provide an answer. The fifth input is entitled 
nAnswef and contains numbers frorn 1 to 9. This wifl be used to answer your team member questions. Finally, you 
can add any comments in the sixth input This is not necessaty but you can do it if you want. 
When people will send you messages, they will appear in the blank vertical area at the left of your screen. The 
messages will be written in the colour of the members who send you the information, and they will be followed by the 
name of this person. You need to know which member is sending you the request to direct your answer to him. 
I will now illustrate how to ask for help. Suppose that member GREEN needs the number from ce11 A/a. First he looks 
at his matrix and identify whose member has this information. CeIl A /a  falls in the red quarter of the matrix so that the 
request should be target to RED. At 'Target", GREEN selects "red". at 'A-Z,  he selects 'A", at "a-z", he selects 
'an, at "?/=", he selects"?". He finally clicks on "Submit". Within a few seconds, the expression "Aa?" wilt appear in 
the vertical area at the lefi of RED'S screen. Note that this request will be in green, so that RED knows that GREEN is 
asking. 
Now, suppose that RED decides to respond to this request She retrieves from her matrix the number corresponding to 
the cell A/a. Suppose that this number is 3. At ' ~a r~e t * ,  she selects 'greenn, at "A-Z", she selects 'An, at 'a-zn, 
she selects 'aw, at '?/="she clicks on the "=", at "Answer", she selects "3", and she finally clicks on 'Submit". Within 
few seconds, the expression "Aa=3" will appear in the vertical area at the left of GREEN'S screen. 
Note that you can use your mouse or the Tab key to move from one input to the next. And for each input, you can click 
XI the arrow and select a character or you can simply type it (at ' A  -Z", you can simply type a letter and it wili 
automatically use the capital format). 
Appendix J (continued) 
Document entitled LLlnstructionssy 
Each of you holds onIy the numbers for one-quarter of the complete maûix, and the other members of your team hold 
the rest of them. ln particular, you hold the numbers corresponding to your colour. Note that fhis matrix is only used for 
the practice example. Each of you has another matrix in the srnaIl envelope under your keyboard, w,Ciich is similar 
except there is a nurnber in each ceIl (instead of an X that you see on your practice matrix). 
Questions 7,8, and 9 were designed to verify that you wuld exchange information with your tearn rnembers. You May 
answer these three questions now. I repeat, you may answer questions 7,8, and 9 of the practice example now. 
[Practice example -questions 7,8, and 9 - in process.] 
When you have answered al1 nine questions, press the grey button at the end of the page. If one of your answers is 
wrong, a pop up box will appear. Please correct the wrong answer immediately and try to submit again. If al1 your 
questions are correct, you will pass tu the main exercise. 
(3) The main exercise 
The three empty spaces at the top of the yellow section should be fiiled. At 'Student # ", write your student's ID 
nurnber. At rearn", click on the drop down arrow and select your team's number. At 'Session", click on the drop down 
arrow and select your session number as indicated on the blackboard at the front of the ciass. 
Please take the white sheet from your envelope. This sheet is entitled tExercise and Incentives". 
Own requests already send Members' requests already 
answered 
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ES condition 1 four person team 
Exercise and lncentives 
(Four penon team) 
As mentioned earlier, your task is to answer anthmetic questions frorn the list provided in your screen. However, you 
are free to answer any questions you wish. You do not have to answer al1 questions. You do not have to answer them 
in the order presented. You may scroll up and down in the list and answer the questions in the order it pleases you. 
You do not have to help your team mernbers by answering their requests. You may choose to help them bot you are 
not forced to. 
You can answer every second question from your list using your own matnx (e-g. questions 1,3, S) ,  but you need the 
help of the other members of your team to answer the rest 
(2) Incentives 
Team's pool of tickets 
During the exercise, your team will accumulate tickets for the draw. Each correct answer will provide additional tickets 
to your team. At the end of the exercise, each team will have a ~ o o l  of tickets to be shared amonq its members. 
The number of tickets per correct answer is indicated in the second column. Note that the number of tickets per 
correct answer decreases as you progress through the questions. 
Sharing rule 
At theend of the exercise, your team's pool of tickets will be equally shared among the team members. In other words, 





Tickets accurnulated by 
each team member from 
his or her list of questions 
Tearn's pool of tickets 1000 
.The draw 
Tickets received by 
Sharing rule each member 
The more tickets yoo receive, the greater is your chance of winning $100.00, 
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ES condition I three person team 
Exercise and incentives 
(Three persan team) 
(1) Exercise 
As mentioned eadier, your task is to answer anthmetic questions fram the list provided in your screen. However. you 
are free to answer any questions you wish. You do not have to answer al1 questions. You do not have to answer them 
in the order presented. You rnay scroll up and down in the list and answer the questions in the order it pleases you. 
You do not have to help your team members by answeB'ng their requests. You may choose to help them but you are 
not forced to. 
You c m  answer every second question tom your list using your own matnx (e-g. questions 1,3,5), but you need ihe 
help of the other members of your tearn to answer the rest. 
Team's pool of tickets 
During the exercise, your team will accumulate tickets for the draw. Each correct answer will provide additional tickets 
to your tearn. At the end of the exercise, each tearn will have a pool of tickets to be shared amonq its members. 
The number of tickets per correct answer is indicated in the second colurnn. Note that the number of tickets per 
correct answer decreases as you progress through the questions. 
Sharing rule 
At the.end of the exercise, your team's pool of tickets will be equally shared arnong the team members. In other words, 
you will receive lb (33.3%) of the total number of tickets eamed by your team, as illustrated in the following example: 
Tickets accumulated by Tickets received by 
each team mernber from Shanng mle each member 




Team's poa tickets 750 750 
@The draw 
The more tickets you receive, the greater is your chance of winning $100.00. 
Appendix K (continurd) 
Document entitled "Exercise and Incentivesy9 
IP condition 1 four person team 
Exercise and Incentives 
(Four person team) 
As rnentioned earlier, your task is to answer anthmetic questions from the list provided in your screen. However, you 
are free to answer any questions you wish. You do not have to answer al1 questions. You do not have to answer hem 
in the order presented. You may scroll up and down in the list and answer the questions in the order it pleases you. 
You do not have to help your team mernbers by ançwering their requests. You rnay choose to help them but you are 
not forced to. 
You can answer every second question h m  your list using your own rnatrix (e.g. quesüons 1.3.5). but you need the 
help of the other members of your team to answer the rest. 
(2). Incentives 
O Accumulation of tickets 
During Me exercise, you will personally accumulate tickets for the draw. In particular, each correct answer in your list of 
questions will provide you with additional tickets. 
The number of tickets per correct answer is indicated in the second column. Note that the nurnber of tickets per 
correct answer decreases as you progress through the questions. 
lt is not important whether you find your answers alone or are helped by your team me.mbers. At the end the exercise, 
you will receive the number of tickets accurnulated frorn Vour list of auestions. 
0 Illustration 
The following example illustrates how the team mernbers received the tickets they accurnulated from their own list of 





Tickets accumulated by 
each tearn mernber from 
his or her list of questions 
Tickets received by 
each mernber 
Total 1 O00 1000 
aThe draw 
The more tickets you receive, the greater is your chance of winning $1 00.00. 
Appendix K (continued) 
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IP condition 1 three person team 
Exercise and lncentives 
(Three person team) 
(1) Exercise 
As mentioned earlier, your task is to answer aritfirnetic questions from the list provided in your screen- However, you 
are free to answer any questions you wish. You do not have to answer al1 questions. You do not have to answer them 
in the order presented. You may scroll up and down in the list and answer the questions in the order it pteases you. 
You do not have to help your team members by answenng their requests. You may choose to help them but you are 
not forced to. 
You cm answer every second question from your list using your own matrÏx (e.g. questions 1,3,5), but you need the 
help of the other rnembers of your team to answer the rest 
(2) Incentives 
Accumulation of tickets 
During the exercise, you wili personally accumulate tickets for the draw. In particular, each correct answer in your list of 
questions will provide you with additional tickets. 
The number of tickets per correct answer is indicated in the second column. Note that the number of tickets per 
correct answer decreases as you progress through the questions. 
It is not important whether you find your answers alone or are helped by your team members. At the end the exercise, 
you will receive the number of tickets accumulated from your list of questions. 
illustration 
The following example illustrates how the team members received the tickets they accumulated ftom their own list of 





Tickets accurnulated by 
each team mernber from 
his or her list of questions 
.The draw 
The more tickets you receive, the greater is your chance of winning $100.00. 
Tickets received by 
each member 
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RP condition 1 four person team 
Exercise and Incentives 
(Four person team) 
As mentioned earlier, your task is to answer arithmetic questions from the list provided in your screen. However, you 
are free to answer any questions you wish. You do not have to answer al1 questions. You do not have to answer them 
in the order presented. You rnay saoll up and down in the list and answer the questions in the order it pleases you. 
You do not have to help your team members by answenng their requests. You may choose to help them but you are 
not forced to. 
You can answer every second question from your list using your own maîrix (e.g. questions 1,3,5), but you need the 
help of the other members of your team to answer the rest 
(2) Incentives 
Team's pool of tickets 
During the exercise, your team will accumulate tickets for the draw. Each correct answer will provide additional tickets 
to your team. At the end of the exercise, each team will have a pool of tickets to be shared amonq its members. 
The number of tickets per correct answer is indicated in the second column. Note that the number of tickets per 
correct answer decreases as you progress through the questions. 
At the end of the exercise, your team's pool of tickets will be shared among the team rnembers as follows. The 
rnember that performs the best will get 4/10 (40%) of the ticket pool. The second place perfomer will get 3110 (30%). 
Third place wi!l get 2/10 (20%). And the last place perfomer will get Vto (10%). 
Your performance corresponds to the number of tickets vou accumulate on vour individual Iist of ~uestions. It is not 
important whether you find your answers alone or are helped by your team members. The member that performs the 
best is the member who accumulates the most tickets in his or her list, as illustrated in the following example: 
Tickets accumulated by Tickets received by 
each team member from each member 
his or her list of questions 
Red 170 (4Ih place) 1000 X 10% = 1 O0 
Blue 350 (1st place) 1 O00 X 40% = 400 
Green 230 (3rd pIace) 1000 X 20% = 200 
Purple - 250 (2nd place) 1000 X 30% = - 300 
Team's pool of tickets 1000 1 O00 
@The draw 
The more tickets you receive, the greater is your chance of winning $100.00. 
Appendix K (continued) 
Document entitled LLExercise and Incentives9' 
RP condition / three person team 
Exercise and lncentives 
(Three person team) 
(1) Exercise 
As rnentioned eariier, your task is to answer anthmetic questions from the list provided in your screen. However, you 
are free to answer any questions you wish. You do not have to answer al1 questions. You do not have to answer them 
in the order presented. You may scroll up and down in the list and answer the questicns in the order it pleases you. 
You do not have to help your team members by answenng îheir requests. You may choose to help them but you are 
not forced to- 
You can answer every second question from your list using your own rnatnx (e-g. questions 1,3,5), but you need ?he 
help of the other members of your team to answer the rest 
(2) Incentives 
0 Tearn's pool of tickets 
Ouring the exercise, your team will accumulate tickets for the draw. Each correct answer will provide additional tickets 
to your team. At the end of the exercise, each team will have a pool of tickets to be shared amonq its members. 
The number of tickets per correct answer is indicated in the second column. Note that the number of tickets per 
correct answer decreases as you progress through the questions. 
Sharing rule 
At the end of  the exercise, your team's pool of tickets will be shared among the team members as follows. The 
member that performs the best will get 3/6 (50%) of the ticket pool. The second place perfomier will get 216 (33.3%). And 
the last place petformer will get 11s (16.6%). 
Your performance corresponds to the number of tickets vou accumulate on vour individual list of suestions. It is not 
important whether you find your answers alone or are helped by your tearn rnembers. The member Viat perforrns the 
best is the mernber who accumulates the most tickets in his or her list, as illustrated in the following example: 
Tickets accumulated by Tickets received by 
each tearn rnember from each mernber 




170 (3B place) 750 X 16.6% = 125 
350 (1st place) 750 X 50% = 375 
230 - (2rd place) 750 X 33.3% = 250 -
Team's pool of tickets 750 750 
.The draw 
The more tickets you receive, the greater is your chance of winning $100.00. 
Appendix L 
Document entitled uFolIow-up questions" 
ES condition 
Follow-up questions 
In which program are you currently involved at University of Waterioo? 
a r t s  Accounting ma th  Accounting Ei cience Accounting 
m r t s  Business ather. Which one 
In what year were you bom? 
Are you male or female? CM ale. 13 emale. 
8 Most people in this country think of themseives as Canadian. However, in addition, is there a partîcular nationality 
or etfinic group to which you think of yourself as belonging? 
CNo. m e s .  Which one? 
The following questions assess your understanding of the exercise. 
During the exercise: 
8 The number of tickets per correct answer ... 
lncreased as I progressed Decreased as I progressed through the 
Through the questions questions 
0 cl 
Answering one of the questions from my iist ... 
lncreased my 
Team's pool of tickets 
0 
Answering one of the questions from my Iist ... 
lncreased the number of 
tickets I received 
O 
Helping one of my team mernbers ... 
lncreased my 
Team's pool of tickets 
D 
Helping one of my team members ... 
Decreased my 
Team's pool of tickets 
O 
Decreased the number of 
Tickets I received 
a 
Decreased my 
Team's pool of tickets 
il 
lncreased the number Decreased the number Had no effect on the number 
of tickets I received of Tickets I received of tickets 1 received 
0 - O 13 
Was constant 
Across questions 
Had no effect on my 
Tearn's pool of tickets 
G 
Had no effect on the number of 
Tickets I received 
O 
Had no effect on my 
Team's pool of tickets 
n 
Had an uncertain effect on the 
number of tickets I received 
0 
Appendix L (continued) 
Document entitled LLFollow-up questions9' 
IP condition 
Follow-up questions 
in which program are you currently involved at University of Waterloo? 
a r t s  Accounting m a t h  Accounting CS c ience Accounting 
a r t s  Business mther. Which one 
O ln what year were you bom? 
Are you male or fernale? Eh4 ale. ff emale. 
0 Most people in this country think of themselves as Canadian. However, in addition, is there a particular nationality 
or ethnic group to which you think of yourself as belonging? 
CNo. m e s .  Which one? 
The following questions assess your understanding of the exercise. During the exercise: 
O The number of tickets per correct answer ... 
lncreased as 1 progressed Oecreased as l progressed Was constant 
Through the questions Through the questions Across questions 
O n !zl 
O Answering one of the questions from my Iist ... 
lncreased the nurnber of Decreased the number of Had no effect on the number of 
tickets l received Eckets I received Tickets I received 
O O !J 
0 Helping one of rny team members ... 
lncreased the number Decreased the number Had no effect on the number Had an uncertain effect on the 
of tickets I received of Tickets l received of tickets I received number of tickets I received 
17 il a cl 
Defining your 'team's pool of tickets" as the total number of tickets accumulated by your tearn, please answer the 
following questions: 
O Answering one of the questions frorn my Iist ... 
lncreased my Decreased my 
Team's pool of tickets Team's pool of tickets 
O Helping one of my team mernbers.. . 
Increased my 
Tearn's pool of tickets 
0 
Oecreased rny 
Team's pool of tickets 
n 
Had no effect on my 
Team's pool of tickets 
G 
Had no effect on my 
Tearn's pool of tickets 
O 
Appendix L (continued) 
Document entitled L6FoIlow-up questionsn / RP condition 
Follow-up questions 
In which program are you currentiy involved ai University of Waterloo? 
Wrts Accounting CMath Acwunting S c ience Accounting 
EArts Business Cûther. Which one 
In what year were you bom? 
Are you male or female? CM ale. OF emale. 
Most people in this country think of thernselves as Canadian. However. in addition, is there a particular nationality 
or ethnic group to which you think of yourself as belonging? 
040. GY es. Which one? 
The following questions assess your understanding of the exercise. During the exercise: 
The number of tickets per correct answer ... 
lncreased as I progressed Decreased as I progressed through the 
Through the questions questions 
O O 
Answenng one of the questions from my list ... 
lncreased my Decreased my 
Team's pool of tickets Team's pool of tickets 
O El 
Answering one of the questions from my list ... 
lncreased rny chance Decreased my chance 
of being the team mernber that of being the team member that 
performed the best perfonned the best 
13 O 
Answering one of the questions from my list ... 
lncreased the number of Decreased the number of 
tickets I received Eckets I received 
n n 
Helping one of my team members ... 
lncreased my Decreased my 
Team's pool of tickets Team's-pool of tickets 
@ O 
Helping one of my team members.. . 
Increased my chance Decreased my chance 
of being the tearn member that of being the team member that 
performed the best performed the best 
Helping one of my team members.. . 
lncreased the number Decreased the number M d  no effect on the number 
of tickets 1 received of Tickets 1 received of tickets I received 




Had no effect on my 
Team's pool of tickets 
3 
Had no effect of my chance 
of being the team member that 
performed the best 
O 
Had no effect on the number of 
Tickets I received 
c 
Had no effect on rny 
Team's pool of tickets 
17 
Had no effect of my chance 
of being the teâm member that 
perfomed the best 
CI 
Had an uncertain effect on the 
number of tickets 1 received 
O 
Appendix M 
Questions on Personal Abilities 
This is Vie last part of Marie-Josee Ledoux's experirnent On a sale from O to 1 O, where 10 is as good as it can be 
and O is as bad as it can be, pfease place an X on the scale to indicate your answer. As always, the results will rernain 
confiden tial. 
How would you evaluate your ability to add numbers quickly? 
As bzd as 
It can be 
As good as 
it c m  be 
O How would you evaluate your cornputer skiils? 
As bad as 
It can be 
As good as 
it can be 
